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1. 
PREFACE. 
This study is concerned with a special problem of 
inequality which arises from the different fiscal capacities of 
local units of government in a politically decentralised system 
of government. In so far as the tax bases of the local govern- 
mental units are different there arises unequal treatment of equals 
residing in areas of different taxable capacity. The attempt to 
solve this problem through the operation of a differential grant 
system is an example of a particular application of the general 
principle of "the equal treatment of equals" .1 
Government grants bulk large in the finances of local 
authorities in this country. At the present time more than fifty 
per cent of local authority income is derived from grants -in -aid 
and an increasing proportion of such grants has taken the form of 
"block grants" distributed on some basis which has regard to the 
different tax bases and needs of the local authorities. Comparatively 
little has as yet been done by economists to apply economic 
analysis to the evaluation of the success of this policy. While 
the literature of public finance includes many excellent books 
on the system of government grants these rave been mainly of 
an administrative or descriptive character and there has been 
little attempt to apply analytical methods to the interpretation of 
grant / - 
1. Equal treatment of equals can, of course, only be true in some 
broad sense. Individual compensation is here, as in all 
public activities financed by taxation, an impossibility. 
See Kjeld Philip, Inter -governmental Fiscal Relations, 
Institute of Economics and History, Copenhagen 1954, P.127. 
ii. 
grant systems . If this is true, in general, for England and Wales 
it is even more so fcr Scotland where there has been a dearth of 
literature on the subject of equalisation grants .1 
The study has in effect three objects. The first object 
is to discuss the general principles of different forms of equalisation 
grants and to provide formulae for achieving equalisation according 
to different concepts of equalisation. The second is to demonstrate 
the application of these principles and concepts in the various attempts 
at equalisation in Scotland, particularly in the Exchequer Equalisation 
Grant and the General Grant. In making this investigation I have 
been mindful of the remarks of J.R. and Mrs. Ursula Hicks who, 
writing in 1944 in their book, The Incidence of Local Rates in Great 
Britain, said 
"Her distinctive institutions naturally tempt the student 
of E n g lish local governrre nt to leave Scotland as a 
terra incognita; but since we share the same central 
government with the Scots, the student of English 
public finance is negligent if he does not investigate. 
It is extremely important that the institutions of 
England and of Scotland should be continually com- 
pared, and translated into one another's terms; other- 
wise their common finan es can hardly be conducted 
with justice to each". 
Wherever possible, therefore, the institutions of both countries and 
their / - 
1. This has to some extent been rectified recently. See C.S. Page, 
Local Finance in Scotland, Section B., Non Specific Grants, 
Wm. Hodge & Co., Ltd., 1962. 
their different practice in relation to Equalisation Grants has been 
compared. The third object is to provide statistical data on the 
operation of the Exchequer Equalisation Grant and General Grant 
in Scotland in an attempt to evaluate the success of the policy of 
equalisation. 
The work is divided into two parts. Part I discusses 
the principles of equalisation grant s and describes the history of 
equalisation in this country. Part II consists of an empirical 
investigation into the operation of the Exchequer Equalisation 
Grant and the General Grant in Scotland. Ch.I contains a dis- 
cussion of possible interpretations of what is meant by equalis- 
ation and provides in generalised mathematical terms formulae for 
achieving equalisation for different concepts of equalisation. In 
subsequent chapters these formulae are used as an interpretative 
device for analysing the nature of the different approaches to 
equalisation which have been attempted in Scotland, England and 
Wales. Ch. II consists of a brief description of the framework of 
local government and the nature of its tax base, viz., rateable value, 
an understanding of which is necessary fcr the later dis cussion of 
the history of equalisation (Ch. III), the Exchequer Equalisation 
Grant (Ch. Iv) and the General Grant (Ch. V.) . The empirical 
investigation is contained in Chs. VI - IX. Ch.IX discusses the 
vexed question of the extent to which rateable value is an indicator 
of the "ability to pay" of the different areas and consequently the 
extent to which it should be used in an equalisation grant fOE mula. 
The conclusion is reached that it is an unreliable indicator but that 
there is no alternative indicator which is more reliable. With a tax 
system such as the rating system where the tax paid is not related to 
the / - 
iv. 
the income of the taxpayer it is not possible to evolve a grant system 
whereby any particularly meaningful form of equalisation can be achieved. 
Certain policy conclusions follow from this if equalisation is considered 
to be a desired objective. Either the tax base of local authorities requires 
to be altered to one which is more closely related to the incomes of those 
subject to the local tax or the major functions of local authorities which 
are of a national character such as education should be transferred to or 
wholly financed by the central government. Given tip present climate of 
opinion in this country it is unlikely that any alternative tax system such 
as a local income tax would be acceptable. The solution therefore lies 
in a re- examination and re- definition of the functions of local ail horities. 
While it has not been possible to provide a ready made 
solution within the present framework it is hoped that many of the points 
brought out in this thesis are capable of application to a system where 
the tax base is related to income as, for example, in Sweden. Others 
again may see possibilities for applying the formulae as also some of 
the findings of the investigation to the study of international grants -in- 
aid. 
Acknowledgements are due to Mrs. Hicks and D.N. Chester 
since it was the reading of their works which first stimulated my desire 
to undertake some research into the relationship between lcc al finance 
and national finance. I am also indebted to the officials of the Central 
Department who supplied me with much detailed information including the 
Exchequer Equalisation and General Grant calculations for all the local 
authorities in Scotland, to the Scottish Branch of the Institute of 
Municipal Treasurers artd Accountants and the Association of County 
Treasurers / - 
V. 
Treasurers for giving my questionnaire to the Scottish Counties and 
Large Burghs official backing. The greater part of this thesis was 
completed while I was employed by Midlothian County Council. My 
thanks are therefore due to this body and in particular to the County 
Clerk (Mr. James McBoyle, C.B.E,) and the County Treasurer 
(Mr. Jarre s B. Hutcheson) who gave me every encouragement and 
provided me with many facilities for undertaking this investigation. 
This was but one example of the generally enlightened attitude to 
study which characterised this authority. Thanks are also due to 
Mr. G.B. Esslemont, C.B.E., City Chamberlain, Glasgow, who 
read and gave me the benefit of his views on certain chapters. 
Finally I am irdebted to my supervisor, Professor 
Alan T. Peacock, formerly Professor of Economic Science, University 
of Edinburgh and now Professor of Economics, University of York, not 
only for suggesting the specific subject of enquiry but also for the 
much wider appreciation of the nature of the problem which I gained 
in the course of many discussions with him. Not the least of tl e 
benefits which I have obtained in the course of this study has been 
the broadening of my knowledge of economics through contact with 
Professor Peacock, the members of his staff and my fellow post- 
graduate students at Edinburgh. 
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THE PROBLEM OF EQUALISATION AND FORMULAE FOR ACHIEVING 
THE DIFFERENT CONCEPTS OF EQUALISATION. 
1. The Problem of Equalisation. 
This study is concerned with a problem in public finance which 
emerges in a de- centralised political system, viz. , that of the different 
fiscal capacities of the local units of government to provide services - 
a situation which is aggravated where the local units of government are 
responsible for the provision of services of a national or semi -national 
character which have large spillover effects such as education. If the 
local units of government were miniature economic replicas of the larger 
national economy this problem would not arise but we know that in real 
life this is never so. Certain geographical areas which form the bases 
of the local units of government are inhabited by relatively high income 
receivers while others again comprise relatively low income groups. 
Consequently the areas of low income are inhibited in their efforts to 
provide an adequate standard of service. Apart from the effects of 
differences in income there are, in addition, certain natural conditions 
present in the areas of some authorities, e.g. , sparsity, which make the 
provision of services such as education more expensive to provide. This 
problem has been the subject of a fair amount of discussion by writers on 
public finance although mainly in relation to the situation between states 
and the federal government in a federal country; but the principles are 
equally / - 
equally applicable to the relationship between local authorities and 
the central government such as subsists in this country. 
Certain writers see the solution to this dilemma to lie in the transfer 
of the major functions to the central government. This of course is to 
destroy the very system which it may be desired to preserve and thus 
while I would not deny the cogency of some of the arguments in favour 
of the transfer of certain functions to the central authority, primarily 
we shall be looking elsewhere for our solution. 
A way of solving this problem within the framework of a de- 
centralised political system is for the central authority to tax the areas 
of high income and to transfer the surplus to the areas of low income. 
This adjustment is generally made via the grant system. 1 Even if it 
were not thought necessary to pay grant to all authorities the doing of 
this makes the system politically more acceptable for it disguises the 
real nature of the operation which is essentially a taxing of the areas 
of hick income /low need and a subsidising of the areas of low income /high 
need. By paying grant to all it is as though we raised the income base 
of all in the first place and then proceeded to reduce that for those of 
high income and correspondingly increased it for those of low income. 
To the economist primarily interested in efficient resource allocation 
equalisation / - 
1. For another suggested method see J.M. Buchanan, "Federalism and 
Fiscal Equity", American Economic Review, Vol.XL (Sept.1950) , pp. 
583 -99 reprinted in Readings in the Economics of Taxation (Richard 
D. Irwin, Inc., 1959) pp. 93 -109. 
equalisation as an objective may be questioned. 1 A.D. Scott has 
contended that equalisation grants are resource distorting in that they 
result in the subsidising of the less economic areas of a country and 
this may tend to prevent the movement of factors of production to 
other areas in which they could be more productively employed and 
which would result in a greater total gain to the nation. J.M.Buchanan 
on the other hand has endeavoured to show that equalisation grants 
may be resource correcting rather than resource distorting. Interesting 
and indeed important as this discussion is, it is not primarily the 
subject of this study. Our objectives have been set out for us by a 
policy which aims at equalisation. 
Discussion of equalisation requires that we define our concepts 
of equalisation. Apart from any conceptual difficulties as to whether 
equalisation in the broader and all- embracing sense is particularly 
meaningful, equalisation in the narrower sense may be directed towards 
different aims. It is perhaps as well to dispose of what is regarded as 
the less sensible interpretations of equalisation having regard to the 
whole raison d'etre of a politically decentralised system of government. 
An / - 
1. A.D. Scott, "A Note on Grants in Federal Countries" - Economica 
Vol. XVII (Nov. 1950) . 
J.M. Buchanan, "Federalism and Fiscal Equity" - American Economic 
Review Vol. XL (Sept. 1950) . 
J.M. Buchanan, "Federal Grants and Resource Allocation" - Journal 
of Political Economy Vol. LX (June 1952) . 
A.D. Scott, "Federal Grants and Resource Allocation -A Reply" - 
Journal of Political Economy Vol. LX (Dec. 1952) . 
J.M. Buchanan, "Federal Grants and Resource Allocation - A Reply" - 
Journal of Political Economy Vol. LX (Dec. 1952) . 
An equalisation plan whereby the central government sought to 
equalise the per capita expenditures of the local units of government 
would not be acceptable because equal expenditures do not represent 
equal performance levels but also because such a plan would offend 
against the principle of freedom of action on the part of the local units. 
For the same reason a plan which aimed at an equalisation of performance 
levels may also be discarded. 1 An equalisation of tax rates is also 
not a reasonable objective of an equalisation scheme for unless equal 
tax rates represent equal tax burdens and equal benefits there is no 
2 justification for tax rates being equal. It is also considered that 
an equalisation of standards of service is not possible within the frame - 
work of a de- centralised political system. Indeed it is this freedom on 
the part of the local inhabitants of the various areas to choose within 
limits the different standards of public services which they will enjoy 
and consequently the different tax rates which they will need to impose 
which forms one of the desirable attributes of such a system.3 If 
equalisation of standards of performance is the objective, central finance 
must take the place of local finance .4 
1. For plans which aim at these approaches to equalisation see 
R.A. Musgrave, "Approaches to a Fiscal Theory of Political 
Federalism" , Public Finances: Needs, Sources and Utilization, 
(National Bureau of Economic Research) , Princeton University 
Press, 1961. 
2. Kjeld Philip, Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations, Institute of Economics 
and History, 1954, pp. 126 -130. 
3. Chas. M. Tiebout, "A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures", Journal of 
Political Economy, Vol.LIV (October 1956), pp. 416 -424. 
4. R.A. Musgrave, op. cit. 
5 
Indeed it may even be doubted whether given central finance, a high 
degree of equalisation of services for all areas may be pursued as an 
objective of public policy without so seriously conflicting with other 
important economic aims of the nation as to render it impracticable. 
For example, would it ever be possible even for the central government 
to provide educational facilities in the Crofting Counties of Scotland 
comparable to the facilities possible in a capital city such as Edinburgh 
or in a large industrial city like Glasgow? It has been thought wise 
to dispose of what may be regarded as the less meaningful approaches 
to equalisation for in my view much of the discussion on equalisation 
in this country has suffered from a lack of precision in defining at the 
outset the proper concepts of equalisation and it is not unknown for 
almost all of the foregoing approaches to be at one time or another 
implicitly included as objectives in such discussion. 
We pass now to what may be regarded as the more meaningful 
concepts of equalisation within a politically de- centralised system. 
The first of these is where the central authority seeks to give each authority 
the same per capita tax potential so that each is provided with the same 
ability to incur expenditure if it wishes to avail itself of it. This scheme 
may be carried a stage further by having regard also to the differing needs 
of authorities thus giving each the same tax potential in relation to its 
needs. The other approach is where the object is to provide each authority 
with the fiscal capacity or means to provide a certain standard of service 
according to some centrally set level of performance and to give each the 
means whether in fact it chooses to make use of it in the provision of 
public services or not. 
It / - 
- 6 
It is now proposed to provide in mathematical terms formulae 
for achieving these objectives. Sine this study is concerned with 
the achieving of equalisation via a grant system these plans are 
expressed in terms which provide for a contribution being made by the 
central authority but at the same time the opportunity is taken of 
relating these plans to those of Musgrave which are of a purely 
redistributional character and involve no contribution from the 
central fisc.1 Since regard must be had to the overall fiscal 
position taking central and local taxes together it is obvious that 
ideally equalisation schemes should take account of the nature of 
the tax structure of the central fisc, e.g., whether it is progressive 
or proportional and also that of the local tax structure and the 
objective of the overall tax system. Initially it is assumed that the 
central tax and local tax systems are both proportional and that the aim 
is an overall proportional system. It is also assumed that the tax base 
may be defined as private income in the area of the authority. The 
following symbols are used: - 
1. R.A. Musgrave, op.cit for a full discussion of the concepts 
of equalisation and plans for achieving these on a purely 
redistributional basis. See however the present writer's 





N. = index of need in i th authority 
1 
t. = tax rate in i th authority 
i 
t = tax ( +) or subsidy ( -) rate of central government required to 
c clear the central budget 
- 7 
number of states or local authorities 
per capita subsidy (+ or -) received by the i th authority in £s 
per capita outlay by the i th authority in £s 
t 
s 
- a standard rate 
B. = per capita tax base of i th authority 
1 
m = minimum outlay per unit of need 
p, = population of i th authority 
1 
Use of bars indicates weighted averages, e.g. 
B 
Bapa + Bbpb + Bnpn 
Pa + p + p a b n 
= Z.ii(Bipi) 
ipi 
2. An Equalisation of Fiscal Potential. 
The object is to provide each authority with the same per capita 
tax potential so that each authority may raise the same revenue and thus 
incur the same expenditure per head by levying the same tax rates. 
Assume 3 authorities 1, 2, and 3 out of a larger number of 
authorities. 
Assume - 
Al = £20; A2 = £20; A3 = £20 
B1 = £98; B2 = £119; B3 = £168 
B == £140 
The definitional equation is A, = B,lti + S. 
i i 
In the absence of any subsidy their tax rates would be - 
Al = 20 = 4s. Od; A2 = 20 = 3s. 4d; 
Bl 98 B2 119 
A3 = 20 = 2s. 5d. 
B3 168 
A per capita subsidy based on the following formula is paid - 




= Ai the formula may be alternatively stated - 
S, = (B - 
Bi 
i) ti ... ... ... ... (la) 
i 
9 
The subsidies are therefore - 
S1 = (140 - 98) x 20 = ;-£6 
140 
S2 (140 - 119) x 20 = +£3 
140 
S3 = (140 - 168) x 20 = -£4 
140 




























£20 + 4 
B 3 168 
Such a formula, therefore, enables all authorities to incur the same 
per capita expenditure by levying the same tax rate. If one authority spends 
more than another its tax rate will be proportionately higher. It is this 
property of the Exchequer Equalisation Grant which has been described as 
"proportionality" of rate poundages, i.e. , the rate poundages of receivers 
vary in direct proportion to their expenditure per head of population. 
It will be seen from the subsidy formula 
Si = (B - Bi) x i 
. . . . . . . . . (1) 
B 
that the rate of change of S. with respect to A. is as follows - 
dS, 




The / - 
B 
10 
The partial derivative is positive when B > B, and negative when 
1 
B < B.,. Therefore, in the case of an authority whose tax base is less 
than the average tax base, an increase in its per capita expenditure increases 
its subsidy. In the case of an authority whose tax base is above the average, 
an increase in its per capita expenditure reduces its subsidy (or rather increases 
the tax imposed on it) . 
This may be looked at in another way. 
The subsidy - 
s, = 
i 
(B - B ) x Ai 
i 
B 
may be alternatively stated - 





in which case it is seen to be a proportion (or percentage) of the expenditure. 
If the per capita tax base is greater than the average per capita tax base 
the percentage will be negative in sign. In the examples quoted above the 
percentages for authorities 1, 2, and 3 are 30 %, 15 %, and -20 %. Thus for 
every increase of, say, £10 in their per capita expenditures authorities 1 and 
2 would get an additional subsidy of £3 and £1. 10 /- respectively, while 
authority 3 would require to pay out another £2 by way of a tax. It is this 
property which has caused the Exchequer Equalisation Grant to be described 
as a percentage grant, each authority's percentage being uniquely determined 
by the ratio of (1) the difference between its tax base and the average tax base, 
and (2) the average tax base. 
Thus / - 
- 11 
Thus the system described above, if applied without modification, 
would have an extremely disincentive effect on above -average base 
authorities increasing their expenditure. This objection may be met by 
applying the formula only to those authorities whose tax base is less than 
average, no adjustment being made to those with above average per capita 
tax base. As will be seen, this is what is done in the case of the English 
Exchequer Equalisation Grant or Rate Deficiency fixant. It is possible to 
vary the formula by fixing a datum line other than the average per capita 
tax base as the desired minimum up to which per capita tax bases should 
be raised. This is what is done in the case of the Scottish Exchequer Equalisation 
Grant. 
In Musgrave's redistributional scheme the subsidies to the receiving 
authorities are obtained by taxing the non -receiving authorities, no contri- 
bution being made by the central authority. The scheme must, therefore, 
meet the condition - 
2i(pi Si) = O 
From formula (1) Si = (B - B,) x Al it is seen that each 
authority's subsidy is a function of its own expenditure; hence the sum 
of the subsidies of all authorities will not necessarily equal zero. It 
may be either positive or negative. In ceder to clear the central budget a 
central tax rate, which may be either + or - is, therefore, applied to the 
individual tax bases of the authorities . The formula is thus - 
- 12 - 
(B - B,) t, - Bt . . . . . . (2) 
i c 
3. An Equalisation of Fiscal Potential in Relation to Needs. 
1 
While the previous plan equalised fiscal potential it neglected the 
differing needs of authorities. 
The following plan endeavour s to equalise fiscal potential in relation 
to needs. 
As before, the definitional equation is - A, = B.t, + S, 
1 11 1 
A per capita subsidy is then paid based on the 
following formula 
S, _ (B - B ) t, + (N, - N )Bt. . . . . . . . . (3) 
1 i. i 1 1 
The first part of this equation is similar to formula (1) In the 
second part of the equation the difference in need is applied to the yield 
from the equalised tax base. Here again, to avoid the disincentive effects 
on above average base authorities, the formula may be applied only to below 
average base or below "datum line" authorities. 
In the redistributional scheme, again the condition must be met that - 
= 0 
The / - 
1. Plan 4. Richard A. Musgrave, op. cit. 
See also for a discussion of the distribution effects 
of the formula. 
- 13 - 
The central budget is, therefore, cleared by adding to formula (3) 
the term - B,t , thus providing the following formula - lc 
S. _ (B - B,) t. + (N, - N ) Bt, - B,t . . (4) 1 i i i i i i c 
In the foregoing plans the emphasis is on potential. Sin _ e it is 
potential which is being equalised, grant is paid to an authority only to 
the extent to which it wishes to avail itself of it by reason of its own tax 
effort. If it wishes to provide or expand the services, more grant is 
forthcoming. If it does not, then less grant is paid to it. It is obvious 
that for .a grant to achieve this type of equalisation the subsidy must be 
a function of the individual authority's expenditure and this is an essential 
feature of both of these formulae. 
It is important to appreciate the philosophy and political significance 
of this approach to equalisation. The idea behind this philosophy is that 
each authority should be provided with the ability in terms of tax potential 
to provide a necessary standard of service while leaving each free to 
determine its own level of activity, but that assistance will only be given 
to the extent to which each authority wishes to avail itself of it. In making 
allowances for need on the expenditure side the same principle is applied, 
viz. , that assistance is only provided to the extent to which the authority 
wishes to take advantage of it. If we consider the part of the formula - / 
1. Plan 6. Richard A. Musgrave, op. cit. 




(B - B,) t, + (N, - N) Bt, 
i i i i i 
dealing with need (N, - 14- Bt, , it is seen that the amount of subsidy 
earned by an authority where need is greater than average need is a 
function of the authority's own tax rate. Hence the greater its own 
tax effort is the greater will be the amount of grant received in respect 
of its need. The formula, therefore, is perfectly logical and consistent 
both in its equalisation of the resources side and the need or expenditure 
side, since it endeavours to put into effect a particular approach to the 
problem. 
4. Equalisation of Fiscal Capacity to Provide a Standard of Service 
According to a Centrally Set Level of Performance. 
We now pass to a fundamentally different approach to equalisation 
from that previously considered. Here the object is to provide each 
authority with the fiscal capacity or means to provide a certain standard 
of service according to a centrally set level of performance. The central 
authority decides what should be spent in respect of a particular service 
and then pays grant to the authorities to enable them to do so whether, 
in fact, the authority decides to spend it or not. Regard is had to the 
differing tax bases and needs of the authorities. Those authorities who 
spend exactly what the central authority has fixed as the 'standard 
expenditure' for the service will have equal tax rates. If, however, 
any authority chooses to spend in excess of this centrally set level of 
expenditure it must bear the full cost itself and conversely if it chooses 
to spend less, the full amount of the saving accrues to it. 
The / - 
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The definitional equation is - 
A. = BA. + S, 
1 ii 1 
A per capita subsidy based on the following formula is paid - 
= C + m(Ni N - ) + ts (B - Bi) . 
The first part of the equation is a constant (C) which must meet 




Thus the value of the constant is equal to the total grant paid by 
the central authority divided by the aggregate population of all authorities. 
The second part of the formula m(N. - Ñ ) is the minimum outlay necessary 
i 
to achieve a centrally set level of performance (m) applied to the difference 
between the authority's standard of need and the standard or average need. 
The third part of the formula is a standard or uniform rate applied to the 
difference between the per capita tax base and the average per capita 
tax base. 
The standard rate must be such that applied to the average tax base 
it will provide the required revenue for an authority of average base and need. 
If the total subsidy paid by the central authority is say 50 per cent of the 
standard expenditure then the formula must meet the condition that 
Example 
3 as follows - 
t 
s 
B = 2 m Ñ 
Assume a system which comprises 3 authorities 1, 2, and 
1 / - 
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1 2 3 Total 
Population (pi ) 10,000 20,000 30,000 60,000 
No. of pupils 2,000 3,000 3 , 000 8,000 
Ratio of pupils 
to population (Ni ) .2 .15 .1 .133 
Assume that the necessary minimum outlay per pupil as fixed by 
the central authority is £66 and that the aggregate grant paid is 50 per 
cent of the standard expenditure for education for the system - 
Standard Expenditure for system (8,000 x£66) = £528,000 
Grant (50 %) _ £264,000 
If we assume that the per capita tax bases of authorities 1, 2, and 3 
are the same we can drop the third part of the formula t 
s i 
(B - B) leaving for 
the moment 
Si = C + m (Ni - N ) 




The per capita subsidies will then be - 
Authority 1 
S1 = 4.4 + 66 (.2 - .133) = £8.822 
Authority 2 
S2 = 4.4 + 66 (.15 - .133) = £5.522 
Authority 3 / - 
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Authority 3. 
S3 = 4.4 + 66 (.1 - .133) _ £2.222 
Now if authorities 1, 2 and 3 were in fact to spend exactly the 
minimum outlay per unit of need their expenditures would be - 
1 2 3 
£132,000 £198,000 £198,000 
(2,000 x £66) (3,000 x £66) (3,000 x £66) 







to be met by 
authority £4.378 £4.378 £4.378 
The formula would therefore succeed in leaving each authority with 
the same per capita expenditures and since the authorities have the same 
tax bases they would be able to levy the same tax rates to meet the expenditure. 
Now supposing the authorities have different tax bases as follows - 
1 2 3 Total 
Tax Base £200,000 £580,000 £420,000 £1,200,000 
. Per Capita 
Tax Base 
The / - 
£20 £29 £14 £20 
Now t 
s 
B = 2 m N 
20t = 66 x .133 
s 
t = 66 x .133 
s 
2 x 20 
= .219 
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The adjustment in respect 
will be - 
Authority 1 
of the third part of the formula t 
s 
(B - B,) 
i 
= .219 (20 - 20) = 0 S1 = ts(B - Bi) 
Authority 2 
S2 = ts(B - B2) = .219 (20 - 29) = - £1.971 
Authority 3 
S3 = ts(B - B3) = .219 (20 - 14) = £1.314 
Then 
1 2 3 
Net Expenditure 
(see previous page) 
£4.378 £4.378 £4.378 
Subsidy adjustment in respect 
of different tax bases - +1.971 -1.314 
£4.378 £6.349 £3.064 
Per Capita Tax Base £20 £29 £14 
. Tax Rate required £.2189 £.2189 £.2189 
For the purely redistributional scheme, since there is no grant payable, 
it is necessary that t 
s 
B = mmg. . To obtain the formula for the redistributional 
scheme all that is necessary is to drop the constant (C) from formula (5) , thus 
giving the following formula - 
S. = m(N, - N ) + t (B - B.) . . . . . . (6) i i s i 
Since / - 
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Since the sum of the individual per capita measures of need for the 
total of the populations of all the authorities equals the sum of the average 
or standard need for the whole population of all authorities1 the sum of the 
(Ni - N)s equals zero. Similarly the sum of the (B - Bi)s equals zero. 
It therefore follows that 
i(piSi) = o 
It will be noted that no further adjustment is necessary to clear the 
central budget. This arises because the subsidy formula is not a function 
of the individual authorities' expenditures, the gains and losses being 
related to arbitrary sums, e.g. , m and t 
s 
. In formula (4) (the equalisation 
of fiscal potential in relation to need) a term to clear the central budget is 
required since the gains and losses in the formula are related to the authority's 
own tax rates (t.) which are functions of the individual authorities' i 
expenditures. 
5. Comparative Merits of Different Approaches to Equalisation. 
Each of these approaches to equalisation is equally tenable depending 
upon / 




I N.p,) = 
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upon one's political outlook, or one's particular set of value judgments. It 
will be seen in the course of this study that the first approach viz. an 
equalisation of fiscal potenial in relation to needs is one which has 
apparently appealed to the Labour party in this country while the second 
approach viz, an equalisation of fiscal capacity to provide a standard of 
service according to some centrally set level of performance is one which 
has appealed to the Conservative party. My task however is primarily 
that of exposition and analysis and in discussing the disadvantages of 
either type of Grant it is not my intention to make value judgments but 
merely to direct attention to features which it is essential to recognise. 
It has been seen that the grant in formula (1) may be looked at 
as a particular type of percentage grant, each authority's percentage being 
uniquely determined by the ratio of (1) its deficiency in per capita tax base 
from the average or "datum" tax base to (2) the average or "datum" tax base. 
Formula (3) although somewhat more complicated has similar features which 
render it a type of percentage grant. Such a grant may, therefore, be 
objected to on the grounds of its substitution effects. It could result in 
receivers of the grant (particularly if they enjoy high percentage rates of 
grant) being tempted to take more of their satisfactions through the public 
sector than they would otherwise have done if they had had average tax 
potential in their own right and thus did not qualify for subsidy. This 
seems of some importance when we consider that in this country the 
dividing line between public and private provision of certain services is 
narrow, / - 
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narrow, e.g. Education anos Housing l . It would seem then that this type 
of grant will in respect of "receiving authorities" lead to an expansion of 
the public services provided by these authorities. In addition in so far 
as it operates as a particular kind of percentage grant the Central 
Government cannot control the amount of its expendittr e in the provision 
of the subsidy. In the terminology of Mrs. Hicks it is "open- ended" . 
The second type of grant while free from these defects has 
other disadvantages. Musgrave has drawn attention2 to the fact that the 
equivalent re- distributional formula gives rise to the fact that some states 
are called upon to contribute to the services of others which, while needy, 
refuse to make an adequate effort of their own. While the position is not 
quite analagous for the pure subsidy formula, in the system as applied in 
this country whereby the total grant to be distributed is related to certain 
aggregate local authority expenditures a somewhat similar disadvantage is 
present. For an exemplication of this we require to wait until Ch.V where 
we deal with the General Grant. 
6. On the Possibility of An Equalisation Grant Formula based on 
Regression Analysis. 
Some work done by Solomon Fabricant on the factors associated 
with differences in the per capita expenditures of the State and local 
governments in the 48 states (as they then were) in the United States in 
1942 suggested interesting possibilities for the use of regression analysis 
in devising an equalisation grant formula. 
1. For a different view see Local Expenditure and Exchequer Grants, 
I . M . T .A . Research Study, 1956. 
2. R.A. Musgrave, op.cit. p.111. 
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He tested the relationship between differences in the per capita expenditures 
of the State and local governments with the three factors of income, 
urbanization and density' which previous research in this field has pointed 
to as being the most important factors associated with differences in per 
capita expenditures. 
He expressed the relationships in the form of regression equations 
for each of the main services, e.g. Education, Health, etc. , his equation 
for total per capita expenditures being - 
E = 3.3 + .0822 I + .1271 U - .0396D 
where 
E = per capita state and local government expenditure in dollars. 
I = per capita personal dollar income in a state. 
U = an urbanization measure. 
D = density, population per square mile. 
In attempting to devise an equalisation grant formula the approach 
was as follows. The object of the equalisation grant is (1) to Ica ke allowances 
for those differences in expenditure which are due to factors outwith the 
control of authorities, e.g. sparsity, and (2) to make allowances for 
differences in the relative incomes of the inhabitants of the areas of the 
different local authorities. It is also desired that the formula should 
be free from the substitution effects present in the first concept of 
equalisation. 
1. S. Fabricant, Trend of Government Activity 1900 - 1950 - National 
Bureau of Economic Research, 1952 - the chapter on "Interstate 
differences in Activity". 
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equalisation. If then we could determine the factors which cause 
differing expenditures and measure the extent to which these factors 
are associated with differing expenditures per head we might construct 
a formula for distributing grant which would make allowances on the 
expenditure side for those differences in per capita expenditures due 
to ext ernal factors outwith the control of the authorities and at the 
same time would equalise per capita incomes or rather that part of 
per capita incomes which is devoted to the public services. 
The flaw in this approach may be already apparent to the reader 
bat it is considered worthwhile pursuing this line of thought since it is 
evident that there are other investigators of equalisation grants who 
believed this approach to be fruitful. 
1 
Now ignoring for the moment any problems of multicollinearity 
which might arise, supposing it were possible to do a regression analysis 
of per capita local authority expenditures in this country which would account 
for the major part of differences in expenditures and that the regression 
equation was - 
E = 2+.2I-t-.lx - .3y 
where / - 
1. J.B. Woodham, "General Grant or Poll Tax", Local Government Finance, 
August, 1961. 
See also Lawrence Boyle, "General Grant or Poll Tax", Local Government 
Finance, November, 1961. 
where 
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E = per capita local authority expenditure. 
I per capita personal income in £s in the area of the local 
authority. 
x = an independent factor not correlated with the other 
independent factors. 
y = an independent factor not correlated with the other 
independent factors. 
This equation may be interpreted as meaning that for every 
increase or decrease in per capita income of £1 (the factors of x and y 
being held constant) there is associated with it an increase or decrease 
in per capita expenditure of £.2 and for every increase of 1 unit of 
factor x (I and y held constant) there is an increase of £.1 in per capita 
expenditure and for an increase of 1 unit of y(I and x held constant) there 
is a decrease in per capita expenditure of £.3. Since this equation 
enables us to make the best estimate of the per capita expenditure of 
any authority we might pay grant in accordance with this formula in 
order to allow for differences in per capita expenditure in the different 
authorities, adjusting the constant 2 to such a figure as would result in 
the total grant available being distributed. 
If grant were paid in accordance with the above formula, 
however, it would mean that we would be paying grant to an authority 
whose expenditure was higher because inter alia the incomes in the 
area were higher and this is precisely what we do not want to do. 
Since / - 
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Since we are attempting to equalise incomes (or that part of personal 
incomes devoted to local authority expenditure) we wish to neutralise 
the effect of different incomes on expenditure. If we reverse the 
sign of the co- efficient of I, this will have the desired effect since 
we will be giving the grant the same rate of change with respect to 
incomes as the expenditure rate of change with respect to incomes 
but these will be operating in opposite directions. 
Our formula therefore becomes - 
Si = C + .lx - .3y - .2I .. 
where the value of C is determined by the total amount 
of grant to be distributed. 
It remains for me to relate the above formula to one of 
those already provided. It was said that one of the objects of this 
plan was that it should be free from the substitution effects present 
in the first concept of equalisation (the equalisation of potential) 
and it is therefore to be expected that any similarity it will have to 
previous plans provided will be to the second concept of equalisation 
(an equalisation of fiscal capacity to provide a centrally set level of 
performance) . For purposes of exposition it will be simpler if we assume 
that the aggregate grant to be distributed is nil. 
The / - 
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Zi(piSf) = 0 
. ijpiC +2 . lpix - . 3 piy - . 2 pili = 0 
. . Zi (piC) + 'i ( . lpix) - i ( . 3 piy) - Z'i ( . 2 piI) = 0 
.1.i 
i (px) 




- .2 ; i (piI ) = 
. 
321i (piY) 2 i (pi I ) 
+ 
Z'i (xpi ) 
x , (see page 7 ) 
iPi 
similarly for y and I 
. C = -.lx + .3y + .2r 
Substituting for C in formula (7) we obtain - 
Si = - .lx + .3y + .2I + .lx - .3y - .2I 
.1(x - x ) - .3(y - y ) + . 2 (I - I) 
0 
It will now be apparent that formula (7) is similar to formula (6) 
The important difference is that in formula (7) the measure of need is 
the factor associated with differences in per capita expenditures 
instead of an arbitrary measure determined by the central authority and 
the co- efficient applied to the measure of need is the rate of change of 
expenditure with respect to the independent factor instead of the "minimum 
outlay" per unit of need. Similarly instead of the per capita tax being 
equalised formula (7) would equalise per capita incomes . 1 
1. In Musgrave's plans this would be synonymous with the per capita 
tax base since he defines the tax base as private income in the state. 
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An attempt was therefore made to see if it were possible to express 
the relationship between the per capita expenditures of local 
authorities in Scotland and the main independent factors associated 
with these differences in per capita expenditure. The results of 
this investigation are given in Ch.VIII. 
Formulae have now been provided for achieving 
equalisation according to the different concepts of equalisation. 
In future chapters we shall study the attempts which have been 
made to achieve equalisation in this country and translate these 
attempts into terms of the foregoing formulae thereby throwing some 
light on nature of the different approaches to equalisation. 
- 28 - 
CHAPTER II. 
LOCAL AUTHORITIES AND THE NATURE OF THEIR LOCAL TAX BASE. 
1. Introduction. 
Before we can study the attempts to achieve equalisation within 
the local government system it is necessary first to describe the framework 
of local government in England and Scotland and to examine the nature of 
the tax base of local authorities. The constitution and functions of local 
authorities have changed considerably over the years since the end of the 
last century and although the historical survey of equalisation will begin 
at the turn of the century it is proposed to deal only with the framework 
of local government as it exists to -day in so far as this is necessary to 
a clear understanding of the operation of the Exchequer Equalisation Grant 
and the General Grant in both countries. 
2. Framework of Local Government. 
In England the main local authorities consist of county councils, 
county borough councils , non -county borough councils and urban and rural 
district councils . The area over which a county council exercises control 
does not include any county boroughs situated within the geographical county, 
county boroughs being completely autonomous for local government purposes. 
The expenditure of a county council falls into two main classes, viz.: expenses 
for general county purposes and expenses for special county purposes. The 
expenditure to be treated as expenses for special county purposes depends on 
whether or not some of the borough or district councils in the county are 
autonomous for a service, which in the remainder of the county, is provided by 
the county council. 
Although / - 
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Although several local authorities may exercise local government functions 
in a particular area, only one authority has the right to levy rates in the area. 
Thus, in a non -county borough, services may be provided by the county council, 
the borough council, and possibly a joint board. Of these only the borough 
council has power to levy rates; the other authorities obtain their requirements 
by issuing precepts. Rates are levied by the borough council sufficient 
to produce the sums required by the precepting authorities as well as the 
amount necessary to meet their own expenditure. 
The rating authorities are county borough, borough, urban district and 
rural district councils. County Councils are not rating authorities. They 
raise money to meet their expenditure by issuing precepts on the borough and 
district councils in the county. County precepts are levied on the rating 
authorities in the county on the "poundage principle" , ie. , the precept 
requires the rating authority to levy, as a part of the general rates, a 
specified rate in the £ . 
In Scotland local authorities consist of county councils, large burghs, 
small burghs and district councils. The counties of cities (Edinburgh, 
Glasgow, Dundee and Aberdeen) are similar to the county boroughs being 
autonomous for local government purposes. The large burghs are similar 
to the non -county boroughs in England. They provide all services except 
Education, Valuation and in certain cases Police which are administered by 
the County Council throughout the area of the whole county. The small 
burghs are similar to the urban district councils. The area of the county 
outwith the large and small burghs is called the landward area of the 
county. The nearest approach to it in England is the area of the rural 
district councils. The difference is however that in Scotland there is no 
separate authority for the landward area, the County Council being 
responsible / - 
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responsible for the administration of the purely landward services. Thus 
as compared with its English counterpart a County Council in Scotland 
operates in a dual capacity. In the provision of general county services 
it acts like an English County Council and in relation to the landward 
services it performs the functions of a rural district council. 
The county Council precepts or requisitions (the word used 
in Scotland) the Burghs for their share of the general county expenditure. 
The term general county expenditure is not entirely synonymous with that 
of General County Expenses in England. Where there are large burghs 
in the County then the expenditure on Education, Valuation and (where 
applicable) Police would be the equivalent of General County Expenses since 
expenditure for these purposes is incurred by the Councy Council for the 
whole county and is chargeable to the large burghs, small burghs and 
landward areas. The remainder of the General County Services in such 
a case, i.e. those services other than Education, Valuation and Police 
would be equivalent to Special County Expenses since the large burghs 
are autonomous for these services. Thi s expenditure is met by the 
small burghs and the landward areas. In a county which had no large 
burghs but only small burghs the general county expenditure would be 
equivalent to general county expenses in England. 
The basis of requisitioning as provided by the Local Government 
(Scotland) Act 1947 was the rateable value of the various authorities for the 
preceding year. This of course was roughly analogous to precepting on 
the basis of rate poundage as in England except that no allowance was 
automatically made for losses on collection. This basis was altered 
to / - 
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to the Standard or Actual Rateable Value whichever is higher by the 
Local Government Financial Provisions (Scotland) Act 1954. 
As in England there is only one rating authority in each 
area. Counties of cities levy a rate in their area to meet their 
expenditure. Large and small burghs levy rates to meet their own 
expenditure plus their share of the county requisition. The county 
Council acting in its capacity of "rural district council" levies a 
county rate in the landward area to meet the expenditure on landward 
services plus the share of general county expenditure. 
District Councils are elected for parts of the landward 
area. They perform only minor functions and are similar to parish 
councils in England. They raise the money necessary to meet their 
net expenditure by requisitioning the county council who levy a 
district council rate within the area of the district council sufficient 
to meet the requisitions. 
Special districts are areas in the landward area of the 
county which are formed for the purposes of providing such services 
as lighting, sewerage, scavenging. Special District rates are levied 
by the County Council for the different services in each of these areas. 
3. The Rating System. / - 
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3. The Rating System. 
The only independent source of local taxation in the United 
Kingdom is derived from rates levied on the annual value of property and 
payable by the occupiers of the property. The tax base of local 
authorities is, therefore, rateable value. The current position in both 
Scotland and England is that the valuation of property is based on 
assessed values rather than on the actual rent being paid. 
A frequent criticism of the rating system is that unlike the 
national income tax it is not related to "ability to pay" 1 . It falls 
somewhat arbitrarily upon a certain class of the community, viz., 
occupiers, and within that class it tends to be regressive. Although 
neither arbitrariness nor regressiveness are necessarily objections to 
a tax it is for consideration as to whether it is possible to devise 
successfully an equalisation scheme to cope with a tax which has 
these characteristics. While under present conditions it is 
recognised that the amounts payable in rates are not related to 
individuals' incomes the original intention of the rating system appears 
to have been to operate as a proportional local income tax. 
The / - 
1. Royal Commission on Local Taxation, 1901. - 
Cmd.638 , Vol. XXIV, p.13. 
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The origins of the Scottish Rating system are to be found in an Act 
passed by the Scots Parliament in 1579 which made the provision for the 
poor of the parish a legal obligation. 1 Hitherto the provision for the poor 
had been made almost wholly by means of charitable contributions, e.g. , 
via the Church authorities. This act provided for the funds for poor 
relief being obtained by means of an assessment to be raised from 
"the whole inhabitants within the parish, according to the estimation 
of their substance, without exception of persons" . 
Difficulties in the application of this statute arose and in 1692 and 
1693 the Privy Council issued Proclamations indicating the method of 
assessment in landward parishes and burgh parishes respectively. The 
first of these proclamations directed that in landward parishes the assess- 
ment was to be made one half upon the heritors, i.e., the owners of 
property, and the other half upon the householders of the parish. The 
second proclamation commanded the Magistrates in burghs to raise the 
necessary funds for the poor in accordance with established usage in such 
a way "as may be effectual to reach all the inhabitants" . 
So far as landward parishes were concerned the heritors were 
assessed for one half of the assessment in respect of their lands and 
heritages within the parish whether they resided there or not. In the 
apportionment of the assessment between them, sometimes the valued 
or estimated rent was taken and sometimes the real rent. For the other 
half of the assessment the inhabitants were assessed according to their 
means and substance. In estimating means and substance there does not 
appear / - 
1. A history of the Rating System in Scotland is contained in the Final 
Report of the Royal Commission on Local Taxation (Scotland) , 
Cmd 1067, (1902) . See also Report of the Departmental Committee 
on Local Taxation in Scotland, Cmd 1674 (1922) . 
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appear to have been any uniform system; in some cases the rent of 
the subjects occupied was taken as the measure of their means and 
substance; in other cases an estimate was made of all property 
belonging to them other than land in respect of which the proprietor 
was liable as a heritor. In estimating the means and substance 
assessors might include stocks, shares, mortgages, ships, stock - 
in -trade and other items of personal property. Wages and salaries 
were also included, but incomes of small amount were frequently 
exempted. In the burghal parishes the method of assessment varied 
in different parishes. 
It is evident, therefore, that the underlying idea was to 
arrive at an estimate of each individual's income and wealth which 
might form a measure of his "ability to pay" . In the case of an owner 
of property obviously the best estimate was the income or rent which 
might be derived from his property while in the case of occupiers the 
alternative method of directly estimating their income or wealth was 
resorted to. This variety of method of assessment continued for many 
years and even in 1844 the Poor Law Commission contended that this 
variety in the methods for raising poor law assessments had considerable 
advantages, and reported that they were not prepared to recommend any 
alteration. The Poor Law Amendment Act of 1845, which followed upon 
the report of this commission accordingly sanctioned the continuance 
of these different methods of assessment. 
In course of time - particularly as a result of the 
industrial / - 
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industrial revolution - the inconvenience of assessing upon means and 
substance became intolerable. No machinery had been provided for 
ascertaining the incomes of the inhabitants, and the growing volume 
of personal property in stocks, shares, etc., combined with the 
increasing mobility of the population, rendered the task more difficult 
year by year. The system was, in consequence, gradually abandoned 
although it did not cease to exist until 1880. The parish in which the 
system continued until 1880 was Greenock which since 1845 had been 
assessing on means and substance. 
It is thus seen that "means and substance" of the ratepayer 
were an important consideration in the Scottish Rating system in the 
earlier part of the 19th century and continued to form the basis in some 
places as late as 1880. In this respect the Scottish Rating system 
differed from the English system where a method akin to the estimation 
of "means and substance" does not appear to have survived as long. 
The continuation of the Scottish practice of rating both owners and 
occupiers up until 1956 1 is a relic of the attempt to strike at the 
incomes of all residents within the local authority area. 
In England the original statute of 1601 provided for 
every inhabitant and occupier being liable to be charged and although 
the liability of the inhabitant to be rated in respect of personal property 
was early established, the difficulty of ascertaining the value of 
personal property made it an almost universal practice not to rate 
personal / - 
1. Valuation and Rating (Scotland) Act, 1956. 
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personal property at all or at most only such as consisted of stock -in- 
tradel. Nevertheless, in 1796 an attorney was rated for his professional 
fees, and it was stated to have been the practice for more than sixty years 
to rate such fees but the Court quashed the rate2. In 1840 the Poor Rate 
Exemption Act exempted inhabitants as such from liability to rates and 
occupation of property became the criterion for liability to charge. It 
is seen, therefore, that expediency and administrative convenience 
rather than considerations of principle have resulted in rates becoming 
as they are to -day regressive. 
The importance of the foregoing history in relation to this 
study lies in the fact that it indicates that initially the object of the 
rating system was to provide a proportional system of local taxation and 
that eventually the measure of the income of the ratepayer became the 
rateable value of the property occupied. If the valuation of the 
property occupied is a reliable indicator of the income of the ratepayer 
then it is a comparatively simple matter to devise equalisation schemes 
in accordance with the formulae provided in Chapter I and it would 
appear to be largely on this assumption that schemes of equalisation in 
this country have been devised. Discussion of the extent to which 
rateable value is a measure of income is however reserved until Chapter IX. 
1. Ryde on Rating , Butterworth & Company, 4th Edition, 1920. 
2. "R v. Startifant" , 7 T .R.60. 
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4. Valuation of Houses. 
Before completing this discussion of the Rating system it 
is necessary to mention briefly the different methods of valuing dwelling 
houses which obtained in England and Scotland. The history of the 
valuation of houses in England has already been adequately dealt with 
elsewherel. It suffices, therefore, to deal only with the salient 
features of the system. The Parochial Assessments Act, 1836, defined, 
for England, the standard by which the value of properties should be 
determined, viz. , the rent at which the property might reasonably be 
expected to let from year to year, free of all usual tenants' rates and 
taxes and deducting therefrom the probable average annual cost of 
the repairs, insurance and other expenses, if any, necessary to maintain 
them in a state to command such rent. While the 1836 Act prescribed a 
standard of value for assessing property it did not provide for the 
necessary machinery to secure the uniformity which had been prescribed. 
At the time of the Act there existed a serious degree of undervaluation 
throughout the country, some parishes not having been revalued for over 
100 years. If local authorities were completely independent of one another 
undervaluation, provided it was uniform throughout the whole area, would 
not present a problem. It is because inter -authority financial adjustments 
are frequently made on the basis of the valuations of their areas that it 
is desirable that uniformity of valuation should obtain throughout all 
authorities. A local authority by assessing property values below the 
full / - 
1. J.R. and Mrs. Ursula Hicks, The Problem of Valuation for Rating, 
National Institute of Economic and Social Research, 1944. 
The Rating of Dwellings - History and General Survey , I . M . T .A. 
Research Study 1958. 
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full value may frequently shift part of the tax burden on to residents 
in other areas'. The two -tier system of local government in this 
country makes the opportunities for such tax shifting even greater 
in that the expenditure of the higher tiered authority is assessed on 
the lower tiered authorities on the basis of their valuations. This 
inequality in valuations continued until finally in 19482 provision 
was made for the necessary machinery to effect uniformity of 
valuation by transferring responsibility for valuation from the rating 
authorities to the central government. The Act provided that for 
purposes of ascertaining values, dwelling houses would fall into 
two main divisions, (a) post 1918 houses and (b) other houses. 
The justification for the distinction between post -1918 and other 
houses arose from the Government's conclusion that the rental 
evidence for post -1918 houses was inadequate and as an alternative 
it was considered expedient to formulate a system of valuation 
based on hypothetical costs. As regards all other houses, 
sufficient rental evidence was assumed to be available but it 
was decided to relate the assessment to the level of rents prevailing 
as at 31st August 1939. The first valuation lists under the 1948 Act 
were to operate as from 1st April 1952. This system in fact was 
never put into effect and a change of Government in October 1951 
brought about a reconsideration of the whole basis. 
The Valuation for Rating Act, 1953, provided for the 
assessment of all dwelling houses being made on 1939 rental values. 
The date for the new valuation li sts originally proposed for 1952 was 
extended / - 
1. See James M. Buchanan, The Public Finances, p.454, Richard D. Irwin, 
Inc., 1960. 
2. The Local Government Act, 1948. 
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extended until 1956. The next revaluation originally scheduled for 1961 
was postponed until 1963 at which date valuations are to be based on 
current rental levels. 
In the case of Scotland, Section VI of the Lands Valuation 
(Scotland) Act of 1854 provided that the annual value of lands and heritages 
"shall be taken to be the rent at which, one year with another, such lands 
and heritages might in their actual state be reasonably expected to let 
from year to year" and required the assessor "where such lands and 
heritages are bona fide let for a yearly rent conditioned as the fair 
annual value" to take that rent as the annual value of the property. 
If a house was not let the assessor estimated the rent which a hypothetical 
tenant might pay by comparing the property with similar houses which were 
let1. In addition in Scotland the valuation roll was prepared annually 
and valuations being based on rents passing were thus kept more up to 
date than in England. Consequently valuations in Scotland were on a 
higher level than those in England. 
Where the tax on property is charged on owners it acts as a 
disincentive to the provision of houses by private speculators. Since 
rates in Scotland were payable partly by occupiers and partly by owners 
the different records of achievement of housebuilders north and south of 
the Border were frequently attributed to the Scottish method of charging 
owners with part of the rates. A Committee was appointed in 1943 to 
investigate "The Effect of the Existing System of Rating on the Provision 
of / - 
1. See The Scottish Rating System - the Sorn Committee Report, Cmd. 6595, 
1945. 
- 40 
of Houses and the question of limiting the amount payable in respect 
of Owners' Rates". While the Committee considered that by their 
terms of reference they were restricted in their recommendations 
to one particular remedy - the limitation of the maximum amount 
payable by way of owners` rates - nevertheless they included in 
their Report an expression of opinion that a complete abolition of 
owners' rates and the adoption of the English system of rating 
occupiers only would provide the best solution to the deterrent to 
private enterprise building for letting1. 
The Valuation and Rating (Scotland) Act, 1956, provided for 
the abolition of owners' rates as from 1956/57. At the same time it 
introduced a new basis of valuation for houses based on the hypothetical 
rent which a tenant might reasonably be expected to pay - similar to the 
English system - the first valuation roll under the new method to be 
effective from 1961/62. This date was intended to coincide with the 
English revaluation on current rentals but the latter had subsequently 
to be postponed until 1963. Thereafter revaluations were to be made 
quinquennially but in the interim period from 1956 to 1961 valuations 
were frozen at 1956 values. The Act did not transfer responsibility 
for valuation in Scotland to the central authority. 
5. Conclusion. 
This concludes our brief survey of the tax base of local 
authorities and we are now in a position to study the attempts which have 
been made to achieve equalisation within the framework of the rating 
system. / - 
1. Op. cit. 
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system. It is appreciated that nothing has been said about the various 
methods used to value properties other than houses, such as the profits 
basis and the contractor's principle, etc. The whole history of 
valuation is a vastly complicated one but to pursue it further here 
would deflect us from the main purpose of the study. The important 
principle which emerges, however, is that the rental basis of 
valuing property which was originally introduced as a method of 
estimating the income of property owners and as such could reasonably 
be regarded as a criterion of their income from property has become a 
standard for assessing the liability to charge of occupiers. It is 
obvious that as a criterion of the income of the occupiers the 
proposition would scarcely bear examination but in my opinion the 
historical association between the value of the property and the 
owner's income has contributed to the vaguely felt view that in 
some measure the rental value of property occupied is at least a 
rough measure of the occupier's income. It should be made clear 
that it is not suggested that the value of property occupied should 
necessarily be related to the income of the resident. As has been 
said many taxes fall arbitrarily on the incomes of citizens and this 
does not disqualify their use. What is doubted, however, is 
whether when the tax imposed is not related to an individual's 
income it is possible to devise a scheme within such a framework 
so as to achieve any particularly meaningful concept of equalisation. 
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CHAPTER III. 
HISTORY OF EQUALISATION. 
1. Minority Report of Royal Commission on Local Taxation (1901) . 
Attempts at equalisation are to be found in Scotland at a 
much earlier date than in England. This was no doubt due to the fact 
that the differences in the per capita tax bases of the various authorities 
in Scotland showed a much wider variation than those in England and 
also because of the smallness of some of the administrative units in 
Scotland. The grant made in 1880 -90 in relief of local taxation in 
the Highlands was based in part on rateable value1. 
The first serious discussion of equalisation is to be 
found in this minority report of the Royal Commission on Local 
Taxation. The terms of reference of the Commission were "to 
inquire into the present system under which taxation is raised for 
local purposes and report whether all kinds of real and personal 
property contribute equitably to such taxation; and if not, what 
alterations in the law are desirable to secure that result" . The 
Commission took evidence from a formidable array of eminent 
economists - Sidgwick, Marshall, Bastable, and Cannan. But 
one looks in vain for any contribution on the subject of equalisation 
grants from these distinguished political economists, their sole 
contribution appearing to relate to the suggestion that the proceeds 
of the inhabited house tax should be transferred to local authorities. 
It was left to a layman, Lord Balfour of Burleigh to make what must 
surely / - 
1. Minority Report of Royal Commission on Local Taxation, Cmd.836 -1901, 
(Vol.XXIV) , page 75. 
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surely stand even by present day standards as a notable contribution to the 
theory of equalisation grants. 
What seems to have impressed Lord Balfour and others was the widely 
differing tax rates in the various areasl and the solution was sought in providing 
a scheme which would reduce the disparity in these. On the question of how 
Exchequer contributions should be distributed among authorities, Balfour thought 
that the main points to be considered were equity, economy and efficiency in 
administration. Since it is obvious that imperial taxation (Balfour was no 
doubt thinking of income tax) can be and is raised more in accordance with 
ability than local taxation it follows that the greater the share of the cost 
of national services which is borne by the State, the more will this principle 
characterise the distribution of the entire burden amongst the contributors. 
On the other hand, the interests of economy and efficiency demand that the 
lo_ al authorities be left with sufficient of this expenditure to meet from their 
own revenues. The total grant should therefore be about one -half of the 
total local authority expenditure on national services, but the proportion 
should vary with different services. This proposal would ensure that, at 
all events, one -half of the funds would be raised with more regard to ability 
than if obtained by means of rates. 
What Lord Balfour appears to have overlooked, however, is that the 
fact that 50% of local authority expenditure may be met out of national taxation 
does / - 
1. See Royal Commission on Local Taxation - Scotland (1902) , Vol.XXXIX, p.44. 
"Opinion of Mr. W. Penney, General Superintendent of Poor, as to desirability 
and possibility of equalising the Poor Rate ": - "Another point which has long 
caused anxiety is the unequal pressure of the Poor Rate assessment. The 
miserably poor parish of Walls in Shetland has to pay nearly 12/- in the £ 
as a Poor rate while many much wealthier parishes escape with less than half 
of the number of pence, with the inevitable result that the able- bodied men 
are driven from it to work in less heavily taxed districts only returning 
when health and strength alike fail. I hope it may yet be found possible 
to impose an equal Poor Rate on all parishes; the poorer would be greatly 
relieved, and the wealthier would not feel it. It ought not to be 'beyond 
the wit of man' so to regulate the expenditure in each parish, arrt by each 
Parish Council, as to prevent the anticipated prodigality which is, I 
understand, at present the chief objection to the scheme" . 
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does not necessarily improve the position vis a vis tax burden and "ability 
to pay" unless the scheme for the distribution of this grant can be made on 
a basis which has regard to the "abilities" of those who pay local taxes. 
Lord Balfour said:- 
"The suggestion which I put forward is that "block grants" should 
be given for each service taken as a whole, and that in the 
distribution some attempt should be made to equalise the burden 
remaining to be charged upon the various localities. 
With this object in view the conditions to be observed would 
appear to be the varying circums tances of the different districts 
as regards, first, ability to raise local funds, and secondly, 
necessity for expenditure upon the services assisted. Having 
established criteria of these two conditions the grants should 
be distributed in such a way that most would be given to those 
dis tricts which have the lowest ability and whose expenditure is 
necessarily high, and less to those with the greatest ability and 
less necessity.for expenditure. 
It has often been said in and out of Parliament that population is 
the best basis for the distribution of a Government grant, i.e. 
that each locality should receive a given sum per inhabitant. 
Population is, without doubt, a very valuable test (though not 
by itself a completely adequate test) in as much 
as it makes no allowance for the comparative ability of different 
districts to bear the burden. 
Now / - 
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Now the ability of any district to bear the burden can best be 
measured by the value of the property subject to rates. I 
do not assert that this test is absolutely accurate as regards 
the ability of the individuals concerned, but it is by far the 
best measure of the ability of the district, i.e. , of the local 
resources available to meet the burden" . 1 
Where the writer might take issue with Lord Balfour is on the extent 
to which one can draw a meaningful distinction between the ability or 
incomes of the inhabitants of an area and the resources of the district 
as a whole. This attempt to regard an authority and its resources as some- 
thing distinct from the persons whom the authority represents runs through 
much of the literature on the subject of equalisation grants in this country. 
This line of approach is particularly evident in official government papers 
on local finance throughout the past sixty years. When such a distinction 
has been made so frequently by those whose opinions command respect by 
reason of their knowledge of public finance it is necessary that this 
proposition be subjected to careful scrutiny before it is rejected out of 
hand. Discussion on the extent to which the resources of an authority 
may be distinguished from those of the residents in the area is reserved, 
hove ever, until Ch.IX. 
Lord Balfour accepted that, for the purposes of the scheme suggested 
in his paper it would be impossible to accept the valuation made by the local 
valuation authorities. It was on the assumption that the Commission's 
recommendations for solving uniformity of valuation made in the First Report 
would / - 
1. The italics are mine. 
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would be implemented that he based his suggestions. 
An example of how his suggested scheme would operate may be 
seen from the proposed grant for police expenditure in Scotland. The 
grant was to be distributed by giving to each authority:- 
(i) The difference between the minimum expenditure for 
which it was found that the service could be 
efficiently performed (1/4d. per inhabitant) and the 
produce of a standard rate of 12d . in the £ on the 
rateable value; 
(ii) A further sum equal to one -half of the expenditure 
incurred in excess of the minimum. 
The first part of this subsidy may be expressed in mathematical 
symbols as follows:- 
S. = C + m + t (B -B.) 
i s i 
where the value of C. will be determined by the total amount of grant to 
be distributed. 
It is seen that this is similar to formula (5) - an equalisation of 
fiscal capacity to provide a standard of service according to a centrally 
set level of performance:- 
S. = C + m (N. - N) + t s (B i - B) .. ... (5) 1 i 
The second part of the subsidy may be expressed thus:- 
- 1 (A- m) 
Thus / - 
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Thus the formula for the full subsidy is:- 
Si = C + m + ts (B - B.) + i (Ai - 
Whereas formula (5) does not contain any term which is a function of 
tl-e individual authority's expenditure, formula (8) (Lord Balfour's) contains 
one term which is a function of the expenditure. Formula (8) would seem to 
lie somewhere between formula (3) (equalisation of fiscal potential in 
relation to needs) and formula (5) (equalisation of fiscal capacity to 
provide a centrally set level of performance) . 
The proposals for England were broadly that minimum expenditures 
per unit of need should be determined for each of the services concerned 
and formulae prepared for the various services on the lines of the foregoing 
illustration. Lord Balfour had an intimate knowledge of lo al circumstances 
in Scotland and he was aware that the smallness of some of the local units 
and the widely varying conditions in which they had to operate made it 
impossible to prescribe minimum standard expenditures which would be 
suitable for application to all authorities - a situation which still prevails 
to -day in Scotland. He, therefore, produced a modified set of proposals 
for services other than police. This scheme involved the use of a 
complicated scale of percentages to be applied to relevant expenditure, 
these percentages being graded inversely in proportion to the rateable 
value per head of population of the authorities. The majority of the Royal 
1 Commission found themselves unable to accept these proposals. / 
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proposals l. 
2. The Kempe Committee. 
The next important reference to equalisation is to be found in the Kempe 
Committee Report. This Committee was set up in 1912 to inquire into the 
cha nges which have taken place in the relations between Imperial and Local 
Taxation since the Report of the Royal Commission on Local Taxation in 1901; 
to examine the several proposals made in the Reports of that Commission, 
and to make recommendations on the subject for the consideration of His 
Majesty's Government, with a view to the introduction of legislation at 
an early date" .2 One obtains the feeling in reading this report that the 
Committee would gladly have evaded the difficult problem of equalisation 
had it not been for the fact that Lloyd George wrote to the Chairman 
specifically asking that attention should be given to the subject.2 They 
saw the problem principally in terms of the wealthier citizens moving out 
of / - 
1. Op. cit. p.32 
"In this connection we may mention that we have considered the relative 
merits of such a scheme of Poor Law grants as we have recommended above 
in which we have selected certain items of Poor Law expenditure in respect 
of which we think that Government grants may properly be given, and a 
scheme of block grants to be given to Boards of Guardians, and based, not 
on selected items of expenditure, but on calculations made from the rateable 
values, population, and expenditure in each Union. We do not see how the 
latter scheme could be worked in connection with the Metropolitan Common 
Poor Fund, or in such a manner as to encourage and reward good Law admin- 
istration. On the contrary, we fear that it would in many cases give the 
greatest relief to Boards of Guardians who have been most remiss in the 
discharge of their duties relating to the provision of proper accommodation... 
And at the same time we cannot but think that the number of these paupers 
in any district is a better test of the "necessity" and "ability" of the 
district to bear its local burdens, in other words of its relative poverty 
or well being as compared with other districts, than any complicated system 
of calculations based on rateable value, population and expenditure especially 
when regard is had to the fact that the R.V. or Poor Law expenditure of a 
district are both materially affected by the good or bad administration of 
the laws relating to valuation and Poor Relief." 
2. H. of C. (1914) Session Vol. 40 -41, Cmnd. 7315. 
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out of the towns into the neighbouring outlying districts. Consequently 
they felt that the solution to the problem lay in expanding the administrative 
units so as to encompass both the wealthy and the poor. The Local 
Government (Adjustments) Act (1913) had just been passed to facilitate 
this process. As Mrs. Hicks has pointed out, even if this had been 
successful, it would still have left the problem of depressed areas 
which might cover a whole range of authorities. 1 
The Committee also recommended that a block grant for elementary 
education be distributed on a scheme framed on the principles advocated 
in the Minority Report of Lord Balfour. They suggested that the standard 
expenditure should be based on the number of children in average attendance 
instead of on the total population, as being more closely related to the 
actual conditions of the service, the standard expenditure to be fixed at 
60/- per child, the standard rate at 7d. and the proportion of excess 
expenditure to be contributed by the Exchequer at 2 /5ths. The grant 
was therefore to be 
£3 per child plus 2 /5ths of the total net expenditure less the 
produce of a 7d. rate. 
This grant may be expressed as follows:- 
S = c + m (N, - N ) + t (B - B, ) + 2/5A, . . . (9) 
i i s i i 
Where N. = the ratio of scholars to population. 
1 
The value of C will be determined by the total grant payable by the 
Central Government. 
It / - 
1. J.R. and Ursula Hicks, op. cit. , p.25. 
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It will be noted that the first three parts of this formula constitute 
formula (5) (an equalisation of fiscal capacity to provide a centrally set 
level of performance) while the last part is a function of the individual 
authority's expenditure. The Education grant based on this formula was 
introduced in 1917 and continued in operation until 1945. It was 
resuscitated in 1948 by the Labour Government with appropriate adjust- 
ments in the "necessary minimum outlay" , the "standard rate" and the 
percentage to be applied to authorities' expenditures. 
3. General Exchequer Contribution. 
In 1929 the Conservative Government, as part of a scheme of 
re- organisation of local government generally, introduced the General 
Exchequer Contribution - the "block" grant. This grant has been amply 
discussed elsewhere) and it is not intended to deal with it at any length 
here. It is proposed merely to draw attention to its equalisation features 
and to its particular concept of equalisation. 
The aggregate grant was calculated for "fixed grant periods" and 
the formula for distribution was based upon the following factors:- 
(a) The estimated population. 
(b) A weighting for children under 5 years of age . 
(c) A weighting for areas of low rateable value per head. 
(d) A weighting for high incidence of unemployment. 
(e) For counties only, a weighting for sparsity as measured 
by the population per mile of road. 
If / - 
1. D.N. Chester, Central and Local Government, Macmillan, 1951 
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If one had the available data it would be possible to show that 
this grant may be expressed in terms of formula (5) (an equalisation of 
fiscal capacity to provide a centrally set level of performance) . In 
principle the grant is similar to the "General Grant" which was introduced 
as from 1959/60 by another Conservative Government. Since the data is 
available for the General Grant it is possible to demonstrate its relation- 
ship to formula (5) and this is shown in Ch.V. 
Researches by J.R. and Mrs. Hicks. 
Although there had been discussion of equalisation there had as yet 
been no empirical research on which to base conclusions about equalisation 
grants or the important question as to what extent the rateable value of an 
authority is a sound measure o_ its resources but in 1944 J.R. and Mrs. Hicks 
published three important books as a result of their investigations into the 
problems of local taxation in this country. A study of these publications 
is important since they are frequently referred to in discussion of the 
Exchequer Equalisation Grant. An attempt is therefore made to summarise 
the results of the "Hick's" investigations and their conclusions using 
wherever possible their own words. 
I must confess at the outset to a little difficulty at times in following 
the logical steps in the development of their argument. There is, too, a 
certain lack of preciseness in the terminology used. For example, reference 
is made to wealthy or poor towns without producing evidence to show that the 
"wealthy" towns are inhabited by persons of high income. On occasion the 
term "wealth" seems to be used as meaning "with a high R.V. per head of 
population" . Again, too, the word "rates" is sometimes used to indicate 
"rate poundages" and at other times to mean the amount of the rate payments. 
In the Incidence of Local Rates in Great Britain' / 
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Great Britain l we find p.27:- 
"This point is of great importance for the understanding of the 
true rate position of London. Because of the popular pre- 
occupation with poundages (a pre- occupation from which 
councillors are not exempt) , London is not considered to 
be especially highly rated Rate poundages are 
also a misleading indication of relative rate incidence in 
other parts of the country 
We have here two examples of ways in which rate poundages 
can be a very misleading indication of relative rate incidence. 
It is only when we can measure actual rate payments against 
local incomes that the true relative significance of local 
taxation becomes apparent. It is extremely desirable that 
more information of this nature should be available to local 
authorities, so that they may be able to measure the true 
money burden they are fastening on their poorer citizens when 
an expansion of local services is agreed to" . 
Yet in Standards of Local Expenditure2 we are told that the object 
of the exercise is to find an answer to the question "Why does the level 
of rates vary from place to place? . By this we see Hicks to mean rate 
poundages. 
It is for this reason that it has been found difficult to give a condensation 
of their works in such a way as to present a logical sequence leading to their 
conclusions regarding a proposed equalisation grant. It is hoped that this 
very condensed "precis" of their works is a fair one, but it is suggested that 
a / 
1. J.R. & Ursula Hicks, The Incidence of Local Rates in Great Britain, National 
Institute of Economic & Social Research, Cambridge University Press, 1945. 
2. J.R. & Ursula Hicks, Standards of Local Expenditure, National Institute of 
Economic & Social Research, Cambridge University Press, 1943. 
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a study of the works themselves will do more justice to Hicks than any abridged 
version given here. 
The first of these works is entitled Standards of Local Expenditure - a 
problem of the inequality of incomesl, the second The Problem of Valuation for 
Rating2 and the third The Incidence of Rates in Great Britain3. Taking the last 
book first I find it to be the least convincing of the three works - at least in 
its relevance to our particular problem, i.e. , the problem of the different 
fiscal capacities of the various lo_al authorities in Scotland. This may be 
due to the fact that the investigation had a two -fold object. It was part of 
an investigation into the burden of Taxation in Britain being complementary 
to the work of G.F. Shirras and L. Rostas whose work The Burden of British 
Taxation studied the proportions of the incomes of different classes which 
were paid in taxation in national taxes and in rates other than rates on 
houses. At the same time it sought to serve as the basis for the other 
investigation being carried out by J.R. and Mrs. Hicks into the problem of 
lo al taxation. One is left with the feeling that the work has more relevance 
to the first of these objects than to the second. 
In analysing the "income incidence" the measure of the burden of rates 
which is adopted is rate payments as a percentage of net income. This seems 
a reasonable basis for discussion. The analysis is based on the returns from 
households for the purposes of the Ministry of Labour 1937 -38 Cost of Living 
enquiry (except for Scotland) . For the purposes of the exercise, Hicks breaks 
down Great Britain into some nine regions, one of which comprises the whole 
of Scotland. Tables are then produced to show that for each of these regions 
rates form a very low percentage of income - the average for Great Britain being 
not - 
1. Op. cit. 
2. Op. cit. 
3. Op. cit. 
4. G.F. Shirras & L. Rostas, The Burden of British Taxation, Cambridge University 
Press, 1942. 
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not more than 3.3% for incomes up to £250 per annum. 
I have two criticisms of this approach. Firstly, the averages are 
based on regions too wide to be appropriate for comparisons of smaller 
local units. It is felt that to draw any conclusion regarding relative 
burdens between the ratepayer of one local authority and another in 
Scotland based on an average for the whole of Scotland is misleading. 
My second criticism is that the range of income - at least for Scotland - 
is too wide and that a lower limit than £250 should have been fixed for 
investigation. 1 These criticisms aside, however, let us accept for 
the moment the premise that rates payments as a percentage of working 
class incomes do not vary widely throughout the country. 
Let us now proceed to Standards of Local Expenditure. This opens 
by stating that the object of the enquiry is to find an answer to the question 
"Why does the level of rates vary from place to place ?" . The question is 
asked "Why do high rates present such a serious problem ?" . Since 
derating was introduced in 1929 the burden on manufacturing industry is 
not serious. The bulk of rate receipts come from house property. It is 
pointed out that in the third publication The Incidence of Local Rates 
evidence has been produced to show that rates as a tax on working class 
incomes do not account for a high percentage of their income on average. 
The real trouble with rates, then, is not the total burden nor the inequality 
between classes for that is quite moderate. The heart of the problem is 
the / - 
1. In 1939 the minimum standard wage of males in Glasgow was £2.17. Od. 
per week (see Corporation of City of Glasgow "Facts and Figures ") . 
The standard wage of county roadmen was approximately £2. 8. Od. 
per week. 
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the disparity between the levels of rates (presumably rate poundages) 1 
in different areas. 
If the analysis in Incidence of Rates is correct, viz. , that rate 
payments as a percentage of income do not differ substantially throughout 
the country either between classes or areas it is difficult to see how wide 
differences in rate poundages present a problem. Differences in rate pound- 
ages can only give rise to difficulties if they represent different burdens of 
rates between individuals in one authority and another.2 
Hicks then proceeds to say that differences in rates may be due to 
one of two causes:- 
(1) Expenditure per head or population, or 
(2) R.V. per head of population. 
High rates may be due either to high expenditure per head of 
population or to low R.V. per head of population. The standard of 
expenditure therefore is to be expenditure per head of population not 
per £ of R.V. The per capita expenditure of each borough on each of 
the main lines of expenditure is analysed. 
To analyse the expenditure of the County Boroughs a system of 
grouping is adopted. This system of grouping endeavours to pay some 
attention to:- 
(1) Geography 
(2) Relative wealth or poverty as measured by R.V. per head 
of population or ld. rate product per head. 
First / - 
1. The comment in italics is mine. 
2. Although I recognise the psychological difficulty of high rate poundages. 
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First of all therefore there is listed in order of ld. rate products 




The County Boroughs are then re- sorted into the following groups:- 
1st Group - At the top of the list come the seaside resorts. By 
reference to another Table (Table III) it is seen that all of these 
excepting Southport, are distinguished for their high expenditure 
per head of population. These are therefore taken as the first 
group, setting aside Southport, whose inclusion would probably 
make the average of the group less significant. 
2nd Group - Next in order come Oxford and Exeter, with Canterbury, 
Bath and Chester close upon their heels. Thus a second group - 
that of the cathedral towns - begins to form. These are relatively 1 
wealthy towns, but (as appears from Table III) these are not, with 
the exception of Chester, high spenders. 
3rd and 4th Group - The 3rd Group is that of "Poor Spenders" (i.e. 
those with a low R.V. per head but who spend more than £5 per 
head of population. The 4th Group is that of "Poor Stinters" (i.e. 
those with a low R.V. or ld. per head rate but who spend less than 
£5 per head of population) . 
5th Group / - 
1. We note this constant substitution of wealthy for high R.V. per head 
of population without having accurately established that the two 
are synonymous. 
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5th Group - Nearly all the towns which appeared in Table III as 
having an expenditure per head greater than £6.5. Od. were 
either seaside resorts (already grouped) or towns which only 
achieved that level of expenditure by levying a rate poundage 
decidedly above the average. These towns therefore, other 
than the seaside resorts and Merthyr, Bootle and Chester 
(excluded for special reasons), form the 5th Group and are 
known as "Big Spenders" . 
6th Group - This comprises a group of industrial towns, which 
are not among the very poor towns but have a level of expenditure . 
comparable with that of the Poor Stinters. These form a grout) 
known as the "Middling Stinters" . 
Table No .1 
Table V - Group Averages - Rates and Block Grants (1938) 
Average of per capita receipts 












Seaside Resorts 9/5 1439 141 1580 
Big Spenders 17/8 1348 282 1630 
Cathedral Towns 10/6 1040 179 1219 
Middling Stinters 11/4 854 232 1086 
Poor Spenders 16/9 925 352 1277 
Poor Stinters * 14/6 802 294 1096 
National Average 
(all county boroughs) 14/- 1078 254 1332 
* This "national average" has been calculated by averaging the per 
capita receipts (or poundages) of the 83 county boroughs. It 
is thus an unweighted average. 
Hicks / 
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Hicks states that it is already apparent from this table that the 
high rates of the poor spenders are due to their attempt to maintain a 
standard of expenditure not too far short of the national average; as a 
result of their poverty they cannot do even this without involving 
themselves in abnormally high poundages. Even the poor stinters who 
take the alternative route of limiting their expenditure, are unable to 
maintain their low standards except by imposing poundages above the 
average. The high rates of the big spenders, on the other hand, are 
due to their abnormally high expenditure. 1 
The conclusion which Hicks comes to is that the main reason 
for disparities in rates (rate poundages) is disparities in wealth 
2 (rateable value per head of population) . At any level of wealth one 
town may be more inclined to spend than another - one may be a 
"spender ", another a "stinter "; but this remains less important (in 
the majority of cases) than the difference which is due to differences 
in wealth. 
It might be pointed out, however, that while it might be true that 
the main reason for disparities in rate poundages was disparities in rateable 
value (not necessarily synonymous with wealth2 ) this would not necessarily 
mean that the rate burdens were widely different in so far as high rates 
applied to low valuations (or undervalued property) might be equivalent 
to low rates applied to high valuations. 
Hicks therefore recommends that the block grant be used as a 
really effective equaliser. It would, for example, be possible without 
any additional cost to the central government to take a basic level of 
rates / - 
1. It is felt that there is an element of "begging the question" here in 
that Hicks has assumed that low rateable value per head is 
synonymous with poverty. 
2. The comments in italics are mine, not those of Hicks. 
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rates (say 12/6d. in the £) and to use the block grant to make the income 
of all authorities which - at the basic rate - fell below a certain 
standard amount (per head of population) up to that amount. For 
county boroughs the standard amount could be at least as high as 
the 1938 expenditure of the poor spenders (on all services but domiciliary 
relief which it was recommended should be taken over by the central 
Government) and enough would still be left over to make some allowance 
for special needs, such as would no doubt be present in the other cases. 
In this way the poor spenders would be able to attain the 
level of expenditure they have actually attained but without any exceptional 
burden on the rates; while those towns whose standards are deplorably 
low would be able to attain a modestly respectable standard without any 
undue strain. There would be nothing to prevent any town from spending 
more than the standard amount, if it chose to bear the cost of the excess 
only the cost of the excess. 
Hicks states that this suggested Equalisation Grant would 
require to wait until there had been a revaluation of properties throughout 
the country. In his second book he had analysed the different levels 
of valuation in different areas and made recommendations for valuation 
to be transferred to the Inland Revenue so as to achieve uniformity of 
valuation throughout the country. With the inequalities in valuation 
which exist at present, a uniform level of rates (such as the basic 
12/6d.) would in fact impose considerably heavier burdens upon some 
towns than upon others. In order for a distribution of block grant, 
genuinely in accordance with the poverty or wealth of the area, to be 
practically feasible, valuations would have to be made more uniform. 
Here / - 
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Here again it is difficult to reconcile this with his findings in 
Standards of Local Expenditure. In Standards of Local Expenditure 
we found Hicks assuming that high R.V. per head was synonymous with 
wealth and low R.V. per head synonymous with poverty and it was on 
the basis of their R.V. per head of population that he categorised them 
into "wealthy" or "poor" . Now we find from this admission regarding 
the lack of uniformity of valuation that on achieving uniformity of 
valuation there will be a change in the categories of "wealthy" and 
"poor" . 
It is felt that there is a failure to appreciate that ultimately 
the resources of an authority do not consist of its rateable value but 
that in the final analysis they are related to the incomes of the ratepayers. 
An increase in the rateable value of an authority does not necessarily 
mean an increase in resources unless it represents a corresponding 
increase in the incomes of the ratepayers. Hicks would seem to be 
primarily concerned with the local authority rather than with the rate- 
payer. I do not say that R.V. per head of population is necessarily 
an unreliable indicator of the incomes in the different areas. I 
merely say that it has not been established by these researches. 
Indeed, Hicks's findings in one book seem to contradict his 
conclusions in the other. 
Like Lord Balfour, Hicks seems to have seen the problem 
primarily in terms of differing tax rates (rate poundages) and his 
suggested grant is designed to reduce the disparities in rate poundages. 
Although Hicks obviously has appreciated that widely different rate 
poundages / - 
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poundages may not necessarily represent widely differing rate burdens 1 
he fails to follow this through in the other part of his analysis .2 
It will be noted that the suggested subsidy was to be a standard 
rate applied to the deficiency in the authority's own tax base from the 
standard or "datum" tax base. The formula is thus:- 
S. =t (B - B.) provided that B. < B i s 
This is similar to the third part of formula (5) . It is an 
equalisation of fiscal capacity on the assumption that there are no 
differing needs. It is not proposed to take anything away from above 
standard base authorities. Thus in this case the sum of the (B - B,)s 
will not equal zero since B. must always be less than B. It appears 
that this concept of equalisation was alien to the philosophy of the 
Labour Government which came to power in the immediate post -war 
period for when the Exchequer Equalisation Grant was eventually 
introduced, although it was, like Hicks's, scheme, based on rateable 
value, it embodied a different approach to equalisation. 
1. J.R. and Ursula Hicks, The Incidence of Local Rates, op.cit., p.27. 
2. do Standards of Local Expenditure, op.cit. 
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CHAPTER IV. 
THE EXCHEQUER EQUALISATION GRANT. 
1. Introduction. 
The 1914/18 war had seen tle introduction in 1917 of 
an attempt at an equalisation of the Education service in a form similar 
to formula (9) . The immediate post -war period of the 1939/45 war saw 
the introduction of the Exchequer Equalisation Grant by the Labour 
Government which came to power on the first election after the war. 
When one considers much of the other legislation which emanated 
from this socialist government such as that which resulted in the 
introduction of the welfare state, it is not surprising that they should 
be interested in achieving equalisation in local finance and that the 
concept of equalisation aimed at should be an equalisation of potential 
in relation to needs. The introduction of the Exchequer Equalisation Grant 
coincided with the transfer of certain local authority functions to the 
central government, e.g., responsibility for National Assistance payments, 
the hospital service and the gas and electricity undertakings. 
2. The Basic Formula (England and Wales) . 
Under the Local Government Act, 1948, Exchequer Equalisation 
Grant1 was payable to County Councils and County Borough Councils whose 
R.V. per head of weighted population fell below the national average. 
Weighted population was defined as actual population plus the number of 
children under 15 plus in an administrative county whose population per 
mile / - 
1. Henceforth th 
P 
abb evi4tion E E . G . will be used to indicate 
Exchequer Equalisation Grant . 
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mile of road was less than 70, one third of the additional population 
needed to bring the population per mile of road up to 70. 
The calculation of E.E.G. is basically a simple one; 
where the R.V. per head of (weighted) population of an authority is 
less than the average R.V. per head of (weighted) population of all 
authorities in England and Wales (excluding London) then the Exchequer 
steps in and pays rates on that additional rateable value (known as the 
credited Rateable Value) necessary to bring the authority's R.V. per head 
up to the national average. Thus each authority with actual rateable 
value per head of population below the national average then has 
rateable resources equal to the average, made up of actual rateable value 
plus credited rateable value. 
It is now necessary to make certain definitions. "Standard 
Rateable Value" (SRV) of an authority means the product of (1) the weighted 
population of the authority and (2) the average rateable value per head of 
weighted population in England and Wales. 
"Credited Rateable Value" means the excess (if any) of the 
Standard Rateable value over actual rateable value (CRV) . 
"Relevant Local Expenditure" means the net expenditure 
which would fall to be met from the rates if no exchequer equalisation grant 
were payable. In the case of a county it includes the expenditure of the 
county council and of all the other local authorities in the county. 
The "Relevant fraction" is the fraction of which the 
numerator is the relevant local expenditure and the denominator is the sum 
of / - 
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of (1) the Credited Rateable Value and (2) the product of a rate of £1 in the 
£ . (£R)1 . 
Exchequer Equalisation Grant is then derived from the 
following formula: - 
E.E.G. = RF x CRV or RLE x CRV 
CRV + £R 
In the absence of E.E.G. the rate which an authority would 
require to levy would be arrived at by dividing its relevant local expenditure 
by its rateable value RLE  
RV 
(This would give us a rate expressed in 
terms of a £ instead of as so many pence in the E). For an authority in 
receipt of E.E.G. the rate required to be levied would be arrived at as 
follows:- RLE since it has an effective rateable value i.e. SRV 
SRV 
made up of its actual rateable value plus its credited rateable value. 
It will be seen therefore that the "relevant fraction" RLE 
( SRV) 
represents 
broadly the rate per £ needed to meet expenditure of an authority which 
is in receipt of E.E.G. It was said that the Exchequer pays rates on 
that additional rateable value necessary to bring the actual rateable 
value per head up to the national average. Applying the above rates 





Disregarding for the moment the complication of the weighting 
factor, it is seen that the above formula is formula (1) , viz., 
Si = (g - Bi) t. 
- an equalisation of fiscal potential. The subsidy in formula (1) is a function 
of the individual authority's tax rate (which in turn is related to its expenditure) 
and the difference between the average per capita tax base and its own tax base. 
In applying the formula to counties it is seen that the Government were treating 
the upper tier authority as though it were in fact the administrative unit for the 
whole / - 
1. The effect of using the product of £1 in the £ instead of actual rateable value 
is to allow losses on collection of rates and exempt subjects. 
Note also:- Contributions in lieu of Rates on Crown property count as rates for 
this purpose (S.145(7) ) 
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whole area including the lower tiered authorities within the county. 
3. Capitation Payments (England and Wales) . 
Capitation payments were paid direct by the Ministry to the 
County districts. The capitation rate for non -county boroughs and urban 
districts was arrived at by dividing one half of the total of E.E.G. paid to 
counties outside London by the unweighted population of those counties. 
The capitation rate for rural districts was one half of that for the other 
districts. 
The capitation grants were deducted from the E . E . G .paid to 
the Counties. They were required to be paid by the County whether it 
received E.E.G. or not, the sums required being raised through the County 
precept. 
The principles adopted in connection with the Capitation 
payments were practically identical with those adopted for the Block Grant 
under the 1929 Act. There was one important difference however; if the 
County Council drew no E.E.G. or if it was insufficient to meet the sums 
due to the districts then it had to pay the amounts or the shortage over to 
the Ministry. 
Thus within a county the capitation payments to the district 
councils were in effect financed by the district councils themselves by 
deduction from their E.E.G. or by direct precept on the basis of rateable 
value where necessary. 
If / - 
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If we let 
c = capitation rate (for sake of simplicity let us assume 
the same rate for non -county boroughs 
and rural district councils) 
t 
s 
= a standard rate 
B. = per capita tax base of ith authority within. the county 
B = average (weighted) per capita tax base within the 
county 
then it is obvious, since the total capitation payments must be provided 
for from the tax bases of the authorities within the county, that 
c = t 
s 
Allowing for the fact that any district contributes out of 
its own tax base to the per capita subsidy, the net subsidy (or tax) will 
be 
Si = c - t B. 
s i 
substituting for c 
S, = t B - t B, 
i s s i 
= t 
s 
(B - B.) . 
But this is our second concept of equalisation (an 
equalisation of fiscal capacity to provide a centrally set level of 
expenditure) and thus while suitable for inclusion in the 1929 Block 
Grant / - 
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Grant of the Conservative Government, it was at variance with the 
principles of the Exchequer Equalisation Grant, a circumstance to 
which attention was subsequently drawn by the study group on The 
Effects of the Local Government Act, 1948, and other Recent Legislation 
on the Finances of Local Authorities .1 
4. Contributions in lieu of rates on Electricity and Transport 
Hereditaments. 
Part V of the Local Government Act, 1948 provided that 
electricity and transport undertakings should not be liable to rates. 
Instead the Central Electricity Authority and the British Transport 
Commission were required to pay lump sums to the Ministry described 
as "payments for the benefit of local authorities" . These sums were 
allocated among local authorities in proportion to their rateable value.2 
County boroughs received the whole allocation; in the case of county 
districts 3 went to the county council and 3 to the district council. 
These sums were treated as deductions from local 
expenditure to arrive at relevant local expenditure thus reducing the 
total amount of E.E.G. which would otherwise be payable. 
5. The 
1. The Effects of the Local Government Act, 1948 and other recent 
Legislation on the finances of Local Authorities. 
Accounting Research Vol.III, No.3, July, 1952. 
2. Sec.100 of Local Government Act, 1948. 
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5. The Basic Formula (Scotland) . 
In Scotland E.E.G. was made payable to County Councils, 
Counties of Cities and large burghs whose R.V. per head fell below the 
necessary standard. Instead of the standard being average R.V. per 
head of weighted population it was the sum taken as the average R.V. 
per head of weighted population in England and Wales plus 25% 
The reason for this addition to the English figure was that 
it was recognised that the different systems of valuation inthe two countries 
resulted in different levels of valuation; whereas in England and Wales 
the principle of valuation was that rates were paid on the reasonable 
rent that the tenant would pay if he were liable for all of the rates on 
the property, for its maintenance and for its insurance, in Scotland 
rates were paid on the rent actually on the assumption that 
the tenant was responsible only for the occupier's share of the rates and 
the landlord was responsible for the maintenance and insurance of the 
property. At that time Scottish rates consisted of both owner's and 
occupier's rates. Thus Scottish rateable values were higher for two 
reasons; firstly they included a sum in respect of the landlord's 
outlays on maintenance and insurance and secondly since landlords 
in Scotland paid owner's rates they accordingly charged higher rents 
to enable them to do so When the Bill for the Local Government Act, 
1948 was being considered there was considerable agitation on the 
part of local authorities in Scotland for a greater addition than 25% 
to be made to the English standard in order to give the standard rateable 
value to be used in Scotland. The figure of 25% however was adopted 
partly because it had been used in the past and also because a revaluation 
in England was imminent and it was not considered advisable to change 
the / - 
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the percentage pending this revaluation. 
The weighting to population was similar to the English 
one being for counties of cities and large burghs, the addition of the 
number of children under 15 years of age and for counties the same 
addition with an addition for sparsity equal to 3 of the additional 
population necessary to bring the population of the county up to 70 
per mile of road. 
For counties E.E.G. was calculated on the basis that 
the counties included the small burghs i.e. the relevant local 
expenditure included the expenditure of the county council on general 
county purposes (excluding any amount allocated to a large burgh) , the 
expenditure on landward services, the expenditure of the small burghs 
themselves, the district council expenditure and the expenditure in 
respect of special districts. The Grants were to be applied towards 
expenditure (except the part requisitioned from large burghs for 
education and police) on all functions exercised throughout the whole 
county including the small burghs. 
6. Capitation Payments (Scotland) . 
Capitation rates for small burghs and landward areas were 
arrived at by dividing one -half of the total of all the counties' Exchequer 
Equalisation Grants by the combined unweighted population of all the 
small burghs and landward areas. The resultant rate, multiplied by 
the unweighted population of a small burgh, gave the capitation grant 
to that burgh. The landward rate was 3 of the burgh rate. 
As / - 
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As in England, if the County Council drew no E.E.G. , 
or if it was insufficient to meet the sums due to the small burghs and 
landward area, then the County Council had to meet the cost or the short- 
age, spreading the payment over the landward area and the small burghs. 
7. Comparison between English and Scottish E.E.G. Formula. 
It will be noted that the original Grant provisions relating 
to Scotland and England were similar, the main differences being (1) that 
in Scotland instead of using average R.V. per head of population there 
was used the English average plus 25 %, and (2) that the landward 
capitation rate was 3 the burgh rate as against the rural district 
council rate which was z the urban and non -county borough rate. 
8. Report of the Committee appointed to Inlvestigate the Operation of 
the E.E.G. in England and Wales 1953. 
(a) Introduction. 
Section 14 of the Local Government Act, 1948 provided 
for investigations into the working of the E.E.G. in the year in which 
the first new valuation lists under Part III of the Act come into force and 
thereafter every 5th year. In the event the revaluation scheduled to be 
completed by April 1953 had to be postponed until April 1956. The 
Government decided however to hold an investigation in 1953 although 
a further investigation would be necessary in the year in which the 
revaluation / - 
1. Report of the Committee appointed to Investigate the Operation of the 
E.E.G. in England and Wales, H.M. Stationery Office, 19 53 . 
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revaluation took effect. A committee was therefore set up under the 
chairmanship of Mr. F.L. Edwards , C.B. , O . B . E . , Under Secretary 
for Finance and Accountant General at the Ministry of Housing and 
Local Government . 
In their investigations the Committee had the help of 
certain studies into the E.E.G. which had been carried out since the 
introduction of the grant. These were Education Rates and the 
Education and Equalisation Grants1by J.B. Woodham; the five reports 
of a study group on The Effects of the Local Government Act, 1948 and 
other Recent Legislation on the Finances of Local Authorities , 
2 the 
first four of these under the Chairmanship of Leo T. Little and the 
last under the Chairmanship of J.B. Woodham. Tribute was also 
paid to the work of D.N. Chester, C.B.E. in various writings and in 
particular his Central and Local Government3 and also to the published 
works of J.R. and Ursula Hicks. 
(b) Capitation Payments. 
It had been pointed out in the Fourth Report of the 
Working Party under the Chairmanship of Leo T. Little that the payment 
to the county council of that part of the Equalisation Grant which was 
payable in respect of the expenditure of the county districts and its 
consequent distribution on the basis of rateable value was in conflict 
with the general principle of the Grant, because it had the effect of 
aiding most those county districts which spend the least and have the 
largest / - 
1. J.B. Woodham, Education Rates and the Education and Equalisation 
Grants, I.M.T.A., Research Study, 1953. 
2. Op.cit. The five reports are published in Accounting Research, 
Aug.1949, Jan. 1950, July 1951, July 1952, Jan. 1953. 
3. Op.cit. 
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largest rateable value per head. Their main conclusions were:- 
(a) In those counties which receive little or no 
Equalisation Grant the capitation payments 
exert an influence in favour of equalisation of 
resources but this influence is not great enough. 
(b) The effect of the Equalisation Grant is in the 
opposite direction, i.e. it accentuates the 
inequalities of resources and in those counties 
which receive Equalisation Grant at a high rate 
this effect outweighs the equalising effect of the 
capitation payments. 
(c) The capitation system favours the urban districts 
in most counties, the Equalisation Grant system 
the rural districts. 
The Committee finally recommended that the best solution was the 
abolition of the capitation payments and the introduction of direct Grants 
to county councils on the lines proposed by the Woodham Working Party 
in their 5th Report I viz:- 
(i) The payment of Equalisation Grant to county councils based 
as at present on the rateable value per head of weighted 
population of the whole county, but calculated on the 
expenditure of the county council for general county 
purposes only. 
(ii) The payment of Equalisation Grant to county district 
councils whose rateable value per head of unweighted / 
I. Op.cit. 
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unweighted population is below the 
national average, calculated, in a 
similar way to the county council 
Grant, on the expenditure of the 
district council, which would be 
defined as including all payments 
made by the district council under 
precept with the exception of the 
precept for general county purposes. 
In reaching their conclusion that unweighted population should be 
used in calculating the Grants to county districts consideration was given 
as to whether there should be a weighting for sparsity and also whether any 
differentiation was desirable between urban and rural districts such as there 
was under the existing capitation system. On the one hand urban districts 
have themselves to meet the cost of urban unclassified roads and in addition 
to bear through the county precepts a part of the cost of rural unclassified 
roads. On the other hand the cost of services in rural districts is, in 
general, far more liable to be inflated on account of sparsity. It was 
considered that those two factors might be expected broadly to balance one 
another. 
(c) Limitation on Relevant Local Expenditure. 
The Committee also recommended that some limits be placed 
on the expenditure ranking for Grant although they had found no evidence of 
the Grant having induced extravagance on the part of local authorities 
receiving it. 
(d) Weighting Factors / - 
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(d) Weighting Factors. 
They also considered the question of weighting which had been 
criticised by Woodham in his Education Rates and the Exchequer Equalisation 
Grant. They decided that the weighting for children should be retained so 
long as the education grant remained in its existing form. As regards sparsity 
they suggested the replacement of the existing weighting by one based on the 
addition to weighted population of /10th of the number required to bring the 
population per mile of road up to 170 together with V5th of the number 
required to bring the population per mile of road up to 60. 
No change however was made in the Grant provisions until 
the local Government Act, 1958 which also introduced the General Grant - 
the Block Grant in place of the former percentage grants. Unlike the Scottish 
Grant the basis of which was altered in 1954 and in 1956 the English E.E.G. 
remained as originally enacted for a period of eleven years. 
9. Report of Investigating Committee into Operation of Grant in Scotland 
(1st Investigating Committee 1953)1 . 
(a) Level of Standard Rateable Value in Scotland and England. 
At the same time as the English investigation a Committee 
sat for Scotland. The first question to which the Committee directed 
themselves was that of the level of standard rateable value in Scotland 
as compared with that for England and Wales. It will be remembered 
that Scottish authorities had contended that the addition of 25% to the 
English average was too low - a figure of 60% had been suggested. After 
investigations / - 
1. Report of the Committee appointed to Investigate the Operation of the 
Exchequer Equalisation Grants in Scotland, H.M. Stationery Office 1953. 
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investigations the Committee recommended that since no precise 
arithmetical measure could be found of the difference between the 
levels of rateable value in Scotland and England and Wales the 
additional assistance for Scottish authorities should be determined 
on some other basis. They suggested that the total amount of 
E.E.G. distributable in any year to local authorities in Scotland 
should be determined on the basis of 11/80ths (the Goschen 
equivalent) of the equalisation grant payable in that year to local 
authorities in England and Wales . The Goschen formula had for 
long been used to determine the education grant for Scotland. 
(b) Weighting Factors. 
The Committee also dealt with the question of 
weighting factors and considered several alternatives including 
weightings for unemployment for increasing and decreasing 
populations, and for excessive cost of housing. The only new 
weighting adopted however was one for rapidly increasing 
population. This is an extra weighting where the growth of 
population over 5 years exceeds 5% of the population in the first 
of these years - the weighting being twice the excess. In a 
county where the weighting applies, small burghs obtain a share 
of the benefit, because (under Sec.4 (3) (c) (ii) of the Local Govern- 
ment Financial Provisions (Scotland) Act, 1954) part of the 
weighting is allocated t o small burghs in proportion to unweighted 
population. 
(c) Relation between E.E.G. and Local Authority Housing / - 
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(c) Relation between E.E.G. and Local Authority Housing. 
The relation between Equalisation Gant and Local Authority 
Housing was another matter for consideration. Rents of local authority 
houses are fixed by the authorities themselves. Since the rent which 
passed determined the Rateable Value it followed that a local authority 
by increasing its rents would increase its Rateable Value and consequently 
decrease its Credited Rateable Value (i.e. that national rateable value 
on which the Exchequer pays rates) . There was therefore a reluctance 
on the part of local authorities to raise their rents since by doing so they 
were losing E.E.G. 
The Committee therefore recommended that in calculating 
equalisation grant the rateable value to be taken in respect of each local 
authority house should be the average rental for the preceding year of all 
houses erected by local authorities in Scotland under the Housing Acts. 
It may be noted that the adjustment of the actual rateable 
value by substituting for the rateable value of local authority houses a 
notional figure based on the number of local authority houses multiplied 
by the average rental of local authority houses in Scotland is merely an 
expedient. It is completely contrary to the whole basis on which the 
E.E.G. rests . The E.E.G. recognises that rental levels vary in different 
parts of the country whereas the adjustment for local authority houses 
assumes that rental levels should be the same throughout the whole of 
Scotland. 
(d) Capitation Payments (Scotland) . 
It / - 
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(d) Capitation Payments (Scotland) . 
It had been recognised, as in England, that the system of 
capitation payments was at variance with the principles on which the 
equalisation grant rests. Areas of high valuation contributed little or 
nothing to the county grant as a whole, but received capitation payments, 
together with a share (proportionate to rateable valuation) of the balance 
of the county equalisation grant where it exceeded the total of the 
capitation grants. Areas of low valuations contributed largely to the 
county grant as a whole, and, in some cases, their capitation payments 
and shares of the county grant were substantially less than their con- 
tribution. 
The Committee therefore recommended the discontinuance 
of Capitation Payments. In considering the alternative arrangements 
for the payment of E.E.G. on the discontinuance of the Capitation 
Payments the Committee had before them statements showing the effect 
of calculating E.E.G. for seven selected counties on the basis of separate 
grant calculations for the landward area and the small burghs within the 
county, with general county expenditure allocated (a) on the existing basis 
of rateable value, and (b) on standard rateable value or actual rateable 
value whichever is the greater. 
On an examination of the first statement i.e. allocating 
on the basis of R.V. it was noted that as compared with the existing basis, 
the rates in Cupar in the County of Fife would rise from 9/7d. to 13 /ld., 
while the rates in St. Monance in the same county would fall from 12/- 
to 9/8d. This was to be expected since the change involved taking 
away / 
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away grant from Cupar which had a high rateable value per head and the 
payment of a larger grant to St. Monance, whose rateable value per head 
was lower than the standard figure. It was also noted that while the 
range of local rates in the County of Fife on the existing basis was 5/- 
- from 9/5d. to 14/5d., the range if the grant were calculated separately 
for each area, would be 8/3d. - from 9/8d. to 17 /l1d. The reason for 
this greater disparsity was considered and it was realised that if direct 
grants were to be paid, the rates levied, since they would be determined 
by standard rateable value, should reflect the expenditure per head of the 
various local authorities. What was making for the greater dispersion 
was the fact that the allocation of county general expenditure was being 
made on the basis of actual rateable value though the rate poundages 
were calculated in effect, by reference to standard rateable value. 
When statement (b) was studied - allocation on basis of 
standard rateable value or actual rateable value whichever is the greater - 
it was seen that the local rate in Cupar would be 10 /l1d, and the rate in 
St. Monance 1V3d. The effect of this arrangement would be to promote 
the proportionality of local rates within the county, since they would be 
based, in effect on standard rateable value in the case of the under - 
average authorities and on actual rateable value in the case of over - 
average authorities. The rate levied in the landward area and the small 
burghs for county general purposes would be the same throughout the county, 
subject to slight variations because the allocation is made on the previous 
year's standard rateable values or actual rateable values as the case may 
be and the rate is levied on the current year's figures. 
It was recommended therefore (a) that the existing system of 
capitation / - 
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capitation payments should be discontinued (b) that in future equalisation 
grant should be calculated separately for the landward area and each small 
burgh and that the county requisitions should be allocated on standard 
rateable value or actual rateable value whichever is higher (c) that the 
weighting of population for children and sparsity should be allocated 
as between the landward area and the small burghs in a county in 
proportion to their respective population. 
It may be pointed out however that the allocation of 
general county expenditure on the basis of S.R.V. or actual R.V. does 
not lead to proportionality of rate poundages if one considers the effect 
of the recommendation which the Committee also made regarding the 
adjustment in respect of local authority houses . It is true that the 
allocation on S.R.V. or R.V. (whichever higher) would have led to 
proportionality of rate poundages had there been no adjustment in 
respect of the rentals of local authority houses. The result of giving 
effect to the Committee's recommendation regarding local authority 
houses however is that the effective rateable value becomes Actual 
Rateable Value plus Credited Rateable Value instead of Standard Rateable 
Value. If there are two small burghs in a county - both receivers of 
Exchequer Equalisation Gant - one of which has fixed the rents of its 
local authority houses below the average for Scotland and the other 
with council house rents above the average then the allocation of 
general county expenditure on the basis of S.R.V. or actual whichever 
is higher will result in the burgh with the low rents policy having to 
levy a higher rate than the burgh with a high rents policy in order to 
meet its share of the general county expendi ture. 
It / - 
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It will be noted that the method recommended by the 
Investigating Committee for Scotland for the calculation of E.E.G. 
payable to the small burghs differs from that recommended by the 
English Committee (see page 72 ) . The Scottish Committee con- 
sidered the possibility of adopting the English scheme in which case 
Grant would have been paid - 
to town councils of large burghs on the existing 
basis (as amended) 
to county councils on general county expenditure 
(excluding that part of it allocated to large burghs) , 
and 
to the town councils of small burghs, and to county 
councils in respect of the landward area, on other 
expenditure. 
Under such a system it will be seen that it would not be 
necessary to allocate on the basis of S.R.V. in order to achieve the 
principle of proportionality. 
If the English scheme had been adopted it would have 
meant calculating the grant to small burghs and the landward area on the 
basis of unweighted population. It was thought however that in Scotland - 
having regard to the burden of expenditure on unclassified roads and other 
services in the landward area - it would be right to use weighted population. 
In that case further consideration would require to be given to the sparsity 
factor to be used in calculating the weighted population of the landward 
area. The Committee therefore decided to recommend the method already 
indicated. / - 
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indicated. 
(e) Limitation on Relevant Expenditure. 
Although no evidence had been produced of excessive 
spending as a result of the Grant the Scottish Committee considered the 
desirability of imposing some limit on the expenditure ranking for Grant 
in view of the fact that the English Committee had recommended some 
form of limitation. 
In Scotland however since the total amount of E . E . G .wa s 
11/80ths of the amount payable in England and Wales there was no Exchequer 
interest in limiting the relevant expenditure in Scotland. Since the local 
authority representatives did not wish any scheme of limitation in their 
own interests it was decided not to recommend any limitation although it 
was agreed that if the Scottish Grant became payable on any other basis 
a scheme of limitation would require to be considered. 
(f) Education Grant. 
The total amount of the Education Grant in Scotland was 
11/80ths of that paid in England (The Goschen formula) . The Education 
Grant to individual authorities in Scotland was similar to that in England 
being 60% of the net relevant expenditure plus £6 per pupil less the 
product of a rate of 22d. in £ or such rate as was sufficient to exhaust 
the grant in the Education (Scotland) Fund. This rate in the £ was varied 
each year in such a way as to distribute the total grant. 
It was suggested that logically any rate deduction should 
be on the effective rateable value i.e. on standard rateable value or 
rateable / - 
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rateable value if higher. So long as the total Exchequer Equalisation Grant 
and the total Education Grant was determined by the Goschen formula a 
change in the allocation of the Education Grant would not affect the 
Exchequer's liability and consequently this was a metter primarily for 
agreement on the part of the local authority representatives. It was 
therefore agreed that the rate deduction factor should be calculated on 
the basis of S.R.V. or actual rateable value whichever is higher. 
(g) Contributions in lieu of Rates on Electricity and Transport 
Undertakings. 
Under Part V of the 1948 Act, electricity and railway 
undertakings had been taken out of the valuation roll and in place of 
the rates formerly paid the B.T.C. the B.E.A. and the North of Scotland 
Hydro -Electric Board each contributed annually sums based on the rates 
paid in 1947 -48, the amount of the contribution being adjusted each year 
in accordance with a formula laid down in the Act and Regulations. These 
contributions were payable to the local authorities in proportion to their 
respective rateable values . 
The Committee considered that having regard to the 
recommendations made for the allocation of county expenditure and for 
the making of deductions under the education grant formula on the basis 
of standard rateable value if higher than actual rateable value, this 
principle should be extended also to payments under Part V of the Act. 
(h) District Councils. 
Representations had been made by the District Councils 
Association / - 
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Association that although the District Council expenditure formed part of 
the Counties' relevant expenditure and thus earned Grant for the county 
no part of the Grant was paid to the District Council in aid of its 
expenditure. It was felt that it was unfair that ratepayers in the area 
of a district council which incurs substantial expenditure should benefit 
no more by way of grant than those in a district in which expenditure is 
negligible. It was therefore recommended that payments should be 
made by the County Council to the District Councils out of the Grant 
payable to the County such payments being based on the proportion of 
the county grant which the district council expenditure included in the 
relevant local expenditure bore to the relevant expenditure on which the 
grant was based. 
Parish councils in England are in a similar position to that which 
obtained in the district councils prior to the above recommendation being 
given effect to by the Local Government Financial Provisions (Scotland) 
Act, 1954. The effect of this recommendation is that the grant to the 
district councils looks only at the expenditure side. It disregards the 
resources aspect. The result is that payment of grant can be made to 
a district council whose R.V. per head of weighted population is above 
the standard and who in terms of the Equalisation Grant principle would 
consequently not be eligible for grant. 
The recommendations of the Investigating Committee were given 
effect to by the Local Government (Financial Provisions) (Scotland) Act, 
1954. 
10. Report of Committee appointed to investigate the Operation of the 
Exchequer Equalisation Grants in Scotland (Second Investigation) 1955.1 
Following / - 
1. H.M. Stationery Office, 1955. 
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10. Report of Committee appointed to investigate the Operation of the 
Exchequer Equalisation Grants in Scotland (Second Investigation 1955)1. 
Following on the Report of the Scottish Valuation and Rating Committee 
(The "Sorn" Committee) the Secretary of State announced that as regards the 
equalisation grant, the Government were prepared, in the light of the report, 
to review the method of determining the grant in consultation with the 
Associations of local authorities. 
The appointment of a Committee was therefore made on 24th June 1955. 
The Committee made no recommendation for any substantial change in the 
method of distributing the grant among local authorities. The main subject 
of report was the question of the adequacy of the 11/80ths formula for 
determining the total grant for Scotland. 
The Sorn Committee had recommended the introduction in Scotland of 
a system of valuation and rating broadly similar to that which is now in 
operation in England and Wales. It had proposed that during the interim 
period, while revaluation on the new basis was being carried out, the 
existing rateable values should be arithmetically adjusted in a way which 
the Committee believed would give results not very different from those 
likely to follow revaluation. The Government did not accept this method 
of arithmetical adjustment but decided as an alternative that valuations 
should be frozen during the interim period. 
The revaluation in England and Wales, the results of which would 
not be available until 1956, in so far as it was based on rentals obtaining 
in 1939 would still not have afforded a basis for comparison even if the 
Sorn / - 
1. H.M. Stationery Office, 1955. 
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Sorn Committee's proposal to estimate new Scottish values by arithmetical 
adjustment had been adopted. 
It was therefore agreed that for the time being the total of E.E.G. 
in Scotland must be determined on some interim basis. The interim nature 
of the alternative method was emphasised. The local authority members 
urged that, as the results of revaluation in Scotland become apparent, 
study should begin of the relative levels of value in England and Scotland 
without waiting until revaluation in Scotland is complete. The interim 
period is likely to be longer than originally envisaged since the revaluation 
in England on current values originally intended to be effective from 1961 
to coincide with the Scottish revaluation was postponed until 1963. 
The effect of determining the total amount of the Grant for Scotland 
on the basis of 11 /80ths of the English Grant was equivalent to calculating 
the Scottish Grant on the average rateable value per head of weighted 
population in England and Wales plus 38 %. The Sorn Committee's sample 
calculations provided strong evidence that the present English average 
would have to be increased by substantially more than 38% to provide a 
Scottish equivalent. In England and Wales the ratio between credited 
rateable value and actual rateable could not fall below the proportion for 
1948 -49 by virtue of the Safeguard in Sec. 3(3) of the Local Government Act 
1948. In Scotland this ratio, although it improved after the introduction 
of the Goschen formula was still less than in 1948 -49. In the opinion of 
the Committee this appeared to confirm that Scotland was receiving less 
than her fair share of the Grant. 
In their opinion the inadequacy of the 11/80ths basis was also 
confirmed / - 
- 86 - 
confirmed by a comparison of the rates and grant borne expenditure, and the 
rate burden, in the two countries. The relevant local expenditure of 
England and Wales (ex. London) for 1953/54 was £378,115,696, the Scottish 
expenditure for the same year was £52,203,401. 
The weighted populations were 50,038,135 for England and Wales and 
6,495,797 for Scotland. Thus the Scottish relevant expenditure per head of 
weighted population was £8.04 as against £7.56 for England and Wales. 
The residual burden left to be met by rates in the two countries 
after the payment of exchequer equalisation grant was then related to 
actual population. The reason given for this was that while the weighting 
of population reflected the additional cost of local government services by 
reason of sparsity or large number of children, reference to actual population 
was considered to provide a closer measure of the burden imposed by rates. 
The figures for 1953/54 were:- 
Scotland 
England and Wales 
excluding London 
£m. £m. 
Relevant local expenditure 52.20 378.11 
Exchequer Equalisation Grant 8.42 61.20 
Rate - borne expenditure 43.78 316. 91 
Actual Population 5 ,117 , 612 40,747,460 
Burden for head £8.55 £7.78 
The / - 
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The Committee said that looked at in this way it might be argued 
that the existing arrangements, by leaving Scotland with a heavier burden 
of expenditure per head of weight ed population and a heavier burden of 
rates per head of actual population were unfair. 
The question was how could a broad equality between Scotland and England 
and Wales be brought about? A simple equalisation grant formula would be 
one which gave Scotland the additional grant which would be required to 
equalise the Scottish residual rate burden per head of actual population 
with the rate burden in England and Wales. This would mean however 
that any expenditure above the English average rate burden would attract 
an equal amount of grant to Scotland and therefore fall wholly on the 
Exchequer. 
An attempt was made to find a formula which would give Scotland 
compensation on an appropriate proportional basis for the excess, as 
compared with England and Wales, in the residual burden per head of 
actual population left after the payment of grant by the Goschen formula. 
For this purpose the Committee considered it necessary to re- introduce 
into the comparison the conception of relevant local expenditure per 
head of weighted population as a measure of the services provided by 
local authorities in the two countries. The approach was then as 
follows: "If the local authority services provided in Scotland were to 
cost proportionately the same as in England and Wales, (ex. London) 
(after payment of ad hoc grants) in terms of relevant local expenditure per 
head of weighted population, what grant might appropriately be paid in 
order to leave a residual rate burden comparable with that carried by 
English local authorities." 
The / - 
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The method was illustrated in the Investigating Committee's 




First a "notional relevant local expenditure" for 
Scotland was derived from the English relevant 
local expenditure by applying the ratio between 
Scottish and English weighted population as 
follows: - 
Relevant local expenditure (England (S, Wales) £378.11m. 
Estimated weighted population (England and 
Wales) 50,038,135 
Weighted population (Scotland) 6, 495, 797 
"Notional relevant local expenditure "(Scotland) £49.8m. 
Secondly a "notional rates burden" was calculated 
showing what would fall on the rates in Scotland if 
the true rates were the same per head of actual 
population as in England and Wales. 
Total relevant local expenditure (England & Wales) 
Exchequer Equalisation Grant (England (S, Wales) 
Population (England and Wales) 
Population (Scotland) 
"Notional rates burden" (Scotland) 
The two figures of "notional relevant local 
expenditure" and "notional rates burden" 
were then dealt with as follows: - 
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Notional relevant local expenditure (Scotland) 
Notional rates burden (Scotland) 
Exchequer Equalisation Grant calculated on 





It is seen that if expenditure per head of weighted 
population were being incurred in Scotland at the same rate as in England 
and Wales (ex London) the E.E.G. would have to be £9.28m. in order to 
leave Scotland with the same rate burden per head of actual population in 
England and Wales. This represents a ratio of grant to notional expenditure 
(£49.08m.) of 18.91%. If this percentage is then applied to the actual 
relevant local expenditure (£52.20m.) the result is an actual E.E.G. of 
£9.87m. compared with an estimated grant in the Goschen formula of 
£8.42m. This Grant represents the proportion that the Equalisation Grant 
would bear to relevant local expenditure if Scotland were (so to speak) 
treated for grant purposes as an average part of England and Wales (ex 
London). 
This then was the scheme recommended by the Committee. It 
was also suggested that the guarantee of a minimum of 11 /80ths of the 
English Grant should be retained. This recommendation was given 
effect to by the Valuation and Rating (Scotland) Act, 1956. Under the 
6th Schedule as amended by the Local Government Financial Provisions 
(Scotland) Act, 1958 the total amount of the E.E.G. for Scotland is a 
proportion of the Relevant Local Expenditure of Scottish authorities, 
the proportion being that represented by the ratio of the "notional 
exchequer grant" for Scotland to the "notional relevant local expenditure" 
for Scotland . The "notional relevant local expenditure" for Scotland is 
derived / - 
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derived from the English relevant local expenditure by applying the 
ratio between Scottish and English weighted population. A "notional 
rate borne expenditure" for Scotland is derived from the English rate 
borne expenditure (i.e. English R.L.E. - English E.E.G.) by applying 
the ratio between Scottish and English unweighted population. The 
"notional exchequer grant" for Scotland is then arrived at by deducting 
the "notional rate" borne expenditure for Scotland from the "notional 
relevant local expenditure" for Scotland. The calculation of the 
total grant for the purposes of the 3rd Provisional Calculation 1959 -60 
is shown in Appendix No. 2. For this purpose the weighted population 
is calculated on the same basis for England and Wales and Scotland, 
ie. the unweighted population plus the number of children under 15 
plus in counties 3rd of the additional number necessary to bring the 
population per mile of road up to 70. In making the calculation for 
the purposes of the Sixth Schedule the total relevant local expenditure 
and population etc. are taken for all authorities both grant- receiving 
and non -grant receiving. 
It will be noted that the only Scottish factors entering into 
the calculation of "Notional Exchequer Grant for Scotland" and 
"Notional Relevant Local Expenditure for Scotland" are the population 
and the weighted population of Scotland. Hence the only Scottish 
factors entering into the calculation of the total Scottish Grant are 
the population, weighted population and the relevant local expend- 
iture of Scottish authorities. Thus changes in the levels of 
valuation of Scottish authorities cannot affect the total amount of 
grant payable to Scotland. They can only affect the distribution 
of the grant to authorities inter se. 
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11. The Local Government Act, 1958. 
The Local Government Act, 1958 gave effect to the main 
recommendations of the Edwards Committee of 1953. The Act 
changed the name of the Grants to the "Rate Deficiency" Grants 1. 
The most important change was that the capitation 
payments were discontinued. Grant is paid to eligible county 
councils on the expenditure for general county purposes only. 
Boroughs, district councils and metropolitan boroughs get R.D.G. 
on their own expenditure and also on payments to the county for 
special county precepts. County Boroughs continue to receive 
grant on all their expenditure. 
The Research Study Local Expenditure and Exchequer 
Grants , 1956 had recommended that E.E.G. should be based on 
ld. rate products instead of rateable value thus making allowances 
for non -effective rateable value. This was given effect to. The 
grant for an authority is the proportion of that authority's expenditure 
represented by the following:- 
Standard ld. rate product - actual ld. rate product 
Standard ld. rate product. 
"Standard penny rate product" is:- 
1d . rate product for England and Wales x Population of the area 
Population of England and Wales 
In making the calculation for counties and county boroughs an 
addition is made to the population of each county with a ratio of population 
to / - 
1. Henceforth the abbreviation R.D.G. is used to indicate Rate 
Deficiency Grant. 
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to road mileage of less than 70. The in:.rease is 2 /5ths of the 
additional population needed to bring the county's population up 
to 70 per mile of road. 
If an authority has relevant expenditure of £1,200,000 
an actual Id. rate product of £3000, and a standard ld. rate 
product of £4,000, then its grant is:- 
1,200,000 x 
Limitation. 
£4,000 - £3,000 
£4,000 = £300,000 
There is a section in the Act which limits the amount of 
the R.D.G. which can be paid to an authority. The object of the 
exercise is to find out which authorities are increasing their 
expenditure most, and to eliminate grant on "excess" expenditure, 
but there is a concession for those authorities who have spent 
comparatively little in the past and who need to "catch up" with 
the others. As this section is somewhat complicated and since 
there is no corresponding provision relating to the E.E.G. in 
Scotland it is not proposed to go into further detail regarding the 
"limitation arrangements" . 
The 1948 Act provided a guarantee that the total E.E.G 
would always keep up with the level of local expenditure. This 
was considered necessary because it was thought that the grant 
would automatically diminish as and when rateable values became 
more uniform throughout the country. The 1958 Act does not 
continue / - 
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continue this guarantee for the R.D.G. The intention of the 
Government is apparently to adjust the total amount of government 
aid by altering the total of the general grant. 
12. Comparison between the English and Scottish Grant. 
Having traced the development of the Grant in both 
countries from the time of its introduction until the present day 
it may be useful finally to summarise briefly the main points of 
difference between the two formulae. 
In England R.D.G. is now based on rate product instead 
of rateable value thus making allowance for empty property, losses 
on collection etc. whereas in Scotland the E.E.G. is still based 
on rateable value. 
For the R.D.G. the standard up to which the actual ld. 
rate product of an authority is brought is that ld. rate product which it 
would have if it enjoyed average rate product per head of weighted 
population In Scotland the standard rateable value up to which an 
authority's rateable value is brought is that rateable value arrived 
at by multiplying the "governing factor" per head of weighted 
population by the weighted population of the area. The "governing 
factor" is the figure used by the Secretary of State sufficient to 
exhaust the total Scottish Grant. 
Thus in England the starting off point is the average R.V. 
or average rate product per head of weighted population and it is 
this / - 
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this which determines ultimately the total grants to local authorities. 
In Scotland it is the other way round; the total grant is first determined 
and this determines the governing factor which in turn forms the basis 
of Standard Rateable Value. 
This is an important difference. It means that whereas in 
England each authority's grant is calculated independently of the others, 
e.g. an increase in the R.D.G. of one authority does not automatically 
reduce the amount available for the others, in Scotland the E.E.G. s of 
the authorities are interdependent - a change in one authority's position 
resulting in a redistribution of grant among the grant receiving authorities. 
This inter -dependence and variability of the factors makes it exceedingly 
difficult to trace through the effect of proposed changes in the Grant 
formula. 
For England the only weighting factor in the population is the 
sparsity one for counties and county boroughs of 2 /5ths of the additional 
population necessary to bring the county's population up to 70 per mile 
of road. In Scotland in addition to the sparsity weighting for counties 
which is 3rd of the additional population necessary to bring the population 
up to 70 per mile of road, the weighting for children under 15 is retained 
for all authorities. Scottish Counties also receive a weighting for 
rapidly increasing population. 
The adjustment for local authority houses in arriving at the 
Credited Rateable Value is no longer necessary since the revaluation 
of 1961/62 in Scotland is based on hypothetical rents instead of on rents 
actually passing. No similar adjustment was ever necessary for 
England. / - 
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England. 
In England eligible County Councils receive grant on 
expenditure for general county purposes only. The net expenditure 
on general county purposes after deducting R.D.G. is precepted on 
the poundage basis on the non -county boroughs and district councils 
within the county. Boroughs and district councils receive R.D.G. 
on their own expenditure and also on payments to the county for 
special county precepts but not of course on the general county 
precept since that is already net after deduction of R.D.G. It 
will be noted that proportionality is not achieved for special county 
purposes although it is understood that the amounts involved are 
small and that there is always Section 7 of the 1958 Act to cover 
the exceptional case. 
In Scotland on the other hand County Councils do not 
receive grant on expenditure for general county purposes. The 
County Council in its capacity of "rural district council" receives 
grant on its landward expenditure plus its share of the county 
requisition for general county expenditure. Large and small burghs 
receive their E.E.G. based on their own expenditure plus their 
share of the county requisition. The allocation of the county 
requisition is made on the basis of S.R.V. or actual R.V. whichever 
is higher this being deemed to be the effective rateable value. 
County Councils must pay out of the E.E.G. received on behalf of the 
landward area a share to the district councils based on the proportion 
which the relevant local expenditure of the district councils bears 
to the total relevant local expenditure of the landward area. 
In / - 
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In Scotland there is no limitation provision similar to that 
contained in the Local Government Act, 1958. The 1st Investigating 
Committee considered the desirability of imposing some limit on the 
expenditure ranking for Grant in view of the fact that the "Edwards" 
Committee had recommended some form of limitation. At that time 
since the total amount of the Scottish Grant was 11/80ths of the 
amount payable in England and Wales there was no exchequer interest 
in limiting the relevant expenditure in Scotland. This is not so now. 
As the local authority representatives did not wish any scheme of 
limitation in their own interests it was decided not to recommend 
any scheme of limitation. It may be that this question will be 
raised at the next investigation either by the Central Government 
or at the instigation of interested authorities. 
13. The effect of weightings in the Exchequer Equalisation Grant. 
It was said that in addition to equalising rateable values 
per head of population the Grant also endeavoured to take account 
of differing needs on the expenditure side. It remains for us to 
see how this was attempted by the inclusion of weightings in the 
formula . 
Instead of equalising Rateable Values per head of population 
the grant equalises Rateable Values per head of weighted population. 
The weightings are (a) the number of children under 15 which is added 
to population, and (b) the sparsity factor - an addition to the population 
where the ratio of population to road mileage is below the prescribed 
standard. / - 
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standard. Woodham sees the introduction of weightings into the 
formula as something unsatisfactory'. " Consider , on the other 
hand, the enormous advantage of a formula which equalised rateable 
resources per head of ordinary population. Given a grant based 
upon such a formula, then rate poundages would become directly 
proportionate to expenditure per head of population, not only 
within the same authority, but equally between two different 
authorities" . 
The precise significance of this weighting does not 
appear to have been fully appreciated by previous investigators2 
of the Exchequer Equalisation Grant, although Woodham comes 
near to it when he says (p.13) "It (the rateable value credited) 
is therefore a measure of the deficiency in local rateable resources, 
compared with the national average, scaled up or down relatively 
to that of other authorities according as the authority's weightings 
for children and sparsity are above or below the national averages." 
I shall take Woodham's own example in analysing the 
Rateable Value Credited of the County Borough of Bootle to illustrate 
the point. 
County Borough of Bootle. 
1. Op.cit. p.15. 
/ 
2. J.B. Woodham, Op.cit. 
Local Expenditure and Exchequer Grants, Op.cit. 
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County Borough of Bootle. 
(1) Population 64,760 
(2) Children 19,100 
(3) Sparsity Nil. 
(4) Weighted Population 83,860 
(5) Rateable Value £468,319 
(6) Standard Unweighted R.V. 
(1) x £7.8394674 (the average R.V.per head of 
unweighted pop .) 1 
(7) Standard Rateable Value 
(4) x £6.4312510 (the average R.V. 
per head of weighted pop.) 2 
507,684 
539.325 
(8) Rateable Value Credited 
(7 - 5) £ 71,006 
Woodham thus breaks down the rateable value credited - 
Rateable Value component = (6 - 5) _ £ 39,365 
Weighting component = (7 - 6) = 31, 641 
71,006 
The weighting component arises because (a) Bootle's ratio of 
children to total population .29494 exceeds the national average of 
.21608, and (b) its sparsity weighting (Nil.) is less than the national 
average of .00288. Thus the gain of 31,641 can be divided between 
children weighting and sparsity weighting as follows:- - 
1. Standard unweighted R.V. is the tax base the authority would have if it 
had average per capita tax base. 
2. Standard R.V. is the t ax base the authority would have if it had average 
tax base per head of weighted population. 
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Actual number of children 19,100 
Standard number of 
children .21608 x 64,760 13,993 
Gain 
Sparsity Weighting 
5,107 at £6.4312510 
(R.V. per head of 
weighted population) 
Actual sparsity factor Nil. 
Standard sparsity factor 
.00288x 64, 760 187 
Loss 187 at £6.4312510 




Net Gain 31,641 
Continuing from where Woodham has left off, it is obvious that in 
per capita terms the Rateable Value credited is:- 
Rateable Value Component. 
By dividing the total R.V. Component shown on page 98 
by the population of Bootle we see that in per capita terms it is 
(6) - (5) 507,684 - 468,319 .607859 
p 64,760 
(p = Bootle's population 
P = Total population 
c = Bootle's children population 
C = Total Children population 
s = Bootle's sparsity factor 
S = Total sparsity factor 
WB / - 
100 
WB = Tax base per head of weighted population) 
Children Component. 





= 5,107 x 6.4312510 = .507171 
64,760 
Sparsity Component. 
Divide total sparsity component on p.99 by Bootle's population 
s - S - - 187 x 6.4312510 = -.018571 
( 
P 
) WB 64760 
We may check this back as follows:- 
R.V. Component 64,760 x .607859 = £ 39,365 
Children Component 64, 760 x . 507171 = 32,844 
Sparsity Component 64, 760 x -.018571 = - 1,203 
Rateable Value Credited 
Suppose now that we let 
£71, 006 
N1 = the per capita standard of need as measured 
by the ratio of an authority's number of 
children/its population (ci ) 
p, 
i 
Ni 11 the per capita standard of need as measured 
by the ratio of an authority's sparsity 
factor /its population (s i ) 
p 
i 
and that the use of bars indicates weighted averages as on page 7 
e.g. / - 
e.g. 
- 101 - 
(Ni pi) 
..t` pi 
(alternatively stated ) 
We then see that the per capita Rateable Value credited will be - 
(B - Bi) + (Ni - -) WB + (Nil - N11) WB 
(R . V . Component) (Children Component) (Sparsity Component) 
and the per capita Standard Rat eable Value will be 
B + (Ni - Nl ) WB + (Nil Nll) WB 
(average tax base) (adjustment to tax base) 
It is seen therefore that the formula having provided an authority with 
average per capita tax base initially then increases or reduces it by a 
proportion of the average tax base per head of weighted population (WB) 
according as its standard d need is above or below the average standard 
of need. 
It would be more meaningful for us however if we could express 
this adjustment in terms of an adjustment to the tax base B instead of the 
weight ed tax base WB . 
Now WB -- 1 (Bipi) 
P + C + S 
multiply numerator and denominator by P 
P i (Bipi) 




- i(Bipi ) 
P 
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Therefore WB = p + C + S x B 
(For convenience represent the weighted population P + C + S as WP) . 
Going back to page 101 we see that per capita R.V. Credited (B - Bi) + 
1 1 11 1 
(Ni -N) WB + (Ni - N 3) WB may be expressed as follows: - 
(B - Bi) + (Nil - Nl) x WP x B + 
(Nill N11) xWP x B 
and per capita Standard Rateable Value B + (Ni1 - N1) WB + (Ni" -R-11) _ as 
T3 +(N. 1 - N1) xWP x B +(N" - N11) x WP x B i 
Let us now re- define our standards of need N1 and Nil. Suppose that 
instead of making 
N1 = c. 1
pi 
and 
N11 = si 
pi 
that we had defined them as follows 
1 
N = ci x P 





N = cli(ciP) = P `ici = P x C 
-;'i(p WP) WP ,lp i 
WP P 
We may now write for per capita Rateable Value Credited 
(B - B. + (N i1 - Nl B ll 11 ) - N B 
and for per capita Standard Rateable Value 
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B + (Ni - N1 ) B + (N. - 11 Nll B 
The subsidy formula is then 
A. 
i 
Si = B + (Ni - I1) B + (Nil Ñll 
B11 




x (B - Bi) +(N- - N1) B+ (N 1 Nll) 
B+(1Vi - N1) 
B1 +( Ni1 - Nll ) B 
( S, _ B - B,) - N1 ) Bti + (N11 1111 1 - 
Stated in this form the Exchequer Equalisation Grant is similar to formula 
(2) Si = (B - B.) t, + (N, - N) Bt - an equalisation of fiscal 
potential in relation to needs. 
The Exchequer Equalisation Grant formula therefore endeavours 
to make allowances for differences in fiscal potential by equalising the 
per capita tax base and at the same time to make allowances for needs 
by applying the correction for need to the yield of the equalised tax base. 
The formula is perfectly logical and consistent both in its equalisation 
of the resources side and the need or expenditure side in so far as it 
attempts to put into effect a particular approach to the problem. This 
is not to say that the measures of need provided for in the Exchequer 
Equalisation Grant are necessarily the most accurate. But it is hoped 
that it does show that the inclusion of needs factors or weightings in 
the Exchequer Equalisation Grant is not objectionable on the grounds 
of / - 
- 104 - 
of obscuring the workings of the Grant if we understand the fundamental 
nature of the Grant. In making recommendations for the dropping of the 
children weighting from the Exchequer Equalisation Grant and for the 
substitution therefor of a scholar -ratio compensating factor1 equal to 
plus or minus £15 for every scholar more than or less than the authority's 
standard number, these writers, although they may not have realised it, 
were expressing a preference for a different concept of equalisation, 
1. J.B. Woodham, Op.cit., p.78. See also a similar recommendation 
Local Expenditure and Exchequer Grants, Op e cit . , p.246. 
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CHAPTER V. 
THE GENERAL GRANT . 
1. Introduction. 
We turn now to the General Grant which also has equalisation 
features but which has a fundamentally different approach to equalisation 
from that of the E.E.G. Labour which had held office from the first 
election after the 1939/45 war and during whose period of office the 
E.E.G. had been introduced was finally defeated at the polls in 1951 
and replaced by a Conservative Government. Early in 1956 the Minister 
of Housing and Local Government announced that a comprehensive review 
of local government finance was being undertaken as part of the Govern- 
ment's proposals for local government in England and Wales and in reply 
to a Question in the House on 8th May 1956 he explained that this review 
was the most thorough of its kind since 1929. The other proposals of the 
Government dealt with Areas and status of Local Authorities) and the 
Functions of County Councils and County District Councils2. No 
similar proposals relating to Areas of Local Authorities and the Functions 
of County Councils etc. were made for Scotland and it was only the 
review of local government finance therefore which affected Scottish 
local authorities. 
The / - 
1. White Paper Cmd. 9831, July 1956 
2. 161 , May 1957. 
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The Government's proposals for Local Government 
Finance (England and Wales) were published in a White Paper' 
in July 1957 and similar proposals for Scotland were contained 
in a White Paper on Local Government Finance in Scotland.2 
Prior to the issue of these White Papers the results of two studies into 
the subject viz. The Report of s Study Group of the Royal Institute 
of Public Administration on New Sources of Local Revenue3 and a 
Research Study set on foot by the Institute of Municipal Treasurers 
4 
and Accountants on Local Expenditure and Exchequer Grants had 
been made available to the Government in advance of their publication. 
The Report of the R . I . P .A . had recommended a local income tax at 
a low flat rate not exceeding 3d. in the £ and the I.M.T.A. Research 
Study had come out strongly in favour of percentage grants against 
a General Grants. 
2. Government's Proposals for Local Finance. 
The Government however indicated that they did not think 
it practicable to devise a satisfactory new source of local revenue 
by authorising the collection of a local income tax or other such 
impost on top of the national system of taxes. Any improvement 
of the system of local finance in this country could only come from 
an / - 
1. White Paper Cmá. 209, July, 1957 
2. " " " 208, July, 1957 
3. New Sources of Local Revenue - R.I.P.A. , Allen and Unwin, 
London, 1956. 
4. Local Expenditure and Exchequer Grants, Op . cit . 
5. p.282 
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an improvement of the rating system combined with a radical re- casting 
of the system of grants. 
The E.E.G. accounted for only about 15% of the total of 
Exchequer Grants, the majority of the other grants being on a percentage 
basis in respect of specific services (e.g. Education, Health, etc.) . 
The Government indicated that the kind of improvement which they 
thought desirable was one which would result in a substantially larger 
part of the grant -in -aid being given in the form of general assistance 
not tied on a percentage basis to specific services. Although it was 
stated that the underlying purpose of the proposals was to give local 
authorities increasedfinancial independence and to encourage local 
government electors to take a fresh interest in local government affairsl 
there does not appear to be anything in the proposals to justify such a 
statement aryl the real reason for the change would seem to be in this 
Government's different political approach to the Grant system. As has 
been seen a previous Conservative Government had in 1929 introduced 
a "Block Grant" in place of a number of percentage grants for specific 
services. At that time they had excluded from the "Block Grant" the 
major grant for the Education Service but on this occasion it was 
proposed to bring Education within the scope of the General Grant. 
The Government did not propose to abandon entirely the Exchequer 
Equalisation Grant which was allowed to continue in a slightly modified 
form. 
3. Re- rating of Industry. 
In 1929 industry and freight- transport had been derated to 
the / - 
1. Mr. Brooke, Minister of Housing and Local Government - Hansard Vot564, 
p.1079. 
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the extent of 75% of their net annual value. With a view to 
strengthening the rating system it was now proposed to re -rate 
these subjects to 50% of N.A.V. Since this re- rating would have 
the effect of reducing the product of income tax, profits tax and 
surtax the Government intended to make some reduction in the grants 
to allow for this. The estimated product of rates from re- rating in 
1956/57 was £30 million in England and Wales and £2.3 million in 
Scotland. While the Government felt that there was a strong case 
for reducing the grants by the whole product of re- rating they 
indicated that they were prepared to restrict this reduction to 
two-thirds. 
4. Payments of rates by nationalised industries. 
Payments in lieu of rates made by the nationalised gas, 
electricity and transport industries would now be included in the 
rating system and treated as rates, rateable values being arrived 
at for these industries on the basis of formulae provided. This 
proposal was not applied to Scotland the Government taking the 
view that as the valuation and rating system in Scotland had 
recently been the subject of radical reform under the Valuation 
and Rating (Scotland) Act 1956 and as all rateable values were 
frozen under the Act until 1961 further amending legislation was 
not desirable meantime. 
5. General Grant - Aggregate Amount. 
It was proposed to replace as many as practicable of the 
specific / - 
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specific grants which were on a percentage basis by a general grant 
of an amount fixed in advance for a short period of years, though not 
necessarily at the same level for each year of the period. This 
general grant was to be distributed by reference to objective factors 
(mainly of weighted population) which could not be influenced by 
the decisions of individual authorities "and which afford a fair and 
reasonable measure of the relative needs of each authority" . 
The grants to be replaced by the General Grant were those 
for - 
Education (but not school milk and meals) 
Health Services under the National Health 
Service Act 1946 
Fire 
Child Care 
Town Planning (But not grants for blitz redevelopment 
in England and Wales or major redevelopment in Scotland) 
Road Safety 
Traffic Patrols 
Registration of Electors 
Physical Training and recreation 
Residential and temporary accommodation under the 
National Assistance Act 1948. 
School Crossing Patrols 
Expenditure on advanced technological education and a wide 
range / - 
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range of further education was to be pooled and shared between all 
local education authorities, the pooling arrangement being a recognition 
of the national nature of this expenditure. 
Initially the grant period was to be two years, a different 
amount of grant being prescribed for each year. The total amount 
for each year would be decided by the Government (after discussion 
with the associations of local authorities) and announced by White 
Paper, the figure then being embodied in an Order. In determining 
the total of the grant for any period the Minister is required to take 
into consideration 
"(a) the latest information available to him of the rate 
of relevant expenditure (excluding, except in 
so far as the Minister or Secretary of State 
with the consent of the Treasury otherwise 
determines, any expenditure of a description 
in respect of which no grant has been paid 
for any year ending before the sixteenth day 
of May, Nineteen hundred and Fifty -nine) and 
the current level of prices, costs and remuneration, 
together with any future variation in that level 
which can be foreseen; 
(b) any probable fluctuation in the demand for the 
services giving rise to relevant expenditure, 
so far as the fluctuation is attributable to 
circumstances 7 - 
circumstances prevailing in Scotland as a 
whole which are not under the control of 
local authorities; and 
(c) the need for developing those services and the 
extent to which, having regard to general 
economic conditions, it is reasonable to 
develop those services." 1 
He is also required to take into account the levels of 
remuneration and prices current at the time together with any fore- 
seeable variations. In the event of unforeseen increases during 
the grant period of such magnitude as cannot reasonably be borne 
by the local authorities (e.g. a teachers' salary award) provision 
is made by way of an Increase Order. 
The Government also took the opportunity to abolish a 
number of minor specific grants. 
2 
All of these proposals in so 
far as they affected England and Wales were given effect to by the 
Local Government Act 1958 which also gave effect to the recommend- 
ations of the Edwards Committee on the E.E.G. which was now re- 
named Rate -Deficiency Grant. The provisions relating t o Scotland 
were contained in the Local Government and Miscellaneous Financial 
Provisions (Scotland) Act 1958. 
The / - 
1. Sec. 2, Local Government and Miscellaneous Financial Provisions 
(Scotland) Act 1958. 
2. See Appendix No.3. 
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The effect of all of the changes in the 1958 Act (e.g. the 
re- rating of industry, the dropping of the children weighting from 
the English Rate Deficiency Grant) was such that it resulted in a 
reduction in the total of the Rate -Deficiency Grants and consequently 
of the Scottish E.E.G. since it was related to the Grant payable in 
England. To compensate for this reduction the Government added to the 
General Grant the amount of the reduction in R.D.G. and E.E.G. The 
Act of 1948 which established the E.E.G. had contained a guarantee 
provision (Section 3 (3) and (4) ) whereby the proportion which the 
aggregate "rateable value credited" for England and Wales bears to 
the rateable value for England and Wales would not be allowed to fall 
below that obtaining in 1948/49. Thi. s was abolished by the Local 
Government Act 1958, the Government's intention evidently being to 
make any adjustment deemed necessary in future by way of addition 
to the General pant. 
As is usual whenever a major alteration in Grants is made 
which result in a change in the distribution among authorities transitional 
arrangements were provided for, the object of the transitional scheme 
being to ensure that the gains and losses would take effect gradually. 
This was done by financing grants to the losers out of gains temporarily 
withheld from the gainers sufficient to meet the losses. The 
transitional period was not to exceed ten years, losses being made 
good to the extent of 100% in the first year 1959/60, 90% in the second 
year, etc. 
In order to arrive at the aggregate amount of grant to be 
distributed / - 
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distributed the Central authority called for estimates for 1959/60 and 
1960/61 from each authority of its expenditure on those services the 
specific grants for which were replaced by the General Grant (but 
not those services the minor grants for which were abolished) . The 
estimates were to allow for the development of the services but they 
were to be based on price and wage levels then in force allowing only 
for known increases pending. Thus no allowance was to be made for 
possible inflation. These estimates were required to be supported by 
certain statistics, e.g. the number of teachers, pupils, firemen, 
children in care, etc., the object of which was to enable the Central 
Departments to check the realistic nature of the estimates. In a 
number of cases they were able to show that while individual authorities 
might wish to recruit the manpower budgetted for, having regard to the 
available of manpower in particular professions the total demands 
were unlikely to be met. After scrutiny by the representatives of the 
central government and consultations with the local authority represent- 
atives adjusted figures were finally agreed as being the estimates to be 
taken for the purpose of calculating the aggregate grant. 
The procedure adopted was to apply the rates of grant which 
had formerly obtained under the percentage grant system to the totals of 
estimated expenditure under the various specific services, e.g. Health 
Service Expenditure 50 %, Fire 25 %, etc., in order to arrive at an 
aggregate grant for distribution. The General Grant Order 1958 (England 
and Wales) and the General Grant Order 1958(Scotland) provided for the 
total grants to be paid in 1959/60 and in 1960/61. The following example 
made up from the figures contained in these Grant Orders shows the 
method / - 
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method of arriving at the aggregate grant for 1959/60. 
England and Wales 1 Scotland 2 
Estimated expenditure on 
1959/60 1959/60 
£ millions £ millions 
" Relevant Services" 707.8 80.235 
Specific grants which would 
have been payable on this 
relevant expenditure 399.9 49.659 
Less Deduction to offset 
20.0 1.5 re- rating income (3) 
379.9 48.159 
Add Compensation for reduction 
in R.D.G. or E.E.G. 11.75 1. 9 
Compensation for discon- 
tinued minor grants 1. 5 .065 
393.15 50.124 
rounded to 393. 0 50.125 
1. Local Government Finance (Eng. and Wales) General Grant Order, 1958 
2. " " Scotland 11 
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Subsequently these figures were increased by the General 
Grant Increase Order 1960 to take account of salary awards to teachers, 
nursing staff and local government officers. 
As the consultations between Central authority representatives 
and local authority representatives in connection with the determining of 
the aggregate grant for the next Grant Order period viz. 1961/62 and 
1962/63 the representatives of the Central Department indicated that 
it was considered wrong to continue using specific grant percentages 
when the whole principle of the general grant was to get away from such 
calculations. They suggested that instead of adding up the various 
specific grants which might have been payable on the old system and 
adjusting for re- rating, discontinued grants and E.E.G. changes, that 
there should be applied to the relevant expenditure a uniform percentage, 
this percentage to be arrived at from the ratio which the aggregate grant 
in the first grant order period bore to the estimated relevant expenditure 
for that period. For Scotland this was 62.4% and for England and Wales 
55.5 %, although it was stated that there was no suggestion that the 
general grant should be permanently fixed at these percentages of 
expenditure; any major change in the services for which local 
authorities were responsible would make it necessary to consider the 
relationship between expenditure and grant again. It was on the 
basis of these percentages that the aggregate grants for the second 
grant period were calculated. 
One might wonder why the percentage of expenditure which 
England and Wales received by way of grant was 55.5% while Scotland 
received 62.4 %. The explanation lies in the history of the Education 
Grant / - 
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Grant for Scotland. The total of the Scottish Education Grant had for long 
been determined at 11 /80ths of the Grant payable in England in accordance 
with the Goschen formula. The Goschen formula which has on a number 
of occasions been used to regulate the respective shares of Exchequer 
funds for England and Scotland was first introduced in 1888.1 It has 
been said that originally it was supposed to represent the contributions from 
taxation to the Exchequer by the two countries) although it is more 
probable that it was arrived at largely on the basis of population figures, 
e.g. the Scottish population as a percentage of that for England and 
Wales in 1891 was 13.88% while the Goschen formula of 11/80ths expressed 
as a percentage is 13.75 %. 
Table No. 2. 
Scottish Population 
Population as a percentage of 
England and Wales 
England & Wales Scotland population 
1881 25,974,439 3,735,573 14.38% 
1891 29,002,525 4,025,647 13.88% 
1961 46, 071, 604 5,178, 490 11.24% 
Goschen formula as a %age 13.75% 
By 1961 however, the Scottish population was only 11.24% of that 
of / - 
1. Vide Royal Commission on Local Taxation - Scotland, Op.cit. p.15 
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of England and Wales. In so far as England's needs in terms of 
population had increased more than Scotland's, England was spending 
more than her " Goschen" equivalent the benefit of which accrued to 
Scotland since her total grant was 11/80ths of England's grant although 
her needs in terms of the population ratio had diminished. Consequently 
the Scottish Education Grant represented a much higher percentage of 
education expenditure than did the English Grant. 
6. Distribution Formula. 
The formula for the distribution of the General Grant in England 
and Wales to the 83 county boroughs, 61 counties and the London County 
Council for 1959/60 and 1960/61 was as follows:- 
Basic Grant 
(a) Per head of population £5.75 (£6.05) 
(b) For each child under 15 £.52 (£ . 54) 
Supplementary Grants 
(c) Young children (under 5) and old people (over 65) 
£.42 (£ . 43) 
(d) School children etc. £.058 (£.06) per head of 
population multiplied by the number of 
pupils etc. per 1,000 population in excess 
of 110. 
(e) High Density. A percentage of the basic grant 
being half the amount by which the number of 
persons per acre exceeds 18. 
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(f) Low Density. A percentage of the basic 
grant payable where road mileage exceeds 
2 per 1,000 population; the percentage 
being 24 times the road mileage per 1, 000 
population with a maximum of 70 %. 
(g) Declining Population. A percentage of the 
basic grant being half the amount by which 
the decline in population over the past 20 
years exceeds 5%. 
(h) High cost in Metropolitan District. 5% of the 
basic grant to authorities wholly or partly 
in the Metropolitan Police District. 
(i) Less: Product of a Sd. rate. 
These figures of £5.75, £.52 etc. are adjusted at each grant 
review so as to distribute the total of the Grant. 
The Scottish Grant which is initially calculated for each 
education area is distributed on the basis of weighted population. 1 
The first weighting is to add the number of children under 15 to the 
actual civilian population. Two further weightings are added to 
reflect, / - 
1. See appendix No.4 for details of the weightings for the ratio of 
landward to total population and that for sparsity in terms of 
pupils per mile of roads. 
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reflect, first, the ratio of the landward population to the total population 
in each county, and secondly, the geographical sparsity of the school 
population. The first of these additional weightings is justified by 
the consideration that the cost of educational and other services 
provided for a predominantly landward population is relatively greater 
than the cost of providing the same service for more compact urban 
units. The second recognises that educational costs are specially 
high in sparsely populated areas. 
The grant calculated initially for each education area is, 
for county areas, then allocated among the rating areas in the county in 
the same way as expenditure is apportioned - that is, according to their 
rateable or standard rateable value, whichever is the higher. 
7. Reduction of aggregate grant and Pooling Arrangement. 
Under the former specific grant system the Government had 
been empowered to meet certain expenditure centrally and re- charge part 
to local authorities by deduction from the fire service and children's grants. 
Under the General Grant system the local authorities' share is recovered by 
deduction from the total of the General Grant. In Scotland this also applies 
to payments made to the universities under Sec. 70 of the Education 
(Scotland) Act 1946. 
It was also considered that certain items of expenditure 
incurred by authorities were of a national character which benefited all 
authorities, e.g. advanced further education and that it was right that 
this should be shared by all irrespective of whether it was mainly incurred 
by / - 
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by a few. This expenditure is therefore pooled and shared between 
the authorities, the pooling arrangement being secured by the Central 
authority adding or deducting appropriate sums for each authority's 
general grant. It is not intended to give any detailed consideration 
to the pooling arrangement since it is a minor refinement to the Grant. 
We have seen therefore that as from 1959/60 the Government 
replaced the majority of the percentage grants on specific services by 
a General Grant in total approximately equal to what would have been 
paid under the percentage grant system and that this total Grant was 
then distributed to individual authorities on the basis of "objective" 
factors not capable of being influenced by the decisions of individual 
authorities. 
8. Analysis of the General Grant Distribution Formula. 
Attention was drawn in Ch. 1 to the essentially taxing and 
subsidising nature of equalisation grants and it was said that it was 
as though we increased the income base in the first place and then 
reduced it or increased it according as the needs of the authorities 
were above or below average. It was seen that in the case of the 
E.E.G. each authority with a per capita tax base below the standard 
was brought up to that standard so as to give each the same potential 
per capita tax base, this being then scaled up or down having regard 
to the authority's needs. 
Since the General Grant is an equalisation grant it must 
have similar features and we take the Scottish General Grant first to 
illustrate / - 
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illustrate this since it is more easily analysed than the English Grant. 
From Appendix Table No.A.2 which shows the details of the 
General Grants for 1959/60 for each authority the following summary 
is prepared:- 
Population of all authorities 5,168,992 
Add for weightings - 
Children under 15 1,306,690 
Pupils per mile of road 132,583 
Ratio of Landward /Total 
Populations 156,679 1,595,952 
Weighted Population 6,764,944 
Total of General Grant £51,134,239 
General Grant per head of weighted population 
" unweighted 
Ratio of Children under 15 /total unweighted 
population 








Now it is obvious that if allarthorities had the same ratios for children 
under 15 to their total populations, etc. , the weightings would have no effect 
on the grant received by them and we could distribute the grant solely on 
unweighted population. The differences in grant arise because ratios of 
children to populations , etc . , are either above or below the average ratios 
of children to population, etc. If we take as an example the figures for 




Unweighted Population 186,350 
Add for weightings - 
Children under 15 44,759 
Pupils per mile of road Nil 
Ratio of landward/total 
population Nil 
Aberdeen's ratio of children to total 
44,759 
231,109 
unweighted population .2401878 
General Grant 231,109 x .55870839 = £1,746,886 
Breakdown of General Grant - 
Unweighted Population 186,350 x £9.89249722 £1,843,467 
Children Factor 186,350 (.2401878 - .2527939)x7.55870839 = -17,756 
Pupils per mile Factor 186,350 (Nil - .02564968) x 7.558 = - 36,129 
Landward/Total Population 
Factor 186,350 (Nil - .030311325) x 7.55870839 = - 42,695 
£1,746,887 
Obviously then the per capita subsidy may be expressed in this way: - 
Si = 9.892 + 7.558 (Nl - Nl) + 7.558 (Nill Ñ11) 
+ 7. 558 (N 
111 Ñlll 
i 
where N,1= ratio of children under 15 /total population of an authority 
11 






ratio of weighting for landward population/ 
1 1 
N. = i(Ni Pi) 
; ipi 
and similarly for N11 and 1q111 
Turning now to the English General Grant but omitting the factors 
for high and low density, declining population and high cost in the Metropolitan 
area, items (e) , (f) , (g) , (h) on pages 1178,14 the following summary is 
prepared from the English General Grant Order 1960:- 
Basic grant: 
(i) Population amount (45, 755, 001 x £6.51) £297,865,062 
(ii) Amount for children under 15 (10,472,000 
x £.58 ) 6,073,760 
Supplementary grants: 
(i) Young children and old people 
(8,915,000 x £.53) 
(ii) School children, etc. 







53p1 Now General Grant = 6.51pí + , 58cí .53cí .  f . 066pí 
x 1000 
110 ) - .033R.V.2 
Pi 
1. The treatment of these items is omitted because of lack of information. 
2. pi = population of authority 
c, = children under 15 
i 
11 = 5 
p. persons over 65 
111 = scholars 
i 
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= 6.51p, + .58c,1 + .53c,11 + .53p,1 + 66c,111 7.26p, - .033R.V. 
1 1 1 
Dividing through by p, we get the per capita subsidy 
si = 6.51 .58-1 + .53c,1í + .53p1 + 66c.111 7.26 - .033R.V. 
pi 1 1 1 
pi pi pi Pi 
= - .75 + .58N,1 + .53N,11 + .53N,111 66N,1111 .033B, 
1 1 
where Nil = ratio of children under 15 /population 
11 N= 5/ 




(p,s,) = £423,159,250 
1 1 
-.75p, + .58N,1p, + .53N 11p + .53N ll1p + 66N lllp - .033B ,p, = 
1 1 11 
423,159,250 
.75p ) + (.58Nilpi) +i(.53Ni11pi) +1(.53Ni111p) +1(66Nillllpl) 
i 
- i(.033Bipi) = 423,159,250 
-.75 Li p. + . 58 (N.lp.) + . 53,1, (N 11 p) + . 534 (N,lllp,) + 66,,'. (N,llllp,) i 1 1 1 1 1 ] 1 1 1 1 1 
' - .033 Zi(Bipi) = 423,159,250. 
' -.75 = -.58i(Nìlpi) - .531(Nillpi ) -.53i(N1111p1) p1) 
, ` 
i 




i 4, i pi 
By definition 
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+ .033'1(BP) + 423,159,250 
4 ipi ipi 
Nl = Zi(Ni1Pi) 
ipi 
Similarly for N11 N111, N 1111, 
. -.75 = -.58Ñ1 - .53Ñ11 - .53N -111 66N111 .033B + 423,159,250 
45,755,001 
Substituting for -.75 we . . obtain:- 
1-N111-Ñ11 111-Ñ111 )+66(N1111-Ñ1111) i i i i i 
+.033(B - Bi) 
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The Scottish grant formula is similar to the first part of formula 
(5) (Si = c + m (N. - N) + ts(B - Bi). Since it is concerned only 
with the expenditure side it does not contain a term similar to the 
second part of the formula (t( B -B) ) . The English grant formula 
on the other hand contains the second part since there is an element 
of correction for the resources side in the grant. Unlike formula 
(5) however: m 1 N -1 + m11N11 etc. does not equal tsB . The .033B 
in the formula is present not for the same reason as the t 
s 
B. in 
formula (5) . Its presence is probably to be explained by practical 
considerations. Whenever a new formula for a grant of this nature 
is being devised one of the main considerations present in the minds 
of those who frame it is to create as little disturbance as possible 
in the existing pattern of distribution1. The Scottish Working Party 
for example tried twenty formulae before they found the one to "fit". 
Now the former Education grant contained a rate deduction factor2 
and since Education was the largest of the specific grants replaced 
by the General Grant it was probably necessary to retain at least a 
portion of the rate deduction factor in order that the new distribution 
formula should give results not too widely different from the existing 
basis of distribution. 
The £66 in the General Grant formula would appear to be arrived 
at on the basis of the estimated total Education expenditure divided by 
the total number of pupils and is therefore, as it were: the amount 
which / - 
1. Cf. Mabel Newcomer, Central and Local Finance in Germany and 
England , Oxford University Press,1937. 
An official connected with the preparation of the 1929 Act Block Grant 
formula told Dr. Newcomer that "they knew just what results they 
wanted and this (the formula) gave these results". 
2. The Education Grant (England) was £6 per pupil plus 60% of the 
education expenditure less the product of 30d rate. 
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which in the opinion of the central authority should be spent annually 
on the education of one child. Similarly, the co- efficients of .53 
for children under 5 and persons over 65 may be roughly arrived at on 
the basis of estimated expenditure on child care divided by the 
number of children under 5 and the estimated expenditure on residential 
homes, etc. , for old folks divided by the total number of persons over 
65. These have all the appearance of conforming to our "minimum 
outlay necessary to achieve a centrally set level of performance". 
The presence of the . 58 for children under 15 may be for reasons of 
expediency similar to the £ .033 rate deduction factor in that the 
weighting for children under 15 was previously contained in the E.E.G. 
being dropped from that Grant on the introduction of the General Grant. 
The Scottish Working Party in experimenting with various formulae 
tried first the English formula (modified) but found that it did not give 
the required result. This was not surprising since the situation re 
the grant in England was different from that in Scotland. In England 
the servicesin respect of which specific grants were replaced are 
functions of the county councils and county boroughs and it is to 
these authorities that the General Grant is paid - in the case of the 
counties the grant being deducted from their gross expenditure to 
arrive at a net sum which is precepted on the rating authorities on 
the poundage basis. Thus since the grant is calculated for the 
unit which incurs all the expenditure it is possible to include 
measures of need in respect of the various services such as education, 
health services and care of the old. In Scotland on the other hand the 
services in respect of which the General Grant is provided are not all 
functions of the county council. Education is the only service (of 
those / - 
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those incorporated in the General Grant) for which the County Council 
is responsible throughout the whole area of the county. Fire is provided 
by joint committees consisting of several authorities. The remaining 
services such as health services, etc. , are administered by the large 
burghs for their own areas and by the county council for the small 
burghs and the landward area of the county. Consequently, since 
the grant is calculated initially for the education area( and then 
subsequently allocated on the basis of standard or actual R.V. which- 
ever is higher) it cannot reasonably provide measures of need associated 
with services other than education. The Scottish distribution formula 
therefore can only be concerned with the Education service. This is 
confirmed by Mr.A.L Imrie 1 (a member of the Working Party and City 
Chamberlain of Edinburgh) . For the Scottish General Grant to be able 
to take account of factors associated with the other services it would 
have required to be broken down and portions provided for health and 
other services each portion distributed direct to the units which originally 
incurred the expenditure in which case measures of need in respect of 
these services could reasonably be incorporated in the formula. It would 
seem that as a general principle in a scheme of equalisation the calculation 
of grant should be made separately for the decision making units which 
incur the expenditure. We shall take this point up later in our empirical 
investigation of the E.E.G. and the General Grant when it will be seen 
that the present organisational structure of local government is an 
impediment to an effective scheme of equalisation. 
The English Grant formual has a more logical appearance 
than / - 
1. AIL. Imrie, "The Scottish Local Government Bill ", Paper given at 
Eastbourne Conference, I.M.T.A., 12th June, 1958. 
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than the Scottish formula in that the £66, etc., can readily be seen 
to be the necessary minimum outlay on the education of a pupil, etc. 
The wider range of pupil costs in Scotland, e.g. from £66 in the 
county of Renfrew to £149 in the county of Sutherland1 makes the use 
of a standard expenditure per pupil for all authorities in Scotland 
inappropriate, a situation which obviously also obtained in Lord 
Balfour of Burleigh's day. The Scottish formula as will be seen 
in Part II of this thesis has therefore been empirically devised so 
as to give each authority roughly the same percentage of its education 
expenditure at the time of the introduction of the General Grant. 
Attention was drawn in C h . I (p.21 ) to the fact that the 
redistributional formula for an equalisation of fiscal capacity to 
provide a centrally set level of expenditure gives rise to the fact 
that some authorities may be called upon to contribute to the 
services of others which, while needy, refuse to make an adequate 
effort of their own. A similar criticism is sometimes levied against 
the General Grant. This is because while there is no direct relation- 
ship between an authority's grant and its expenditure, there is a 
relationship between the aggregate expenditure of authorities and 
the aggregate General Grant. If one authority is expanding its 
General Grant services at a greater rate than other authorities the 
increased expenditure arising out of such greater expansion may 
help to earn increased grant for the whole country but only a small 
proportion of this increase in grant will accrue to that authority. 
Hence / - 
1. "Rating Review" 1960. 
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Hence the suggestion made in certain quarters that "progressive" 
authorities may be helping to subsidise less "progressive authorities. 
The long run effect of the General Grant could be to lead to a 
contraction of local authority expenditure. This view might be 
questioned since the total grant is arrived at as a percentage of the 
relevant expenditure and is approximately equal to the Grant which 
would have been payable under the former system. But since each 
local authority must bear the full cost of expenditure in excess of 
the standard those authorities who are anxious to expand and provide 
the services will require to limit this expansion after they have 
progressed beyond the standard and those who do not wish to expand 
the services will gain further by reducing their expenditure since it 
will not reduce their grant. Ultimately therefore there may tend to 
be a contraction of total expenditure which will arise both from the 
necessity on the part of the spenders to limit their expenditure and 
from the advantage to be derived by the "non spenders" from reducing 
their expenditure. 
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The Exchequer Equalisation and General Grants 
General 
1. Introduction. 
The second part of this thesis is directed to an empirical 
investigation into the operation of the Exchequer Equalisation Grant and 
General Grant in Scotland. The year principally chosen for investigation 
is 1959/60, the first year of the General Grant, although data for other 
years will be provided where this is necessary. Primarily the object 
is to see if, in fact, some form of equalisation has been achieved but 
at the same time the opportunity will be taken of giving other information 
which, while it may have little bearing on the immediate purpose of the 
study, will help to fill the gap in our statistical knowledge of the grant 
operations in Scotland. The investigation is confined to the Counties 
of Cities, the Counties (landward area) and the large burghs. The 
small burghs have been excluded from the investigation, not because 
their importance is under -estimated but because of the necessity of 
keeping the scope of the study within reasonable bounds. 
In this chapter an endeavour is made to give some idea of the 
nature of the problem having regard to the widely differing sizes of 
the administrative unit and the varying conditions under which services 
have to be provided. An attempt is also made to place the grants in 
perspective / - 
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perspective in relation to the finances of local authorities and to 
obtain some idea of their scope and magnitude. 
2. The Scottish Economy and the Sizes of Administrative Units. 
In area Scotland comprises some 29,724 square miles. 
With a population of 5,178,490 according to the 1961 Census this gives 
an average density of 174 persons per square mile as against that for 
England and Wales of 790 persons per square mile. Of this total 
population, however, approximately 4 million or 76.5% is concen- 
trated in the central industrial belt - an area of some 4,277 square 
miles with a density of 925 persons per square mile' The Northern 
Division (ex Crofting Counties) comprises some 13.3% of the total 
population with a density of 90 per square mile while the Southern 
Division including the Border Counties (4.8% of total population) 
has a density of 57 per square mile. The Crofting Counties which 
form the "problem area" of the Scottish economy, have a density of 
only 20 per square mile, being inhabited by 5.4% of the population 
(see Table No.3). 
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(1) (2) (3) 
1. West Central 2,495,849 48.1 1,000 
2. East Central 1,473,863 28.4 827 
3. Northern (ex Crofting 
Counties) 692,109 13.3 90 
4. Southern (other than 
Border counties) 145,128 2.8 58 
5. Border Counties 99,084 2.0 57 
6. Crofting Counties 277,897 5.4 20 
5,183,930 100.0 174 
The increase in the population of Scotland over the past 90 
years has not kept pace with that of England and Wales, Scotland showing 
an increase over 1851 of 79% as against that for England of 159% and Wales 
of 127% This is largely due to Scotland's traditional loss by migration. 
Over the period 1861 - 1961 the net loss by migration was 1,840,000 - each 
census period consistently showing a loss. The net loss over the period 
1951 -61 was 254,701 persons as against 248,859 for the 20 year period 
1931 - 51, whereas for England and Wales there was a net gain from 
migration / - 
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migration of 524,000 from 1931 - 39, 231,000 from 1939 - 51 and 352,000 
from 1951 - 61.1 
Within Scotland the picture is one of a gradual movement 
of population out of the Crofting Counties and the Border Counties with 
an increase in the population of the industrial belt. The greatest 
concentration of the population is in the Glasgow and Clydeside area 
which also for many years witnessed the greatest relative increase 
in population. In recent years, however, the tendency has been for 
the growth of population in the central and eastern portions of the 
industrial belt to exceed that of the western portion. There is the 
likelihood of this trend continuing in the near future as a result of 
the planned overspill programme from Glasgow, the setting up of the 
new B.M.C. factory in West Lothian, the creation of the new town 
at Livingston, and a number of other industrial projects in the area 
of Midlothian and West Lothian. 
In Scotland there is a wide variation in the size of 
local government administrative units and in the conditions under which 
they operate. Some idea of the extent of this may be obtained from 
Table No.4, which shows the populations and density of the Counties 
of Cities and the County Councils (including the landward area and 
the large and small burghs) . At one extreme we have Glasgow with 
a population of 1,056,008 and a density of 17,469 persons per square 
mile and at the other extreme we have Sutherland with a population of 
only 13,290 and a density of 7 persons per square mile. Within the 
counties there is a further subdivision for small burghs and large 
burghs (where appropriate) . 
Table No.4. - 
1. Census 1961 Scotland and Census 1961 England and Wales - Preliminary 
Reports. 
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Table No. 4. 
Populations and Density (population per square mile) . 
West Central Division Population Density 
Glasgow 1,056,008 17,469 
Renfrew 340,389 1,508 
Ayr 340,690 303 
Dunbarton 186, 660 765 
Lanark 572,102 682 
East Central Division 
Edinburgh 474,062 9,003 
Dundee 182,854 9,574 
East Lothian 51,664 197 
Midlothian 113,164 356 
Stirling 194,335 432 
Clackmannan 41,342 758 
Fife 322,561 635 
West Lothian 93,881 772 
Northern Division (ex Crofting Counties) 
Aberdeen City 185,222 10,752 
Bute 14,425 69 
Perth and Kinross 131,258 51 
Moray and Nairn 58,440 91 
Angus / - 
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Table No.4 Con-0d. 
Populations and Density (Population per Square Mile) . 
Population Density 
Angus 95,732 112 
Kincardine 25,577 129 
Aberdeen 135,304 70 
Banff 46,151 74 
Border Counties 
Peebles 13,465 41 
Selkirk 20,812 79 
Roxburgh 42,691 65 
Berwick 22,116 49 
Southern Counties 
Dumfries 87,686 82 
Wigtcwn 28,978 60 
Kirkcudbright 28,464 3 2 
Crofting Counties 
Caithness 27,620 40 
Argyll 60,409 19 
Inverness 82,838 20 
Orkney 18,636 50 
Ross & Cromarty 57,414 19 
Zetland 17,690 32 
Sutherland 13,290 7 
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Inevitably the unit costs of providing certain services show 
considerable variation. For example, in 1959 -60 costs per pupil were 
£149 in Sutherland, £129 in Zetland, £109 in Orkney, but in Ayr, Moray 
and Nairn and West Lothian they were £66, £68 and £70 respectively. 
3. Income of Scottish Local Authorities from Rates and Grants. 
In 1959 -60 the total income of local authorities in Scotland from 
rates and grants was £173.399 millions. Of this sum £76.894 millions 
or 44.35% consisted of rates and £96,505 millions (55.65 %) of Govern- 
ment Grants. The Exchequer Equalisation Grant amounted to £14.685 
millions, the General Grant £50.125 millions and specific grants 
£31.695 millions. 
Table No.5. 
Income of Scottish Local Authorities from 
Rates and Grants in 1959/60. 
£ millions 
Rates 76.894 44.35 
Grants - 
Exchequer Equalisation Grant 14.685 8.47 
General Grant 50.125 28.90 
Specific Grants 31.695 18.28 
96.505 55.65 
Total 173.399 100.00 
In 
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In aggregate terms, therefore, the Exchequer Equalisation Grant 
is not a large grant. It accounts for only 8.47% of all local authority 
income from rates and grants as against the General Grant which accounts 
for 28.90% and specific grants 18.28% 
Table 6 shows the aggregate Scottish Exchequer Equalisation 
Grant as a percentage of that for England and Wales over the period from 
its inception up to 1959/60. The years from 1948/49 to 1952/53 cover 
the period when entitlement to Exchequer Equalisation Grant was based 
on the English average rateable value per head plus 25 %. During this 
period the percentage which the Scottish grant bore to the English grant 
fell from 12.85% down to 10.39 %. The years 1953/54 to 1955/56 cover 
the period when the Goschen formula obtained; the difference between 
the percentages of 13.56 %, etc. , and that of 13.75% (the Goschen 
formula - 11/80ths) is probably explained by the time lag in the 
calculations. The years 1956/57 to 1959/60 when the percentage 
exceeded 16% in each year covers the period when the present "burden 
basis" of calculating the aggregate grant obtained. 
Table No. 6. 
Scottish Exchequer Equalisation Grant as %age of 
England and Wales. 
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Table No.6. 
Scottish Exchequer Equalisation Grant as %age of 














English average R.V. per head 
+ 25% basis 
Goschen formula basis 
"Burden" basis 
Exchequer Equalisation Grant per head for Scotland was 
£2.891 as against £1.926 for England and Wales and Gereral Grant £9.903 
as against £8.726 giving Scotland an excess in total of £2.142 per head 
of population. 
Table No. 7. 
Exchequer Equalisation Grant and General Grant per Head 1959/60. / 
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The percentage fell from 15.57% in 1948/49 to 12.22% in 
1952/53 during the period when the English average R.V. + 25% basis 
obtained, rose to over 15% on the introduction of the Goschen formula 
basis and finally to 19% in 1956/57 when the "Burden basis" of 
calculating the aggregate grant was introduced. Since then it has 
fallen to just over 17% in 1959/60. 
4. Degree of differential in Exchequer Equalisation Grant and General 
Grant. 
The importance of an euqalisation grant falls to be measured 
not solely in aggregate terms but in the degree of differential aid which 
it provides to different authorities. While the Exchequer Equalisation 
Grant is not as large a grant as the General Grant its importance as a 
differential grant is greater. As will be seen from Tables 9 and 10, 
the Exchequer Equalisation Grant per head varies from nil for some 
authorities to £21 for Sutherland county whereas the General Grant 
per head ranges from £8.181 for Bute County to £18.436 for Sutherland 
Table No. 9. 
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Table No. 9 
Excheouer Equalisation Grant per head 1959 60 










£ £ £ 
Aberdeen 1.333 - .186 - .365 - .023 .759 
Dundee 1.233 + .004 - .296 .019 .922 
Edinburgh . . - . - 
Glasgow - - 
Large Burghs 
Airdrie 6.116 + .324 - .326 .020 6.094 
Arbroath 5.217 - .015 - .280 .018 4.905 
Ayr - - . - 
Clydebank 4.752 + .546 - .356 .022 4.920 
Coatbridge 6.056 + .727 .316 - .020 6.447 
Dumbarton 3.414 + .566 - .324 - .020 3.636 
Dumfries 3.45e - .087 - .294 - .018 3.059 
Dunfermline 4.515 - .197 .307 - .019 3.992 
Falkirk 2.830 - .378 - .322 - .020 2.110 
Greenock 3.532 + .291 - .280 - .017 3.527 
Hamilton 4.115 + .260 .297 - .019 4.059 
Inverness 1.168 + .033 - .317 - .020 .864 
Kilmarnock 1.858 + .041 - .339 - .021 1.539 
Kirkcaldy 4.015 + .001 - .337 .021 3.658 
Motherwell 8 Wishaw 3.112 + .179 - .302 - .019 2.970 
Paisley 3.190 + .008 .2d7 - .018 2.893 
Perth 2.094 - .173 - .318 - .020 1.583 
Port Glasgow 5.650 + .b44 - .266 .017 6.011 
Rutherglen 3.895 ..187 - .352 - .022 3.334 
Stirling 1.906 - .109 - .324 .020 1.453 
144 
Table No. 9 








£ £ £ £ 
Counties (Landward) 
Aberdeen 6.406 + .033 + .529 - .015 6.953 
Angus 6.453 - .I69 .252 - .016 6.016 
Argyll 5.635 .436 + 2.899 . .016 8.082 
Ayr 3.381 + .029 - .254 + .064 3.220 
Ganff 9.194 + .063 + .141 - .015 9.382 
But" 2.362 - .602 - .232 - .015 1.513 
Berwick 6.205 - .361 + 2.575 - .015 8.404 
Caithness 7.720 - .094 + .379 + .994 8.999 
Clackmannan 2.979 + .492 + .274 + .229 3.974 
Dumfries 4.823 - .057 + .791 - .017 5.540 
Dunbarton 3.494 + .148 .342 + .139 3.429 
East Lothian 3.464 - .045 .140 - .015 3.164 
Fife 5.348 + .369 - .300 .019 5.398 
Inverness 5.922 .134 + 4.057 - .016 9.829 
Kincardine 5.780 + .072 + .965 - .013 6.804 
Kirkcudbright 5.119 - .030 + 2.336 .013 7.412 
Lanark 3.599 + .154 - .294 - .018 3.441 
Midlothian 3.321 + .309 .260 + .139 3.509 
Moray b Nairn 
Moray 4.347 .020 - .170 - .011 4.146 
Nairn 6.496 .316 - .231 - .014 5.935 
Orkney 8.508 - .153 + 1.900 - .012 10.243 
Peebles 
earth b Kinross 
- - ° 
Perth 4.094 - .273 * .499 .014 4.306 
Kinross 4.846 - .388 + .532 - .016 4.974 
Renfrew .694 .372 .246 .015 .061 
Ross b Cromarty 9.660 .134 + 1.378 .016 10,888 
Roxburgh 5.697 - .277 * .307 .014 5.713 
Selkirk 6.849 .484 - .278 .019 6.068 
Stirling 5,551 + .051 .340 - .021 5.241 
Sutherland 8.832 - .150 +12.357 .018 21.021 
+i est Lothian 5.887 + .087 - .295 - .018 5.66! 
Nigtown 7.324 + .324 + 1.002 - .016 8.634 
Zetland 15.845 .545 + 4.048 - .U22 19.326 
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Mile of Road 
Landward /Total 
Population aid 
£ £ £ £ £ 
Counties of Cities 
Aberdeen 9.892 - .095 .194 - .229 9.374 
Dundee 9.892 - .009 .194 .229 9.460 
Edinburgh 9.892 - .207 .194 .229 9.262 
Glasgow 9.892 + .041 - .194 - .229 9.510 
Large Burghs 
Airdrie 9.934 + .133 - .195 + .150 10.022 
Arbroath 9.999 - .110 .196 - .232 9.461 
Ayr 10.229 - .005 .200 .237 9.787 
Clydebank 9.807 + .120 .192 - .227 9.508 
Coatbridge 10.170 * .137 .200 + .153 10.260 
Dumbarton 9.850 + .120 .193 .228 9.549 
Dumfries 9.394 - .040 - .184 + .141 9.311 
Dunfermline 9.614 + .035 .190 .224 9.295 
Falkirk 9.183 .013 .180 .213 8.717 
Greenock 9.619 + .023 - .189 .223 9.230 
Hamilton 9.922 + .133 .194 + .149 10.010 
Inverness 8.200 .031 + 1.563 + .750 10.482 
Kilmarnock 9.759 - .005 .191 - .226 9.337 
Kirkcaldy 9.769 * .035 - .191 - .226 9.387 
Motherwell & Wisher 9.868 + .133 .193 + .148 9.956 
Paisley 9.432 + .022 - .185 - .218 9.051 
Perth 9.600 - .170 - .188 .222 9.020 
Port Glasgow 9.889 + .U23 - .194 .229 9.489 
Hutherglen 9.642 + .13U - .189 + .145 9.728 
Stirling 9.314 - .013 - .183 - .216 8.902 
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Mile of Road 
Landward /Total 
Population Total 
£ £ £ 
Counties (Landward) 
Aberdeen 9.884 + .064 + .562 + 1.659 12.169 
Angus 9.932 - .110 - .195 - .230 9.397 
Argyll 9.892 .217 + 2.451 + .149 12.275 
Ayr 9.800 .005 - .192 - .227 9.376 
Banff 9.950 + .097 + .185 .230 10.002 
Bute 7.806 .186 + .742 - .181 8.181 
Berwick 9.888 .242 + 2.073 + 1.660 13.379 
Caithness 9.841 + .059 + .559 + .148 13.607 
Clacx.annan 10.022 + .I6U .197 .232 9.753 
Dumfries 10.129 .043 - .199 + .153 10.040 
Ounbarton 9.617 + .117 - .188 .223 9.323 
East Lothian 9.518 + ,000 - .186 - .220 9.112 
Fife 10.021 + .036 .196 - .232 9.629 
Inverness 10.774 - .041 + 2.053 + .985 13.771 
Kincardine 10.012 + .0u8 + 1.142 + .916 12.078 
Kirkcudbright 9.950 - .U45 + 2.086 + .910 12.901 
Lanark 9.859 + .133 .193 + .148 9.947 
Midlothian 9.930 + .144 - .195 + .150 10.029 
Moray and Nairn 
Moray 9.890 + .064 .194 .229 9.531 
Nairn 9.688 + .063 - .190 .225 9.336 
Orkney 9.916 .IC2 + 2.458 + 1.664 13.936 
Peebles 10.313 .259 + .980 .239 10.795 
Perth and Kinross 
Perth 10.012 .177 - .196 - .233 9.406 
Kinross 10.024 - .177 .196 .233 9.418 
Renfrew 9.686 + .023 .19C - .224 9.295 
Ross and Crosarty 9.864 .078 + 1.503 + 3.540 14.829 
Roxburgh 9.900 - .238 + 1.130 - .229 10.562 
Selkirk 9.927 - .270 .195 - .230 9.232 
Stirling 9.448 .014 - .165 .218 9.031 
Sutherland 9.896 .110 + 3.209 + 5.441 18.436 
West Lothian 9.842 + .137 - .193 + .148 9.934 
Wigtown 9.999 + .149 + .950 
+ .150 11.248 
Zetland 9,879 .206 + 2.826 + .904 13.403 
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The gains and losses in respect of the weightings for number 
of children under 15, sparsity, rapidly increasing population, etc., 
have been calculated following the lines of the formulae for 
Exchequer Equalisation Grant and General Grant shown on pages 
z 
102 and 123. Under the General Grant the basic amount per head 
for each of the Counties of Cities is the same £9.892 as per the 
formula on page 129. The reason for the varying figure in the large 
burghs and Counties (landward area) is that the grant is calculated 
initially for the education area and then allocated to the burghs and 
landward area on the basis of standard rateable value. On the 
initial calculation for the education area the basic figure per head 
is £9.892 but because standard rateable values are not proportional 
to populations, the final basic figure per head varies slightly from 
£9.892. 
The tables demonstrate what is already well known, that the 
effect of the children weighting in both grants is very small. This 
is because there is not a wide variation in the ratios of children to 
population as between the different authorities. The gains and losses 
for children in the Exchequer Equalisation Grant range from +£.727 for 
Coatbridge to - £.602 for Bute County, while for the General Grant 
they vary from + £ .149 in Wigtown to - £ .270 in Selkirk, the 
differential being greater in the case of Exchequer Equalisation Grant 
than in the case of the General Grant. This is partly due to the fact 
that the Exchequer Equalisation meant is a function of an authority =s 
expenditure. Consequently for an authority with less than average 
numbers of children to population the greater its expenditure is the 
larger will its loss be in respect of the children weighting. It will 
be / 
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be evident that if we had two authorities with the same ratio of 
children to population the per capita adjustment in respect of the 
children weighting under the General Grant formula would be 
identical for both authorities, but under the Exchequer Equalisation 
Grant formula it would vary according to the different expenditures 
of the authorities. 
It will be evident that the gains and losses as a result 
of weightings for children, pupils per mile of road, etc. , in the 
Exchequer Equalisation Gant are functions of the total expenditure 
of an authority on all services . This does not seem logical unless 
we are prepared to say that because an authority has a higher than 
average ratio of children to total pupulation it ought to spend more 
per head of population not only on education, health services, etc., 
which have an apparent relationship with numbers of children, but 
also on those services such as police, roads, fire, etc., which have 
no obvious connection with numbers of children. This applies also 
to the other weightings. It would seem, therefore, that having 
decided for what purpose our measures of need are provided we 
ought logically to apply these not to the total relevant expenditure 
or the total tax rate but to the expenditure or tax rate in respect of 
the appropriate service. 
The weighting for sparsity in the Exchequer Equalisation 
Grant shows the largest range of differential in grant per head of all 
the weightings in both the Exchequer Equalisation Grant and General 
Grant. It ranges from - £.365 in Aberdeen City to + £12.357 in 
Sutherland. The rapidly increasing population factor is the least 
important / - 
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important, its effect being to reduce the grant per head at one end 
of the scale by - £.023 for Aberdeen City and to increase the grant 
by + £.994 for Caithness at the other extreme. The increase in 
Caithness's population in recent years is attributable to the develop- 
ment of the atomic energy station at Dounreay. 
In the General Grant the most important weighting is that 
for the ratio of landward/total population. For those authorities who 
enjoy no weighting it gives a loss of - £.299 per head. Sutherland 
is the largest gainer with £5.441. The weighting for pupils per mile 
brings a loss to Ayr and Coatbridge of - £.2 per head while the largest 
gainer is Sutherland with £3.209. 
The weighting for sparsity in the Exchequer Equalisation 
Grant and those for pupils per mile and landward/total population in 
the General Grant are all weightings which are associated with 
sparsely populated areas. The combined effect of these "sparsity" 
weightings is considerable. For example, they bring a total gain to 
Sutherland of £21.007. These sparsely populated areas are also, in 
general, areas of low rateable value. It is evident therefore that 
the sparsely populated areas receive considerable gains at the expense 
of the more populous areas. 




Since the problem was seen in this country as being 
primarily one of widely differing rate poundages of the different 
authorities' we examine changes in rate poundages at intervals over 
the period from 1938/39, the year of Hicksts investigation to 1958/59, 
the year prior to the int roduction of the General Grant. 
The rates examined are actual rates levied as distinct 
from "true rates" calculated on the basis of actual expenditure 
excluding balances, the latter method being that adopted by the 
"Working Party on the Effects of the Local Government Act, 1948 etc. on the 
Finances of Local Authorities" .2 It would have been impossible for 
me to collect information from the various authorities for the different 
years involved in order to calculate "true rates" but in any event over 
the longer period actual rates should be a sufficiently good indication 
of "true rates" since it is impossible to exist on balances for any length 
of time. Water rates have been excluded since expenditure for domestic 
purposes is not recognised as relevant expenditure for Exchequer 
Equalisation Grant. 
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1. J.R. and Ursula Hicks, Standarctof Local Expenditure, Op.cit. 
2. Op. cit . 
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The figures for the 83 county boroughs are taken from 
"Return of Rates" and the figures for the Scottish authorities were 
obtained partly from "Rating Review" and partly from replies to 
questionnaires to local authorities where this information was not 
available in "Rating Review" for earlier years. 
2. Burgh Rate and County Borough Rate. 
Table 11 shows some measure of the dispersion of rates 
in the county boroughs, counties of cities and large burghs for the 
years from 1938/39 to 1958/59:- 
Table No. 11. / - 
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Table No.11. 
Rate Poundage - County Boroughs, Large Burghs and 
Counties of Cities. 
Co- efficient 
Lowest Highest Arith. Standard of Dispersion 







(4) (5) (6) 
1938/39 
83 County Boroughs 94 330 236 168 39.57 23.55 
20 Large Burghs 105 170 65 134 18.60 13.88 
4 Counties of 
Cities 89 167 78 
1947/48 
83 County Boroughs 132 360 228 223 39.75 17.83 
20 Large Burghs 134 246 112 189 26.75 14.16 
4 Counties of 
Cities 96 194 98 
1949/50 
83 County Boroughs 138 300 162 219 28. 12.8 
20 Large Burghs 153 206 53 169 16.21 9.60 
4 Counties of 
Cities 98 181 83 
1952/53 
83 County Boroughs 168 336 168 252 30.23 12 
20 Large Burghs 187 287 100 232 28.55 12.31 
4 Counties of 
Cities 130 233 103 
1958/59 / - 
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Col. 5 Col. 4. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
d. d. d. 
1958/59 
83 County Boroughs 148 312 164 232 32.12 13.84 
20 Large Burghs 228 312 94 277 25.16 9.08 
4 Counties of 
Cities 199 329 130 
In 1938/39 the rate poundages in the 83 County Boroughs ranged 
from 7/10d. in Bournemouth to 27/6d. in Merthyr Tydfil, a range of 19/8d., 
whereas in the 20 large burghs the rate varied from 8/9d. in Perth to 14/2d. 
in Clydebank, a range of only 5/5d. In tie counties of cities the lowest 
was 7/5d. in Edinburgh and the highest 13/11d. in Glasgow. The standard 
deviation was 39.57 for the county boroughs and 18.60 for the 20 large burghs. 
A certain caution must be exercised in interpreting these measures because of 
different circumstances obtaining in the different sets of figures . In the first 
place there are more observations in the case of the county boroughs than for 
the other authorities; the number for the counties of cities (4) has been 
regarded as being too small for the Standard Deviation and co- efficient of 
Dispersion to be meaningful in comparison with the 83 county boroughs and 
has therefore been omitted. Secondly, the arithmetic averages about which 
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the dispersions have been measured are somewhat different, 
e.g., in 1938/39 in the case of the county boroughs it is 168d. 
while it is 134d. in the large burghs. In order to make the 
measure of dispersion more comparable a co- efficient of 
dispersion is therefore used which is the standard deviation 
divided by the arithmetic average. This also enables the 
figures for the different years to be compared with one another. 
Allowing for all these factors, it still remains true to say that 
the "problem of the widely differing rate poundages" was not 
as acute in the counties of cities and large burghs of Scotland 
as it was in the English county boroughs. 
The explanation of this may lie in the fact that rateable 
values per head of population in Scotland were not so widely 
divergent as those in England (see Table 12) . 
Table No.12. 
Rateable Values Per Head. 
Lowest Highest 
R. V. R. V. Standard Co-efficient 
per Head per Head Range Deviations of Dispersion 
1938/39 
83 County Boroughs 3.55 16.15 12.60 2.35 32.50 
20 Large Burghs 5.600 10.000 4.400 1.301 17.58 
4 Counties of 
Cities 8.700 13.000 4.300 
It is generally recognised that the state of valuation in 
Scotland / - 
- 155 - 
Scotland was better than that in England; valuations in Scotland 
in the case of houses being based on the rent actually passing and 
being revised each year were thus kept more up to date than those 
which obtained in England where in certain areas revaluations had 
not taken place for many years. 
By 1947/48 the year prior to the introduction of the 
Exchequer Equalisation Grant, the dispersion of rate poundages 
in the County Boroughs had reduced somewhat (Co- efficient of 
Dispersion 17.83) while that in the large burghs remained much 
the same (Co- efficient of Dispersion 14.16) . It is noteworthy 
that the dispersion in the 83 county boroughs on actual rates 
basis for 1947/48 is considerably less than that shown on true rates 
basis in the Working Party Report1 although for 1949/50 actual rates 
and true rates give much the same result (Table 13) . 
Table No. 13 / - 
1. Op. cit. 
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Table No. 13. 
Actual and "True" Rate Poundages of County Boroughs - 
1947/48 and 1949/50. 
Lowest Highest Arith. Co- efficient 
Rate Rate Range Average S.D. of Dispersion 
1947/48 
Actual Rates 132 360 228 223 39.75 17.83 
"True Rates" 132 480 348 223 49.90 22.38 
1949/50 
Actual Rates 138 300 162 219 28. 12.8 
"True Rates" 145 313 168 226 30.72 13.60 
The difference in the 1947/48 figures may arise from adjustments 
which the Working Party may have made in connection with transferred services 
but sufficient information as to the complete basis on which their true rates 
were arrived at is not given to enable me to say. On an actual rates basis, 
however, the reduction in the dispersion from 1947/48 (Co- efficient of 
Dispersion 17.83) to 1949/50 (Co- efficient of Dispersion 12.8) in the County 
Boroughs does not appear to be as spectacular as is generally thought to be 
the case. 
The co- efficient of dispersion for the large burghs fell from 
14.16 to 9.60 in the same period but by 1952/53 it had risen to 12.31 and 
by 1958/59 it was down again to 9.08. Two points are worthy of note in 
connection with the large burghs; firstly, for a large part of its expenditure, 
viz. , education, the decision as to the spending is not in its own hands but 
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is determined for it by the county council and, secondly, that from 
1947 to 1953 the "proportionality principle" would not apply in relation 
to education expenditure allocated to the large burghs within the same 
county. From 1947/48 to 1952/53 allocations of general county 
expenditure were still made on the basis of actual rateable value 
but since Exchequer Equalisation Grant was paid direct to the large 
burghs on this expenditure the result was that a burgh with a lower 
rateable value per head than another would require to levy a lower 
rate poundage to meet its share of the education requisition since 
the allocation was made on the basis of actual rateable value when 
it had a potential rateable value equal to the standard rateable value. 
It may be that this was partly responsible for the increase in dispersion 
between 1949/50 and 1952/53 but for a conclusive explanation a much 
closer examination of the detail of individual services would be required. 
3. County Rate. 
The County Rate in Scotland is comparable to the total rate 
levied by the rural district council to provide for both general and special 
county purposes plus the rural district council's own expenditure. It 
excludes special district rates for sewerage, lighting, etc. , levied on 
different parts of the county and also the district council rate and domestic 
water rate. In the Report of the "Working Party to investigate the effects 
of the Local Government Act, 1948, etc." a rate is shown in respect of 
county services and also in respect of county and district services. 
The rate in respect of county services is stated to represent the net 
expenditure of the county council on both general and all special accounts, 
spread over all districts uniformly, regardless of variations in the incidence 
of the county precept between one district and another while the rate for 
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district purposes represents for each county the single uniform rate 
which, levied over all the districts within the county, would have 
produced an amount equal to the total product of these separate rates 
levied for district purposes. This method appears to have been 
followed in "Local Expenditure and Exchequer Grants" .1 What 
they are therefore doing is expressing a notional rate which cannot 
in fact exist in any particular area of the county but which might 
obtain if a different organisational structure obtained, viz . , if the 
whole county was one uniform area for rating purposes. It is 
interesting to note that they are unconsciously altering the admin- 
istrative unit in order to examine the effects of the Equalisation Grant. 
This is significant because, in my view, for any scheme of equalisation 
to be effective it is necessary that the area whose fiscal capacity is 
being equalised should co- incide with the area in which the burden of 
expenditure is being met. No comparison is therefore made between 
the county rate in Scotland and the "county" rate as contained in the 
Working Party Report. 
Tablel4 shows the details of the dispersion of the county 
rate or consolidated rate as it was known prior to the Local Government 
(Scotland) Act, 1947. 
Table No .14 . 
1. Op. cit. 
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Table No. 14. 
Rate Poundages - Consolidated or County Rate. 
Co- efficient 
Lowest Highest Arith. Standard of Dispersion 
Rate Rate Range Average Deviation Co1.5 =Col. 4. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
d. d. d. d. d. % 
1938/39 63 158 95 111 20.4 18,4 
1947/48 101 281 180 154 33.75 21.92 
1949/50 84 166 82 131 22.71 17.3 
1952/53 108 248 140 187 29.3 15.7 
1958/59 140 318 178 207 37.93 18.32 
A word of caution is necessary in considering the county rate. Some 
counties have abolished special districts for such purposes as scavenging and 
lighting and include expenditure on these services in the county rate. It might 
be said that in so far as the county rate is not the only rate in the county the 
same criticism as I have made of the Working Party might be levied against 
me for demonstrating changes in the dispersion of it. In the first place, the 
county rate is an actual rate levied in the counties; in the second place, I am 
not demonstrating that in the long period there has been a significant reduction 
in dispersion. If there has not been a significant reduction in the dispersion 
of the county rates then there is not likely to be a significant reduction in the 
total rate including special district and district council rates except by a most 
fortuitous circumstance. 
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It is seen that the county rate in 1938/39 ranged from 
5/3d. to 13/2d., a range of 8/11d., while the co- efficient of dispersion 
was 18.4 %. This latter co- efficient had increased somewhat by 1947/48 
to 21.92%, falling in 1949/50 to 17.3% and further in 1952/53 to 15.7 %, but by 
1958/59 it had moved up again to 18.32% - about the same as in 1938/39. 
In the counties a severe impediment to equalisation is the 
existence of a variety of different rates . In addition to the county rate 
there is the district courmil rate, special district rates and domestic water 
rate. The expenditure on domestic water does not earn Exchequer 
Equalisation Grant. The remainder of the landward expenditure, i.e., 
county rate expenditure, district council expenditure and special district 
expenditure, earns Exchequer Equalisation Grant, all of which, apart 
from a proportion allocated to the District Councils pro rata to expenditure, 
is credited to the county rate. Now in 1959/60, for example, the domestic 
water rate in counties varied from 1/- in one county to 5/5d. in another. 
The highest total of district council and special district rates was as much 
as 8/6d. in one county. In the County of Lanark the county rate was 
18/8d. , but the highest total rate in that county was 29/10d. It is 
reasonable to suggest that to the individual ratepayer in the highest 
rated area the 11/2d. represented by the domestic water, district council 
and special district rates was just as important as 11/2d of his county 
rate. When we consider that we have the position of a county rate in respect 
of which more grant may have been received than is due in terms of the 
principle of equalisation, a domestic water rate for which no grant is paid, 
a district council rate in respect of which either too much or too little 
grant in terms of equalisation has been received, and special district 
rates which have received no grant but whose expenditure has helped 
to earn grant for the county rate, we see what an impediment this 
organisation of units is to equalisation. 
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The effectiveness of any scheme for equalisation whether this 
be based on rateable value per head or any other measure per head 
will depend upon the area whose fiscal capacity is being equalised 
coinciding with the area in which the burden of expenditure is being 
met. Put another way - to achieve proper equalisation for the 
district councils and the special districts a scheme of equalisation 
would require the fiscal capacities (in this case the rateable values 
per head of population) of each of these areas to be separately 
calculated. In view of the large number of these individual areas 
this would be an impossible task. The principle is important, 
however, because it has an obvious bearing on the proper organisation 
of units or areas of service if equalisation is to be achieved. 
4. Conclusion. 
The conclusions to be drawn from the foregoing are:- 
(1) The reduction in the dispersion of the actual County 
Borough Rates in England since the introduction 
of the Exchequer Equalisation Grant has not 
been as great as has been generally believed; 
(2) Rate poundages in the large burghs in Scotland, 
although they were not as widely divergent 
as the county borough rates in England, are 
now somewhat less widely dispersed than 
they were prior to 1948; 
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(3) The dispersion in the county rates in Scotland 
in 1958/59 was as great as it was in 1938/39. 
The existence of the many special district 
rates in the landward areas constitutes an 
impediment to equalisation; 
(4) There is insufficient evidence to suggest that the 
Exchequer Equalisation Grant has had any 




The Expenditure Side. 
1. Introduction. 
For purposes of analysis it is convenient to distinguish 
between the expenditure or needs side and the income or resources side. 
This chapter is concerned with the expenditure side. First of all we 
shall try to see if there is any evidence to suggest that the Exchequer 
Equalisation Grant has in fact given rise to substitution effects, the 
possibility of which was suggested in Chapter I. Secondly we shall 
examine the different expenditures of local authorities in the light of 
certain factors which might be regarded as causing different expend- 
itures. The object of this latter investigation is to see to what extent 
compensation may be required on the expenditure side so as to achieve 
equalisation. 
In the analysis of the grant operations in this chapter, 
wide use is made of the calculation of correlation coefficients . It is 
perhaps unnecessary to underline the necessity for caution in the 
interpretation of these coefficients, particularly where multi - 
collinearity is present or to point out the obvious fact that the 
correlation coefficient itself cannot tell us anything about cause and 
effect. 
2. The Exchequer Equalisation Grant as a Percentage Grant. 
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The Exchequer Equalisation Grant expressed as a percentage 
grant varies from Nil to 44.8% in the large burghs and from Nil to 86.75% 
in the counties (landward area) as shown in Table 15. We therefore seek 
to see to what extent high rates of grant have tended to encourage high 
rates of growth of expenditure. The period chosen for examination is 
from 1953/54, the first year when the capitation grants were discontinued, 
to 1958/59, the last year prior to the introduction of the General Grant. 
Table 15 shows the percentage increase in estimated relevant local 
expenditure from 1953/54 to 1958/59 (Co1.3) with the percentage rate of 
Exchequer Equalisation Grant (Co1.4) for 1958/59 alongside. 
The Counties of Cities showed an increase in expenditure 
per head of 56.8 %, the large burghs 50.7%, and the counties 66.1% of 
which the Exchequer Equalisation Grant as a percentage or relevant 
local expenditure was 1.30 %, 23.62% and 38.03% respectively. In 
the Counties section it is noticeable that very high percentage rates 
of grant are associated with high rates of growth, e.g., Zetland with 
a grant percentage of 86.75% shows a percentage increase in per capita 
expenditure of 212.7 %, Orkney with 87.84% a percentage increase of 
190.2% while those with low rates of grant show low rates of increase 
in per capita expenditure, e.g., Peebles with a nil grant percentage 
shows an increase of only 30.1% and Renfrew with a grant percentage 
of 3.30% an increase of 38.8% 
Table 
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Table No. 15 
Estimated Relevant 




1953/54 1958/59 Increase 
C 
Counties of Cities 
Aberdeen 10.963 16.396 49.6 4.76 
Dundee 10.058 15.363 52.7 10.10 
Edinburgh 8.842 14.217 60.8 .06 
Glasgow 12.038 18.933 57.3 
Aveva e 10.967 17.200 56.8 1.30 
Large Burghs 
Airdrie 12.054 17.396 44,3 39.04 
Arbroath 10.083 15.125 50.0 34.01 
Ayr 9.900 13.446 35.8 
Clydebank 12.283 18.746 52.6 30.65 
Coatbridge 11.492 16.721 45.5 41.29 
Dumbarton 10.313 15.617 51.4 26.29 
11.158 15.688 40.5 19.42 
Dunfermline IC.204 16.583 62.5 26.66 
Falkirk 10.971 15.804 44.1 16.98 
Greenock 10.363 14.746 42.3 25,35 
Hamilton 10.892 15.650 43.7 26.70 
Inverness 12.958 15.758 21.6 4.79 
Kilmarnock 11.492 18.521 61.2 11.35 
Kirkcaldy 9.867 18.538 87.9 25.27 
Motherwell & Wishaw 10.550 15.463 46.6 28.58 
Paisley 10.225 16.492 61.3 22.22 
Perth 10.404 15.917 53.0 9.45 
Port Glasgow 10.133 16.117 59.0 44.88 
Rutherglen 11.800 18.421 56.1 19.88 
Stirling 11,408 15.175 33.0 10.80 
Average 10.821 16.304 50.7 23.62 
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Table No. 15 
(contd. ) 
Estimated Relevant 
Local Expenditure per Head E.E.G. as 
sage %age 
1953/54 1958/59 Increase of R.L.E. 
E E 
Counties (Landward) 
Aberdeen 8.850 13.708 54.9 53.67 
Angus 7,796 13.883 78.1 47.04 
Argyll 9.117 (7.038 86.9 52.79 
Ayr 8.404 14.763 75.7 26.85 
Banff 7.221 13.263 83.7 67.90 
Bute 6.121 11.408 86.4 15.52 
Berwick 9.033 15.771 74.6 55.90 
Caithness 6.388 13.513 111.5 67.40 
Clackmannan 8.717 14.788 69.6 31.32 
Dumfries 1E.063 13.371 32.9 42.42 
Ounbarton 11.483 18.429 60.5 23.89 
East Lothian 9.229 12.779 38.5 25.85 
Fife 8.638 16.621 92.4 37.23 
Inverness 9.104 19.846 120.2 63.19 
Kincardine 7.783 13.692 75.9 56.81 
Kirkcudbright 10.008 14.033 40.2 57.22 
Lanark 11.917 17.196 44.3 28.20 
Midlothian 9.317 14.200 52.4 29.73 
Moray 8 Nairn 
Moray 5.363 9.296 73,3 45.28 
Nairn 7.275 12.208 67.8 51.67 
Orkney 4.613 13.388 190.2 87.84 
Peebles 12.188 15.858 30.1 
Perth 8 Kinross 
Perth 7.904 12.413 57.0 36.10 
Kinross 7.513 11.933 58,8 39.01 
Renfrew 10.392 14.429 38.8 3.30 
Ross 8 Cromarty 7,425 15.238 105.2 75.50 
Roxburgh 7.454 14.467 94.1 47.34 
Selkirk 5.766 13.654 136.8 43.45 
Stirling 10.371 19.329 86.4 31.54 
Sutherland 14.558 26.925 84.9 75.01 
Nest Lothian 9,054 15.904 75.7 39.99 
Wigtown 7.017 15.IS2 116.5 60.06 
Zetland 5.592 17.488 212.7 86.75 
h221.1 22 9 475 15.738 66.1 38.03 
Notes (I) The figures of estimated relevant expenditure for 1953/54 and 1958/59 
and E.E.G. as a percentage of relevant local expenditure ara taken 
from 'Rating Review' and are supplied by the Scottish Home Department. 
(2) The averages are weighted averages. 
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The coefficient of correlation between Exchequer Equalisation 
Grant expressed as a percentage grant (1958/59) and the per capita 
percentage increase in relevant local expenditure between 1953/54 
and 1958/59 was + . 67 for the Counties and f . 33 for the burghs. 
In the case of the counties, therefore, there is some indication that the 
grant acted as an incentive to spending but this does not appear to be 
so for the burghs . This is probably explained by the fact that in the 
first place the range of the percentage rates of grant is much wider in 
the case of the counties (Nil to 86.75%) than for the burghs (Nil to 
44.8 %) and inthe second place a large part of the burghs' expenditure 
is determined for it by the decision of the county council. Thus the 
County is its own decision -making unit in relation to its expenditure 
while the burgh is not, and consequently it may be that the County's 
decision regarding spending is affected by its knowledge of the percentage 
which will be borne by the Central Government. It is also necessary 
to point out, however, that some of the increase in per capita expend- 
iture may be explained by declining populations. 
3. Factors associated with Differences in per capita Expenditure. 
Reference was made in Ch. I to the possibility of fitting a 
regression equation which would express the relationship between per 
capita expenditure and the factors associated with differences in per 
capita expenditures and thereafter to use the coefficients of this equation in 
a grant distribution formula. With this object in mind data on per capita 
expenditures for the different services were collected from the Counties 
of Cities, the large burghs and the counties of Scotland. 
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It is a necessary requirement in a statistical exercise 
of this kind that the observations on which the calculations are 
based should be "independent observations" . It was immediately 
apparent that the total per capita expenditures of the large burghs 
and counties were not independent observations because a large 
part of the expenditure consisted of expenditure allocated on some 
pre- determined or arbitrary basis, e.g. , standard rateable value. 
It became evident therefore that one had to select one's observations 
from expenditures incurred by the original decision -making unit 
responsible for incurring the expenditure, expressing these in per 
capita terms relating to the whole area of the authority. Now 
since the General Grant is calculated initially for each Education 
area it was therefore necessary to see what services were provided 
throughout that area by the Education authority (viz. the Counties 
of Cities, and the Counties) which might form "independent 
observations" . The only service to which this applied was Education. 
It was this service therefore which I chose to investigate. 
Although in one sense the exercise did not prove 
fruitful, nevertheless it was the process of carrying out this 
statistical exercise and the necessity of fulfilling its requirements 
which brought to my attention the interesting circumstance of which 
mention has already been made in Ch. V viz, that it is not possible 
for the General Grant distribution formula to be aimed at making 
allowance for any service other than Education. Since the General 
Grant is calculated initially for the Education area it can only take 
account of those services which are provided for that area by the 
education administrative unit and as has been indicated, the only 
service / - 
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service in Scotland to which this refers is Education. 
I feel this point is of particular importance for it is one 
about which the Central Government is somewhat sensitive. It is 
maintained that the General Grant is a general contribution in aid 
of all services and that it must not be regarded as being linked with 
any particular service. 1 The Government have refused to enter- 
tain representations from local authorities or local authority 
associations who express the general grant received by them in 
relation to their education expenditures . The Central Department 
aver that the General Grant is directed in aid of all services . This 
is interesting for in the writer's view, given the present structure 
of local government in Scotland and the present distribution of 
functions among authorities, it is statistically impossible to 
devise a formula which could be used to distribute a global sum 
so as to have regard to all services. As we indicated in Ch. V, 
to enable this to be done the Aggregate General Grant would require 
to be broken down for the various services, each portion being 
distributed directly to the units which originally incurred the 
expenditure. It would seem that this should be an essential 
principle in a scheme of equalisation, viz., that the calculation 
of the grant should be made separately for the decision -making 
units which incur the expenditure. It is interesting to note that 
the Minority Report of the Royal Commission on Local Taxation2 
recommended a system of block grants for individual services which 
were to be distributed to the authorities responsible for incurring 
the / - 
1. Cmnd. 208, P.S., para. 11. 
2. Op. cit. 
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the expenditure on those services. 
We therefore take Education per capita expenditures 
in 1959/60 and test these against certain factors which might be 
regarded as likely to give rise to different expenditures. The 
factors tested include those for which weightings are included 
in the General and Exchequer Equalisation Grants. Tip first 
factor chosen for examination is density as measured by pop- 
ulation per square mile. We find that the correlation is negative 
but not significant ( - .11) . It is to be expected that it should be 
negative in sign in that to the extent that there is any correlation 
it might be expected that the greater the density the less might be 
education expenditure per head because of economies of scale. 
The next factors to be tested are those for which 
weightings are included in the grants. The coefficients of 
correlation for the ratio of scholars to population (+ .13) , the 
ratio of children under 15 to population (- .02), population per 
mile of road (- .25), and pupils per mile of road (- . 24) are not 
statistically significant. 
1 
Table No. 16. 
Coefficients of correlation.2 / 
1. For tests of significance see R.A. Fisher, Statistical Methods 
for Research Workers, Table V -A "Values of the Correlation 
Coefficient for Different Levels of Significance", Oliver and 
Boyd, Limited, Edinburgh. 
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Table No. 16. 
Coefficients of Correlation.2 
Coefficient of 
Correlation 
Per Capita Educn. Exp. 1959 /60 /Density - .11 
do do /Ratio of Scholars 
to population + .13 
do do /Ratio of children 
under 15 to 
population - .02 
do do /Population per 
mile of road - .25 
do do /Pupils per mile 
of road - .24 
do do /Ratio of landward to 
total population + .58 
do do /E.E.G. as %age grant + .67 
do do /General Grant per 
capita + .88 
E.E.G. as %age grant / do + .72 
Increase in Educn. Exp. per 
head 1947/48 to 1957/58 / E.E.G. as %age grant + .62 
It / - 
2. The data from which these coefficients are calculated are shown 
in Appendix Table A - 3 where not otherwise given in Tables 
in the text. 
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It is interesting to note that the coefficient for the ratio 
of scholars to population is positive while that for the ratio of 
children under 15 /population is minus. This difference in sign 
is no doubt accounted for by the different age groups and the 
fact that a number of children attend private schools. The 
coefficients for population per mile of road (- .25) and pupils 
per mile of road (- .24) are very similar as one would expect 
since there is not a wide range in the different ratios of pupils 
to population in the various authorities. Again the signs ( - ) 
are as one would expect. 
Another factor which might have been expected to have 
an influence on expenditure is the political complexion of the 
authority. But here again the relationship was not significant. 
The correlation ratio betw een education per capita expenditure 
and political complexion was .2. It is interesting to note, 
however, that, in the case of housing relevant expenditure per 
head in which the deficit per head is largely determined by the 
rents policy of the authority, the correlation ratio between housing 
deficit per head and the political complexion of the county was 
high, viz., .82. 
So far then we have found very little evidence of direct 
association between the factors mentioned and per capita education 
expenditures. We now test the ratio of landward population to 
total population and the result is + . 58 which is higher than in 
previous cases. What is more significant however is that when 
we correlate education expenditures with the percentage rate of 
E.E.G. / - 
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E.E.G. which authorities were receiving the coefficient was 
+ .67. In addition we find that the increase in expenditures 
between 1947/48 (the year prior to the introduction of the E.E.G) 
and 1957/58 when correlated with the percentage rates of E.E.G. 
the coefficient is + .62. In other words those with the highest 
rates of E.E.G. have increased their expenditure most and those 
with the highest rates of E.E.G. have the highest expenditures 
per head.l 
It would seem therefore that a most important factor in 
determining the different expenditures of the authorities is the 
way in which grant has been distributed in the past and indeed 
that the pattern may largely be set by the way grant has been 
distributed. In view of the fact that over 50% of local authorities' 
income is derived from grant and in view of the importance of the 
income factor as disclosed by previous investigations2 this might 
seem to be a not unrealistic conjecture. Even the correlation 
between edir ation per capita expenditures and the ratio of landward 
to total population may be capable of explanation in the same way. 
The ratio of landward/total population is a measure of scatter of 
population, a condition which will necessitate low pupil/teacher 
ratios and the Education Grant which preceded that introduced at 
the inception of the E.E.G. contained a large element in respect 
of each teacher employed by the local authority. To this extent 
therefore the relationship between education expenditure and 
landward/total population may be partly due to the larger grants 
paid / - 
1. It is necessary to point out, however, that some of the increase in 
expenditures between 1947/48 and 1957/58 will be due to the fall 
in money values. 
2. S. Fabricant, Op. cit. 
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paid to those authorities with high ratios of landward to total 
population. 
The case must not be overstated. It is perhaps sufficient 
to say that differences in expenditures are caused by an amalgam of 
factors, not least of which will be the income factor (in our case this 
will include the incomes of the ratepayers and the grant subventions 
from the central authority) and that conclusions drawn from a mere 
observation of expenditures without regard to the income factor must 
necessarily be suspect. If we assume that two areas are inhabited 
by residents of roughly the same income groups and that no grant is 
paid but that one is sparsely populated and the other densely populated, 
while the sparsely populated area would require a much higher per capita 
expenditure to enable to provide the of education as the 
densely populated area, it would in fact be unable to do so because of 
the limitations of income. It follows from a mere observation of 
expenditures that the sparsely populated area would not show an 
appreciably higher expenditure, the result being of course that the 
standard of service would be lower. Or again it might have been 
expected that authorities with higher than average numbers of children 
in relation to total population should spend more than those with less 
than average numbers but in the event they would not do so because 
of the limitations of income. This suggests that, ideally, schemes 
of equalisation should include an assessment of the amount that 
should be spent or the degree of allowance that should be made for 
the factors which need compensation. It would also seem that an 
equalisation graft formula such as that envisaged by Mr. Woodham 
and the author would not be a practical possibility. Having carried 
out our exercise we can see - with the aid of hind -sight - that the 
result / - 
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result is precisely what might have been expected. Fart of the 
object of equalisation grants is to enable those authorities to 
incur higher expenditures which would be necessary owing to 
natural conditions and which otherwise would not have been 
attainable by those authorities owing to their income limitations. 
What significance has the foregoing analysis in our attempt to 
assess whether the equalisation grants have achieved their purpose? 
It means that quite apart from any difficulties of assessment on the 
income side (about which we shall deal in Ch. IX) , we would require 
on the expenditure side to establish measures for the various services 
which would be representative of similar standards of service having 
regard to different conditions under which these services are provided. 
This is a task beyond the possible scope of this investigation and 
indeed might well from the subject of a separate research study itself. 
It is possible, nevertheless, to give some indications about how this 
might be done. Cost analysis might be used. For example, in the 
case of Education, standard costs per pupil might be devised by 
allowing a standard amount per pupil for books, apparatus, etc., 
a standard amount for teachers' salaries based on certain pupil/ 
teacher ratios which would require to be varied having regard to the 
degree of "scatter" of population, etc. We might thus build up our 
"necessary minimum outlay to achieve a centrally set level of 
performance" although it would seem that this minimum outlay would 
require to be different for authorities operating under such widely 
diverse conditions as those of the Crofting Counties and those in 
the Central Industrial belt. Difficult as it might be to devise these 
standards in terms of expenditure which would be representative of 
similar standards of service and which would be necessary for our second 
concept / - 
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concept of equalisation ( an equalisation of fiscal capacity to 
provide a centrally set level of performance) , it will be apparent 
that it is even more difficult to devise measures of need for our 
first concept of equalisation where the adjustment requires to be 
made in terms of fiscal potential. 1 
Although attention has been drawn to the dangers of 
conclusions drawn from a mere observation of expenditures - at 
least for equalisation purposes - it is not suggested that such 
an observation of expenditures is neither useful nor fruitful. In 
the field of public finance we have frequently in practice to be 
satisfied with something less than the ideal. Other consider- 
ations, such as the avoidance of major financial disturbances 
in the existing positions of the local units of government, may 
affect our objective. When the architects of formulae come 
to devise a new formula they require to take the existing expend- 
itures as they find them irrespective of how these may have emerged 
and then fit their formula as best they can to these. It is evident 
from the coefficient of correlation between Education per capita 
expenditures and the per capita General Grant of authorities 
(+ .88) that the General Grant formula is aimed at making the 
General Grant "fit" existing Education expenditure.2 Since the 
major grant replaced by the General Grant, viz. Education, was 
broadly / - 
1. It is understood that attempts at the definition of appropriate indexes 
of fiscal capacity and need have been made. See Selma Mushkin 
and Beatrice Crowther, Federal Taxes and the Measurement of State 
Capacity, Washington, Public Health Service, U.S. Department of 
Health, Education, and Welfare, May, 1954. 
2. Vide note on p.128 
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broadly a percentage of Education expenditure, in order to avoid 
undue disturbance in the existing grants being paid an endeavour 
was made to produce a formula based on "objective" factors which 
would give each authority roughly the same percentage of its 
expenditure - at least initially. 
The technique of correlation coefficients does not appear 
to be widely used by the Central Department in devising formulae. 
They are therefore involved in a great deal of "trial and error" 
before producing a suitable formula . It may therefore be pertinent 
to draw attention to the practical usefulness of these calculations. 
We have seen that the General Grant formula contains weightings 
for (a) the number of children under 15, (b) the ratio of pupils to 
miles of road, and (c) the ratio of landward to total population. 
Our correlation co- efficients show that of these three factors the 
number of children under 15 (- .02) contributes least to the making 
of the Grant formula "fit" Education expenditure - indeed if anything 
it would seem to have the reverse effect - the ratio of pupils to 
population appearing to be more appropriate for this purpose; although 
it is obvious from the low value of the correlation coefficients that 
neither of these factors would contribute much towards achieving the 
purpose in mind. The Working Party when experimenting with various 
factors tried doubling the numbers of children under 15 to see if this 
would help to achieve the objective whereas a calculation of the 
correlation coefficient in the first place would have shown that this 
would have little effect. 
It is also apparent from the correlation coefficients that the 
ratio / - 
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ratio of landward/total population is the most important factor in 
making the formula "fit" . Yet during the recent investigation of 
the General Grant the Working Party stated their intention of 
dropping this factor from the formula and of so modifying Table I 
of the Second Schedule to the Local Government (Scotland) Act, 
1958, (the weightings for pupils per mile of road) that the formula 
would give much the same result and they appointed a sub -committee 
to produce suitable formulae. In the light of these correlation 
coefficients I predicted that this would be impossible and in the 
event this proved to be the case, the sub -committee after having 
several attempts, being forced to revert to a modified version of 
Table II (the weightings for ratio of landward/total population) . 
Before closing this discussion of correlation coefficients 
I would draw attention to the relationship between the percentage 
rate of E.E.G. and the General Grant per head of population (+.72) 
from which it will be seen that in general those with high rates of 
E.E.G. also received high General Grant per head and those with 
low rates of E.E.G. low General Grant per head. This relationship 
again accords with what might have been deduced from the other 
relationships. We saw that high rates of E.E.G. were associated 
with high Education expenditures and since the former Education 
grant was broadly a percentage of Education expenditure it follows 
that high rates of E.E.G. would also be associated with Education 
grant per head and since the General Grant formula was aimed at 
giving authorities roughly the same grant as they were receiving 
under the former specific grant system it also follows that the 
same relationship exists between the percentage rates of E.E.G. 
and per capita General Grant. 
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CHAPTER IX . 
The Income Side. 
1. Introduction. 
If in the wider field of public finance the concentration 
of study has been on the income side to the neglect of the expend- 
iture side the reverse has been the case in studies of the Exchequer 
Equalisation Grant. Such researches as there have been have 
produced much by way of comparative statistics of expenditure 
but nothing about relative incomes in the different regions. I This 
may have been due to the lack of available statistical data on 
regional incomes in this country. Nevertheless there has also 
been a failure to examine the conceptual basis of income for 
equalisation purposes. 
The most frequent method of dealing with this problem has 
been to assume that rateable value is a reliable measure or at least 
an indicator of the wealth of an area and then to proceed with an 
examination of the other aspects of the research. In my view 
this is one case where a process of "contracting out" is not 
permissible because if, as I believe, the income factor is such 
an important one in determining expenditures, no useful conclusion 
may be drawn from an examination of expenditures without some 
knowledge of incomes. In this chapter, therefore, I shall first 
of 
1. J.R. and Ursula Hicks, Standards of Local Expenditure, Op. cit. 
The Effects of the Local Government Act, 1948, and other recent 
Legislation on the Finances of Local Authorities, Accounting 
Research Vol. II, No.3, July, 1951. 
Local Expenditure and Exchequer Grants, Op. cit. 
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of all discuss some of the factors which have contributed to the 
view that rateable value may be regarded as a measure of the 
prosperity of an authority, secondly I shall endeavour to provide 
a satisfactory concept of the taxable capacity or resources of an 
area, and finally I shall consider what available information there 
is with which to measure these resources. 
2. Rateable Value as an Indicator of Capacity to pay. 
Unlike the income tax which is a comparative newcomer, 
the property tax is one of the oldest of our tax institutions . The 
origins and history of the tax provide an interesting commentary on 
the influence of contemporary economic ideas on the tax system. 
In medieval times before the advent of a developed monetary system 
it is natural that property or real assets should belooked to as the 
base of taxation. Later the Physiocrats with their idea that only 
land yielded a "net product" and consequently that this surplus 
received as rent by the landlords should be the source of all 
taxation lent strength to the view that property should be the subject 
of taxation. 
Ricardo in endeavouring to explain the causes of value tried 
to show that the value of goods depended on the amount of labour 
involved in production and attempted to apply this principle to the 
various agents of production. The subsistence wage was held to be 
the cost of production of labour. Interest, being the inducement to 
people to abstain from present consumption, was looked on as the 
cost of production of capital or the reward to past labour. Difficulties, 
however, / - 
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however, were encountered in applying this notion to the return 
to land. Ricardo's explanation was that "rent" represented the 
return over and above the costs of production on marginal lands. 
Rent was the result of price and not the cause of it. It represent- 
ed the only true surplus. Against the background of such economic 
thought it is not surprising that rent should be regarded as the 
measure of capacity to pay. 
With the developrre nt of modern concepts of income as a 
flow of real goods and services measured in money terms it was 
necessary to obtain a more satisfactory justification for contending 
that rateable value could be regarded as a measure of ability to pay - 
one which would be consistent with current ideas about income. This 
argument would seem to run as follows. If we assume a hypothetical 
situation in which free market conditions apply and that there is a 
reasonably good supply of houses, "buyers" and "sellers" being 
free to strike bargains over rents, then it will be possible for 
anyone to choose a dwelling which suits his purse. The rental of 
the dwelling chosen would in such circumstances provide a rough 
guide to the occupier's ability to pay1. As used here the expression 
would seem to mean "proportional to income". There is a superficial 
attraction about such a proposition particularly in advance of seeing 
how it works in practice and if one ignores the difficulty of establishing 
hypothetical / - 
1. Local Expenditure and Exchequer Grants, Op.cit. p.25. 
Rating of Dwellings, History and General Stxvey, Op.cit. p.70. 
The term "ability to pay" is not sufficiently positivistic. It is 
capable of being interpreted as indicating a tax system which is 
proportional, progressive, or indeed even regressive if one has 
regard to the benefit aspect of taxation. In the context of this 
discussion the writer interprets it as meaning a "tax system where 
the tax imposed has some pre- determinate measurable relationship 
with the income of the individual". 
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hypothetical values in a situation which has in fact rarely existed 
since the 1914/18 war and certainly never since the 1939/45 war. 
Widespread rent control and heavily subsidised local authority 
housing have prevented anything in the nature of a free market 
in rents operating and it is difficult to see how in such circumstances 
assessors can set about valuing hypothetical rents. This whole 
approach postulates a situation which does not exist in the real 
world of to -day. 
In introducing the Second Reading of the Bill which 
provided for the Exchequer Equalisation Grant (Local Government 
Act, 1948) Mr. Aneurin Bevan, the then Minister of Health, said - 
"We are not concerned primarily with the local authority; we are 
concerned primarily with the ratepayer We are 
concerned primarily with the individual, and what we should find 
out, therefore, is whether two citizens of equal substance in 
different parts of the country have to make an equal contribution 
for the same local services. That is the formula, that is the basis" .1 
It was with this stated objective that the Exchequer Equalisation 
Grant was submitted to and justified before the House of Commons. 
It was immediately recognised and indeed admitted in Parliamentary 
debates that it could not possibly achieve this objective so long as 
the known lack of uniformity in rating assessments (which obtained 
in England particularly) persisted. On the other hand, it was fairly 
commonly thought that the only impediment was this lack of uniformity 
in assessments and that, given a new and proper revaluation, a 
satisfactory basis for this objective might emerge. 
At / 
1. Hansard 18th November 1947: Col. 993. 
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At this point it may be pertinent to draw attention to a 
frequently made misconception as to what is meant by "uniformity" 
of valuation. In the minds of some it is thought to mean complete 
parity of value between similar properties in whatever area they are 
situated and that, say, a five apartment house in one area would 
necessarily have the same value as another identical five apart- 
ment house in another area. With a system of valuation resting 
upon a rental basis clearly a result of this kind is neither possible nor 
to be expected. Numerous factors enter into the establishment of a 
free market rent and these are bound to differ in emphasis and 
importance from area to area. A moment=s reflection only is needed, 
therefore, to realise that uniformity even in a free rental market does 
not necessarily mean complete standardisation. 
The realisation that this assumption of a relationship 
between the valuation of a house and the occupier=s income was 
untenable has caused the protagonists of the rateable value indicator to shift 
their ground. For example it has been said "The first criticism of the 
use of rateable value per head is based upon two main grounds: (1) 
standards of house accommodation in different parts of the country 
are largely conventional, so that persons of equal substance tend to 
occupy houses of different standard in different areas and (2) levels 
of valuation are far from uniform, so that equal houses are not every- 
where equally rated. The objection on ground (1) we do not dispute, 
but we classify it along with those local disparities in expenditure 
levels which we suggested in para. 8 were part of the inevitable price 
to be paid for local democracy. Local taxation must be allowed its 
idiosyncracies."1 This statement might be acceptable in a situation 
which did not postulate equalisation but as an expression of view by 
a/ 
1. The Effects of the Local Government Act, 1948, and other Recent 
Legislation on the Finances of Local Authorities, Part 5, p.8, para 12 
The italics are mine. 
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a Research Committee appointed to investigate the Exchequer 
Equalisation Grant it is an evasion of the whole issue, namely, 
that the objective is equalisation. While "local idiosyncracies" 
may be permissible under some circumstances it is not logical, 
given equalisation as an objective, to admit these anomalies on 
the one hand and yet to contend that a scheme which is based on 
anomalies can achieve a meaningful concept of equalisation. 
Another and more frequent justification for the use of 
rateable value is to draw a distinction between the resources of 
an authority and the individuals contained within the area of 
the authority, admitting that valuations are not an indicator of 
individual incomes but that they are representative of the taxing 
resources of the authority. It will be noted that such a distinction 
has frequently been made throughout the history of equalisation 
grants and while it was not made at the time the Exchequer 
Equalisation Grant was introduced it has re- emerged frequently since 
then in writings and official pronouncements about the object of the 
Exchequer Equalisation Grant. In 1952 the Minister of Housing and 
Local Government (in the Conservative Government) stated the 
objectives of the Exchequer Equalisation Grant in terms very different 
from those used on its introduction. 
"The Equalisation Grant looks not to the resources of the 
individual but to the resources of the local authority and is designed 
to come in relief when those resources are below the average for the 
whole country" .1 
Further / 
1. Paper given by Minister of Housing & Local Government, Annual 
Conference I.M.T.A., 1952. 
185 
Further official expression of this view was given in the 
Ministerial paper setting out the terms of reference of the Committee 
"to Investigate the Operation of the Exchequer Equalisation Grants 
in England and Wales "1 and dealing in detail with the origin and 
scope of the investigation 
"These (equalisation) grants start from the basis that 
rates are the only taxable resources at present available to local 
authorities. These resources may be lower than they might other - 
wi se have been by the conscious act of the local authority or by 
derating or for any other reason but - whatever the cause - the 
local authority is handicapped if its rating resources are less than 
the average. It is inhibited from applying higher poundages to low 
assessments by the need to keep its rates within the band of rate 
poundages accepted as reasonable at that time in the region of the 
country." 
It is difficult to discern in this statement an exposition of 
a fundamental purpose for the Grant but only an explanation of what 
it does. If rateable value is accepted as a measure of resources, the 
statement is, of course, a perfectly accurate description of what the 
Grant does but it leaves unanswered the fundamental question of 
whether in fact rateable value is a measure of resources. Inherent 
in the Ministry's statement is an assumption that what matters is 
"rate poundages" rather than the "rate bill" and that most local authorities 
with / - 
1. Investigation into the operation of Exchequer Equalisation Grants 
to Local Authorities in England and Wales, Cmd. 9270, 1954. 
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with rateable value below the average will choose to have standards 
of local services below the average rather than rate poundages well 
above it. The opposing view to this is that what matters is not rate 
poundage but the rate bill and that there is no more ratepayer resist- 
ance to levying a rate of £2 on a valuation of £10 than there is to 
levying a rate of £1 on a valuation of £20. The I.M.T.A. Research 
Study, while admitting the difficulty of obtaining firm evidence on 
which to base conclusions on these opposing views,1 favours the 
Ministry view. 
My view is that the truth may lie somewhere between these 
opposing views. Primarily what must be considered is the rate bill 
but it would be wrong to say that rate poundages are entirely un- 
because of the interconnection between rate 
poundages and rents whichw ould be paid in a free market. When a 
buyer is considering what rent he would be prepared to pay he will 
have regard to his total outlays including rates. Thus in considering 
the rent which a buyer would give for two alternative houses, assuming 
that all other things are equal, he would be prepared to give less rent 
for a house in an area with a high rate poundage than one in an area 
of low rate poundage. This applies also to property values in high 
and low rated areas. This leads us into difficult questions regarding 
the ultimate incidence of rates. What has been said about the inter- 
connection between rent and rates viewed against the fact that over 
one -third of all dwelling houses in Scotland consist of local authority 
houses will also make evident how difficult the task must be of assessors 
to value houses on the basis of hypothetical rents. 
3. / - 
1. Local Expenditure and Exchequer Grants, Op . cit . p.3 0 . 
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3. Conceptual Basis of an Authority's Resources. 
In endeavouring to obtain a satisfactory conceptual basis 
for determining the resources of an authority we start from the basic 
assumption that in general taxes, although they may be levied on 
property or things, are ultimately payable out of the income of 
individuals or corporate bodies . Income may be regarded either 
as a flow of goods and services to the individual during a specified 
period of time - measured in terms of money values or prices - or 
alternatively as the maximum amount of real goods and services that 
may be consumed over a period of time without reducing the value of 
real capital. The first of these definitions is generally referred to as 
the "flow" concept and the second the "accrual" concept. In many 
cases both defintions come to the same thing but I shall adopt the 
first definition which is an extension into the field of taxation of 
the standard concept of income used in national or economic accounting.' 
The equalisation plans discussed in this thesis are not 
primarily concerned with vertical redistribution of incomes . The aim 
is redistribution on a geographical basis so that individuals will not 
be penalised in relation to local taxes and services because of 
residence in areas of different income distribution. While the income 
redistribution resulting from these equalisation plans may have both 
vertical and horizontal effects the primary object is to neutralise the 
effect of different geographical income distributions on the local tax 
system. It follows, that the measure of taxable capacity for the 
local unit of government will depend upon the nature of the local tax 
system, e.g., whether it is proportional, progressive or regressive. 
If / - 
1. The definition of income presents many difficulties but these need 
not concern us here. Vide Henry C. Simons, Personal Income 
Taxation - The Definition of Income as a Problem of Fiscal Policy, 
University of Chicago Press, 1938. 
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If the tax system is proportional to income then income per head 
will be the measure of capacity and rateable value per head may 
be measured against it. It will be remembered that the formulae 
provided in Ch. I were suitable only where the tax was proportional 
to income. 
Suppose, however, that the tax system is progressive, each 
area applying the same degree of relative progressiveness, then in 
order to neutralise the effect of different income distributions we 
require for tax purposes to provide each authority with the same 
income distribution structure. 
For purposes of exemplification let us take a simple if 
somewhat unreal example. Suppose the system comprises three 
authorities who operate a highly progressive system of local income 
tax for three ranges of income as follows - 
Example 
1. 2. 3. Total 
No. of No. of 
Incomes No. of Taxpayers No . of Taxpayers Taxpayers Taxpayers 
Highest Range 200 200 
Middle Range 100 200 300 
Lowest Range 100 300 400 
300 300 300 900 
Population 1,200 1,200 1,200 3,600 
Now the average per capita tax base is obviously - 
200 
3600 / 
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200 300 400 
3600 (Highest Range) + 3600 (Medium Range) + 3600 (Lowest Range)1 
= .05S (Highest Range) + .0833 (Medium Range) + .11 (Lowest Range) 






where Bl = per capita tax base (highest range) 
B11 = do do (medium range) 
B111 
do do (lowest range) 
Authority 1. 
Per Capita 
200 200 300 100 400 
Adjustment = - 0 ) ( 3600 1200 ) + ( 3600 1200) + ( 3600 
Total Adjustment 
to Tax Base = 1200(.055 - .166) + 1200(.083 - 0) + 1200(.11 - 0) 
- 1331/3 + 0 + 1331/3 
Authority 2. 
Per Capita 200 
Adjustment = ( 3600 0) 
Total Adjustment 
to Tax Base 
300 200 400 100 
+ ( 3600 1200 ) + ( 3600 1200 ) 
1200(. 055 - 0) + 1200(. 083 - .166 ) + 1200(.11 - .083) 
+ 662/3 - 100 + 331/3 
Authority 3. / - 
1. This may alternatively be stated in terms of income for the different 
ranges instead of taxpayers. 
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Authority 3. 
Per Capita 
200 300 400 300 - Adjustment = ( 3600 0) + ( 3600 - 0) + ( 3600 1200 ) 
Total Adjustment 
to Tax Base = 1200 x .055 + 1200 x .083 + 1200(.11 - .25) 
= 662/3 + 100 - 1662/3 
1 2 3 
Original Adjust- Adjusted Original Adjust- Adjusted Original Adjust- Adjusted 
Tax Base sent Base Tax Base sent B ase Tax Base sent Base Total 
Range 
Highest 200 133i 66i . + 66i 66$ . + 66$ 66i 200 
Middle 100 100 200 . 100 100 - + 100 100 300 
Lowest + illj ila I00 + 33 133 300 - I66 1221 400 
300 - 300 300 300 300 300 900 
Thus each authority is provided with the same tax structure per head 
of population. 
It follows that, for a progressive or regressive tax, we 
require not one measure of capacity to pay such as income per head, 
but a series of standards for each of the different ranges of income 
subject to different progressive or regressive rates of tax. It is 
possible / - 
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possible for an authority to be above the standard for one range and 
below the standard for another range of income depending upon the 
income distribution structure of the area. It will be appreciated, 
therefore, that with a progressive or regressive tax the difficulties 
of measuring our standard of taxable capacity are much more form- 
idable than for a proportional tax although it is not impossible - 
conceptually at least - to devise such standards. Where a tax, 
however, has no definite measurable relationship with the income 
of the taxpayer there can be no satisfactory standard of income 
whereby the tax base of the authority can be equalised. 
It should be noted vhat may happen if we use income per 
head as our measure of capacity for a purely redistributional scheme 
when in fact the tax system is regressive. Suppose we have two 
areas A and B: Area A with a relatively large number of taxpayers 
in the high income group and a relatively small number in the low 
income group and Area B with a small number in the high income group 
and a large number in the low income group. Area A would have a 
higher per capita income than Area B and consequently income would 
fall to be transferred to Area B and to be financed by the taxpayers 
in Area A via their regressive tax. Low income groups in Area A 
would be helping to subsidise in Area B not only those in the same 
income group as themselves but, since the tax is regressive, there 
would be the possibility of their contributing also to the high income 
groups in Area A. 
If regional areas tended to be occupied either solely by high 
income groups or solely by low income groups this difficulty might not 
trouble / - 
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trouble us but it is known that this is not so. Phyllis Deane has 
shown that, as measured by the "coefficient of concentration ", not 
only is there inequality in income as between regions but also that 
in areas of high average assessed income there tends to be great 
inequality in the distribution of incomes .l Of course, if the income 
distribution were in fact such that areas of high average assessed 
incomes were inhabited by high income groups only and areas of low 
average assessed incomes by low income groups only, there would 
be no room for a progressive or regressive tax system in these areas. 
It would seem, from the foregoing, that where the local unit 
of government is restricted in its tax resources to one particular type 
of tax system there is a sense in which a distinction may be drawn between 
the resources of the authority and the individuals within its area . There 
has, however, in previous researches, been a failure to follow this 
through to the necessary and ultimate connection which must exist 
between the resources of the individual and of the authority. This, 
in turn, has been due to a failure on the part of these writers to 
distinguish clearly in their minds the alternative approaches to the 
theory of government finance. As Buchanan has pointed out, the 
pure theory of government finance may rest on two opposing theories 
of the state.2 In the "organismic" theory the state, including all 
individuals within it, is regarded as an organic entity. In the other 
approach, the "individualistic" one, the state is regarded as the sum 
of / - 
1. Phyllis Deane, "The Geographical Distribution of Assessed Incomes'', 
The Economic JournalJune 1953, pp. 477 -482. The coefficient of 
concentration represents the ratio between (a) the area enclosed by 
the Lorenz curve and the diagonal of perfect equality and (b) the whole 
area between the diagonal of perfect equality and the two sides of the 
square which give the limiting position of perfect inequality. 
2. J.M. Buchanan, "The Pure Theory of Government Finance: A suggested 
Approach ", Journal of Political Economy LVII (Dec.1949), 496 -505, 
reprinted in "Fiscal Theory and Political Economy ", University of 
North Carolina Press, 1960. 
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of its individual members acting in a collective capacity. While 
neither of these approaches to the theory of government is com- 
pletely appropriate when applied to all problems in public finance, 
nor indeed to different aspects of one particular problem, a re- 
cognition of these two fundame ntal concepts of government would 
have prevented these writers from drawing the legitimate distinction 
between the resources of the individual and the authority without at 
the same time appreciating the necessary connection between the 
resources of these two. 
It is evident, therefore, that a prerequisite for devising 
any scheme of equalisation must be knowledge of the nature of the 
tax system or the relationship between the tax and the income of 
the individuals subject to the tax. If the tax imposed were a poll 
tax there could obviously be no question of a scheme of equalisation. 
Again supposing we had a tax system in which only the first £500 of 
individuals' incomes was subjected to tax then if the minimum 
income per taxpayer in each area were £500 no equalisation scheme 
would be called for. If, however, the tax imposed initially has no 
definite measurable relationship with the income of the individual then 
it is not possible to evolve a measure of the taxable resources of the 
authority in such a way as to achieve any meaningful form of 
equalisation. It is also evident that for equalisation schemes 
such as are under discussion here there is no room for the use of 
broad indicators of capacity to pay which may be suitable for other 
purposes, for the concept of the taxable capacity of an authority 
can only be determined in the light of its tax system. The use of 
broad indicators of capacity to pay may result in bringing about a 
greater / - 
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greater distortion of the tax bases than if no adjustment had been 
attempted. As has been indicated, the purpose of these re- 
distributional schemes is not to transfer income from areas of 
high income to areas of low income per se but merely to adjust 
the tax bases of the different areas so as to place all individuals, 
regardless of their income group, in the same position in relation 
to local taxes in whatever area they may choose to reside. 
Under the rating system as operated in this country the 
property tax is levied on the occupier of property, whereas normally 
a property tax is levied on the owner. If the tax were payable by 
ownersI then there would be some logical basis for using rateable 
value per head as the measure of taxable capacity of an area and 
for the Exchequer Equalisation Grant formula, in that it would place 
all owners of property in the same position in relation to local taxes 
irrespective of the area in which their property was situated. This 
relationship between the tax and the owner does not exist and since 
there is no measurable relationship between the tax on the value of 
the property occupied and the income of the ratepayer, it is not 
possible to devise a satisfactory conceptual basis for measuring 
the resources of the rating authority. Although this is evident on 
a priori grounds nevertheless I shall compare rateable values and 
incomes in different regions to see if there is any observable 
relationship between them. 
4. Regional Incomes and Rateable Value per head. 
The 105th Report of the Commissioners of Inland Revenue for 
the / 
1. The extent to which it may be passed on to occupiers is ignored here. 
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the year ended 31st March 1962 (Cmnd. 1906) Tables 135 and 136) 
gives details of personal incomes for tax purposes (1959/60) for 
16 regions in Scotland classified under 17 income ranges. The 
allocation to counties and regions is based on the place of main 
assessment of each person which is generally the place of business 
or employment. Ideally for our purpose income should be on place 
of residence. The figures must therefore be treated with caution 
because of the problem of "commuters". For example, many 
people who work in Glasgow (Lanarkshire area in the tax returns) 
live in Dunbartonshire, Renfrewshire and Ayrshire. This applies 
particularly to the higher income groups. The Forces, Merchant 
Seamen and most Civil Servants are assessed centrally and are 
therefore not included in the regional or county figures. 
If we assume for the moment that rateable value is 
proportional to income then our standard should be income per 
head. The nearest which we can get to this is the average 
assessed income from all sources per taxpayer. This latter 
figure makes no allowance for non -earners such as the unemployed, 
married women and children. To take the total assessed income 
for the region and divide by the population so as to arrive at a 
figure per head of population would be less accurate, however, 
since, because of the "commuters" problem, the total assessed 
income shown for a region does not relate to the actual resident 
population of that region. 
The average assessed income per taxpayer in Scotland was 
£675 as against £740 for England and Wales or 91% of that for England 
and Wales. We cannot test these figures against rateable value per 
head / - 
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head because valuations in the two countries are not comparable 
and also because the basis on which the aggregate grant for the 
two countries is calculated is not related to rateable value. 
Scottish total grant from Exchequer Equalisation Grant and General 
Grant per head was £12.794 as against £10.652 for England and Wales, 
or 120% of that for England and Wales. If we are prepared to say 
that Scotland's needs on the expenditure side are probably greater 
than those of England and Wales, the grant for the two countries 
might be considered to be broadly in the correct relationship. 
Turning now to within Scotland itself, the rateable value 
of authorities may be classified into the following categories - 
(a) dwelling houses or domestic properties; 
(b) shops and commercial properties; 
(c) industrial premises. 
Since the incomes we are dealing with are personal incomes 
we shall test the rateable value of demestic subjects per head of 
population again these. Figures of rateable value for the different 
valuation areas for 1961/62, the first year of revaluation, have been 
provided by the Central Department. These have been grouped to 
coincide with the 16 regions in the Commissioners of Inland Revenue 
Report and then expressed per head of population. The limitations 
of taking larger regional units for comparison will be evident when 
one has regard to the fact that within these regions there exist many 
smaller units for which no information is available on incomes. To 
make a correct assessment for equalisation purposes it is necessary 
to be able to measure the resources of each area which is the subject 
of / - 
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of separate fiscal treatment. 
Table 17 shows the rateable value per head (domestic subjects) 
in descending order of value with the average assessed income per tax- 
payer alongside (rankings are given in brackets) . 
Table No. 17. 7 - 
- 198 - 
Table No. 17. 
R.V. per capita Average Assessed 
- Domestic Sibjects. Income per Taxpayer. 
£ £ 
1. Midlothian 12.513 706.5 (1) 
2. Dunbarton 11.84 6 656.9 (11) 
3. Fife 11.575 657.4 (10) 
4. Angus & Kincardine 10.700 689.8 ( 3) 
5. Renfrew 10.625 686.1 ( 4) 
6. Berwick, East Lothian, 
Peebles, Roxburgh and 
Selkirk 10.371 689.9 ( 2) 
7. Perth 10.354 670.4 ( 7) 
8. Ayr 10.183 653.5 (12) 
9. Argyll and Bute 10.142 645.5 (16) 
10.Clackmannan and Kinross 9.563 666.7 ( 8) 
11. Stirling 9.471 658.1 ( 9) 
12. Lanark 9.317 677.4 ( 6) 
13. Aberdeen, Banff, Moray and 
Nairn 9.183 645.7 (15) 
14. Dumfries, Kirkcudbright and 
Wigtown 8.425 677.9 ( 5) 
15. West Lothian 8.142 652.0 (13) 
16.Caithness, Inverness, Orkney 
Ross and Cromarty, Sutherland 
and Zetland 6.300 646.0 (14) 
It / - 
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It is seen that rateable value per head varies from £6.3 to 
£12.513 while the average assessed income per taxpayer ranges only 
from £645 to £706. Obviously there can be no significant linear 
correlation. The rank correlation co- efficient (Kendall's) is .33 
and is just barely significant1. Rateable value, therefore, is not 
proportional to income. 
Although initially we assumed for the purposes of the foregoing 
investigation / - 
1. The rankings are 16, the value of S observed is 40 and accordingly 




n (n - 1) (2n + 5) 
= Var S = 1 (16 x 15 x 37) = 493.3 
18 
= 22.211 
For S corrected for continuity we have the value 39 and thus 
S (corrected) = 39 
22.211 
= 1.75 
From Appendix Table 3 - M.G. Kendall "Rank Correlation Methods" 
it is seen that the probability of a deviation less than 1.75 is 
about .9599. The probability that 1.75 is obtained or exceeded 
in absolute value is thus about 2(1 - .9599) = .08. This is 
small but not very small. It has a higher than 5 per cent 
probability level. It is suspected therefore that the observed 
value of J is significant but no very definite conclusion can 
be reached. 
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investigation that rates were proportional we know in fact that in broad 
aggregate terms they tend to be regressive. They form a larger pro- 
portion of the incomes of the lower incorre groups than of the higher income 
groups. A possible approach might therefore be to concentrate our invest- 
igation on the lower income groups in the different regions and to disregard 
the higher income groups. This requires some investigation of the income 
distribution structure of authorities. 
The modal income group for the U.K. is £500 - £599. This is 
also the modal income group for Scotland and for all the regions under 
discussion except for Stirling where the modal income group is £600 - 
£699. On the basis of the modal income group little equalisation would 
be required. 
Table 18 shows for the different regions the average assessed 
income per taxpayer for (1) incomes up to and including the modal group, 
(2) incomes up to and including the group £900 to £999, and (3) incomes up 
to and including the £900 to £999 group but including in the £900 to £999 
group all incomes above £999. 
Table No. 18. 
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Table No. 18. 
Average Income per Taxpayer. 
Up to and 
including the 
Modal group 
Up to and 
including the 
£900 -£999 group 
Up to and including 
the £900 -£999 group 
but assuming all 
incomes above £999 
to be £950 
Aberdeen, Banff, Moray 
and Nairn 403 (5) 509 (12) 554 (12) 
Angus and Kincardine 397 (10) 531 ( 9) 581 ( 9) 
Argyll and Bute 383 (16) 488 (16) 542 (16) 
Ayr 400 ( 7) 530 (10) 575 (10) 
Berwick, East Lothian, 
Peebles, Roxburgh and 
Selkirk 400 ( 8) 498 (14) 554 (13) 
Caithness, Inverness, 
Orkney, Ross and Cromarty, 
Sutherland and Zetland 393 (14) 499 (13) 499 (14) 
Clackmannan and Kinross 385 (15) 547 ( 6) 585 ( 8) 
Dumfries , Kirkcudbright, 
Wigtown 401 ( 6) 513 (11) 563 (11) 
Dunbarton 407 ( 3) 556 ( 2) 596 ( 3) 
Fife 411 ( 2) 554 ( 5) 590 ( 6) 
Lanark 394 (13) 544 ( 7) 590 ( 5) 
Midlothian 397 ( 9) 534 ( 8) 588 ( 7) 
Perth 397 (11) 495 (15) 542 
(15) 
Renfrew 396 (12) 556 ( 4) 
606 ( 2) 
Stirling 404 ( 4) 556 ( 3) 
591 ( 4) 
West Lothian 417 (1) 577 (1) 
612 (1) 
Scotland 398 536 
582 
Tables / - 
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Tables 17 and 18 demonstrate the very different rankings, 
which are obtained depending upon which income group is chosen 
as the standard of income. For example, Midlothian which 
occupies first place in Table 17 moves down into 9th, 8th and 
7th place respectively for the three lower income groups shown 
in Table 18. Berwick, etc., which ranks second in Table 17 has 
a ranking of 8, 14 and 13 respectively in Table 18. On the other 
hand West Lothian which ranked 13th in Table 17 moves into first 
place for each of the three groupings in Table 18. These changes 
in rankings arise because of the different regional income distribution 
structures. The different rankings obtainable depending upon the 
particular income group chosen illustrate the importance of what 
has already been said about the necessity for knowing the initial 
relationship between the tax system and the incomes of the 
individuals subject to it. 
As regards the non -domestic subjects, what can be said about 
the relationship between their rateable value and the profits or income 
of the firms? The fundamental difficulty about the rating system is, 
as we know, that the amount payable in rates is not dependent on 
profits. It is well -known that rates form a much larger proportion 
of the income or profits of some businesses than other, e.g., a 
shipbuilding firm as against a bookmaker or commission agent. 
As far as the individuals resident in the area of an authority are 
concerned it might well be argued that they would be at a disadvantage 
vis a vis those in another area if there were not a sufficient proportion 
of rateable value in respect of non -domestic subjects in their area. 
To this extent a case might be made out for providing such areas 
with at least average rateable value per head in respect of non - 
domestic / - 
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non -domestic properties. 
It follows from the foregoing that with a tax system such as 
the rating system it is not possible to evolve a satisfactory concept 
of resources for equalisation purposes. A non -personal tax such as 
a property tax or an indirect tax is not a function of personal incomes. 
It is related to the value of things. Only where the base of the tax 
is the income received by the individual or family unit is it possible 
to adjust the tax base so as to equalise for tax purposes the income 
distribution structure of different regional areas. 
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CHAPTER X. 
CONCLUSION . 
Evaluation of the success of the policy of equalisation 
has been made difficult by the lack of information about the precise 
objectives1 of equalisation and by the conflicting expressions of 
opinion at Government level as to the result which the Exchequer 
Equalisation Grant was intended to achieve. To overcome this 
difficulty I have therefore to some extent been compelled to provide 
my own interpretation of what is meant by equalisation and thereafter 
to examine whether it has been achieved cr whether it is capable of 
achievement within the present framework. 
The conclusion has been reached that in the context in 
which equalisation has been here interpreted no real form of equal- 
isation can be attained based on the rating sys tem. In any scheme 
of equalisation account must be taken both of the "needs" and of the 
resources or taxable capacity of the authority. Essentially there- 
fore / - 
1. For a similar criticism see Report of Working Party on the Formula 
for the Distribution of the General Grant, Society of County 
Borough Treasurers, 1962:- 
"We think we should, at an early point in this report, draw 
attention to a major difficulty under which our investigation 
has been carried out. We do not know why the various facto s 
in the fOmula were adopted, why de factors take the fcr m they 
do nor the basis on which weighting s of the various factors are 
determined. We feel that had information of this nature been 
made available by the Ministry in, say, the White Papers 
published on the general grant, criticism and comment on the 
formula would have been better informed. In the absence of 
such details, any criticisms of the formula which arise from 
our investigation cannot be as constructive as we would wish 
17_ _ ._.. 1 ... I 
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therefore the problem is one of devising, in quantitative terms, 
suitable measures of need on the one hand and of taxable capacity 
or "ability to pay" on the other. "Ability to pay" connotes some 
functional relationship between the tax and the incomes of those 
subject to it and in as much as the amount paid in rates is not 
related to incomes it is not possible to devise a quantitative 
measure of taxable capacity suitable for equalising "ability to pay". 
The concept of equalisation is based on ideas of equity and what- 
ever other attributes the rating system may have, in terms of 
conventional definitions of equity it has little to commend it. 
This suggests that if equalisation is a desired objective 
either (1) the tax base of local authorities requires to be altered 
to one more closely related to the incomes of those subject to the 
tax or (2) the major functions of local authorities which are of a 
national character should be transferred to or wholly financed by 
the central government. Even if the local tax system were to be 
altered to a local incorrE tax the present structixe of local govern- 
ment with its widely varying sizes of administrative units presents 
difficulties in the way of achieving equalisation. It is unlikely, 
however, in view of already expressed Government policy that 
anything in the nature of a local income tax would be acceptable 
in this country. It would seem therefore that the solution must 
lie in a re- examination and re- definition of tle functions of local 
authorities accompanied by a re- organisation and simplification 
of local government based on larger administrative units. The 
whole basis of distribution of government grants in this country 
has become so complicated that even among those who are engaged 
in / - 
- 206 - 
in local finance - officials and members alike - there are 
relatively few who fully understand its workings. 
It would be idle for me to suggest a specific scheme of 
re- organisation of local government based on the results of a 
study such as this for there are many other factors which 
require to be considered in any such re- organisation, the 
most important of which is the role which we expect local 
or regional government to play in this country. It is hoped, 
however, that when this re- organisation does take place it 
will not be left entirely to the administrators to determine its 
form for no re- organisation of local government is likely to 
be successful without adequate consideration being given to 
the financial aspects involved. Indeed, it would seem that 
any re- organisation of the finance of local government would 
best be undertaken as part of a review of the national system 
of public finance and taxation. 
Appendix No. I 
Note on Musgrave's formulae for equalisation 
In Musgrave's formulae the following symbols are used:- 
n number of states 
Ti - taxes collected by ith state, in dollars 
S. subsidy (+ or -) received by the ith state, in dollars 
A. total aoilar outlay by the ith state 
N. index of need in the ith state 
t. tax rate in the ith state 
tc - tax ( +) or subsidy ( -) rate of central government 
required to clear the central budget 
t 
s 
- standard rate 
B. - tax base of ith state 
e minimum outlay per unit of need 
Use of bars indicates averages 
Musgrave's formulae would succeed in equalising the tax bases, expenditures, 
etc., of the 50 states without regard to the differing populations in the 
states. Obviously there would be little point in equalising the tax bases 
of say two states, one of which had half the population of the other. The 
approach should therefore be in per capita terms. 'Per capita" is mentioned 
only once in Musgrave's paper (p. y9) where it is stated: - 
"Plan I. A first and rather primitive approach to equalisation 
is one where the central government equalises actual per capita 
dollar outlays on state services in all states 
Since/ 
I R.A. Musgrave op. cit. p. 98. 
2 
Since it is the object of central government policy to 
equalise the outlay Ai in all states, it must meet the 
condition Ai - iAI.' 
But this would be to equalise total dollar outlays per state not 
per capita dollar outlays. For Musgrave's formulae to achieve the desired 
result it is necessary to alter the definition of the above symbols to be 
read in per capita terms as is done on page 7 of this thesis, and to add 
he symbol pi - population of ith authority. Also the use of bars should 
indicate weighted averages, e.g.:- 
B - iBipi) 
Pi 
The important point to note is that in dealing in per capita terms 
it is not sufficient to take a straight arithmetic average of the per capita 
items in order to obtain our average per capita term. 
Example 
Total Tax Base Population Per Capita Tax Base 
A. £ 200,000 500 £ 400 
B. 130,000 600 300 
C. 400,000 600 500 
0. 770,000 1,100 700 
£1,550,000 3,000 £1,900 







The average tax base - 3,000 
- £516.66 
3 
Appendix No, 2 
3rd Provisional Calculation 1959/6O 
Computation of Total Grant fur Scotland 
England and Wales LexcIuding London) 
Weighted population (1959/60) (Note 1) 52,015,001 
Population (Mid. 1959) 42,135,000 
Relevant local expenditure 625,142,789 
Rate deficiency grants 88708,211 
Rate -borne expenditure £536.434,578 
Scotland 
Weighted population excluding weighting for rapidly increasing population 
(li546U) mote 1) 6,633,783 
Population (Mid. 1359) 5 Í9I,660 
Relevant local expenditure £85,295,061 
Less cost of collection of rates other than commission to owners and occupiers (Note 2) 490,355 
84,804,706 
Add Part V payments lNote 2) 2,274,065 




x R.L.E. . and Wales) R. L .. (S) 





Notional Rate -borne (S) P' (S x Rate -borne (Eng. and Wales) 





Notional Exchequer Grant (S) Notional R.L.E.(S) - Notional 
Rate -borne (S) 
£79,728,135 66,018,394 
£13,709,791 
Notional Exchequer Grant (S) 






Total Exchequer Grant (S) 
Deduct Exchequer 
Transitional Grant 




Notes (1) For this purpose the weightings 
are calculated on the sane basis, 
i.e. the Scottish weighting excluding 
that for rapidly increasing 
population. 
(2) The relevant Local Expenditure 
is adjusted for Costs of Collection 
and Part V payments to make it comparable 
with the English relevant 
local expenditure. 
Appendix No. 3 
Minor Grants discontinued on introduction 
of General Grant 
Applicable to England and Scotland:. 
Compensation for loss of fees from the licensing of 
hackney carriages, trolley vehicles, etc. 
Portable wheel weighters 
Rodent control 
Salaries, etc. of highway engineers and surveyors 
Applicable to England only:- 
Compensation for loss of rates on 
tithe rant charge 
Special Welsh Grant for education 
Grant in aid of the compensation to dairy 
tarmers for destruction of infected milk 
5 
Appendix No. 4 
Wei.htin s for ratio of landward to total 
for pupils per miles of roads 
o ulation and 
(Second Schedule - Local Government and Miscellaneous Financial 
Provisions (Scotland) Act 1958) 
Additions are made to the civilian population as follows:- 
Proportion of population in landward 
area of county to total population 
;cage 
of population 
85 per cent and over 75 
Under 85 per cent and not under 75 per cent 50 
' 75 ' 70 ' 25 
' 70 1 ' 60 ' 15 
' 60 " " 50 ' 5 
50 o Nil 
troportion of pupils to miles of road 
Under 2.5 to I 50 
' 3.0 to I and not under 2.5 to 
4.4 
' 3.5 to ' 3.0 to 
45 
s 4.0 to ' 3.5 to 
42i 
4.5 to ' 4.0 to 40 
' 5.0 to ' 4.5 to 
37* 
' 5,5 to 5.0 to 
35 
I 5.0 to 5.5 to 
32t 
' b.5 to ' 6.0 to 
30 
" 7.0 to 6.5 to 
27i 
7.5 to 7.0 to 
25 
8.0 to ' 7.5 to 
22# 
" 8.5 to ' 8.0 to 
20 
" y.0 to I 
8.5 to 
17# 
'v.5 to I ' 9.0 to 
15 
' 10.0 to I ' 
9.5 to 
12i 
' 10.5 to I ' 
10.0 to 
le 
I II.J to I ' 
10.5 to 
7i 
' 11.5 to I " 
11.0 to 5 
' I[.0 to I " 
11.5 to 
2 
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